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I. INTRODUCTION 
With the callousness of an unfeeling coroner, Nietzsche announced a 
dramatic societal shift with a simple three-word phrase: “God is dead.”1  
Regardless of the metaphysical validity of Nietzsche’s statement, he 
illuminated a fundamental truth in Western civilization—the declining role 
of the Augustinian model of God2 as a functional all defining and exclusive 
paradigm, which provides absolute and definitive meaning to the world.  
With the traditional image of God and religion being subsumed in the 
United States beneath a potent force of materialistic progress, relativist/ 
postmodernist thought, alternative scientific paradigms for defining the 
world, and exploding cultural and religious diversity,3 the courts face an 
increasingly varied and complicated religious environment.  Within that 
dynamic, religion, including traditional religion, remains a powerful force.4  
Defined by “its diversity and radical pluralism,”5 the United States, in large 
part due to the religious liberty available in this nation, has the most diverse 
religious landscape in the world.6 
 
1. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE GAY SCIENCE 167 (Walter Kaufmann trans., 1974) (1882). 
2. Augustine’s understanding of God is of an all encompassing unitary figure, who is, 
[t]he greatest and the best, mightiest, almighty, most merciful and most just, utterly 
hidden and utterly present, most beautiful and most strong, abiding yet mysterious, 
suffering no change and changing all things: . . . gathering all things to Thee and 
needing none; sustaining and fulfilling and protecting, creating and nourishing and 
making perfect; ever seeking though lacking nothing. 
AUGUSTINE, THE CONFESSIONS OF ST. AUGUSTINE 5 (F.J. Sheed trans., 1943). 
3. Andrew Koppelman, Secular Purpose, 88 VA. L. REV. 87, 125 (2002) (“The United States 
is not a purely theistic nation; this country is home to 1,032,000 Hindus, 1,150,000 atheists, and 
2,450,000 Buddhists.” (citing BRITANNICA BOOK OF THE YEAR 801 (2001)); see Steele v. 
Blackman, 236 F.3d 130, 132 n.2 (3d Cir. 2001) (“1,558 religious groups sufficiently stable and 
distinctive to be identified as one of the existing religions in this country.” (citing J. GORDON 
MELTON, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN RELIGIONS 870-71 (1991)); Note, Toward a 
Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1056, 1069 & n.78 (1978) [hereinafter 
Harvard Note] (“In 1960 there existed ‘more than 400 more or less definitely organized bodies . . . 
[not including] the multitude of store-front churches, local sects, cults, and unclassifiable quasi-
religious associations which operate ephemerally but often vigorously in the American scene. . . .’ 
The listed groups ranged in size from the 35-million-member Roman Catholic communion to the 
Church of Jesus Christ (Cutler) with a single congregation of sixteen members.” (citing A. 
Jamison, Religions on the Christian Perimeter, in 1 RELIGION IN AMERICAN LIFE 162, 167 (J. 
Smith & A. Jamison eds., 1961)). 
4. Grant H. Morris & Ansar Haroun, “God Told Me to Kill”: Religion or Delusion?, 38 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 973, 979 (2001) (“We were a religious country when our country was founded; we 
continue to be a religious country today.  A recent Newsweek poll revealed that eighty-four 
percent of adult Americans believe that God performs miracles and forty-eight percent report that 
they personally have experienced or witnessed a miracle.” (citing What Miracles Mean, 
NEWSWEEK, May 2000, at 55-56)). 
5. Harvard Note, supra note 3, at 1069 n.77 (citing S. AHLSTROM, A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF 
THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 3-4 (1972)). 
6. John C. Knechtle, If We Don’t Know What It Is, How Do We Know If It’s Established?, 41 
BRANDEIS L.J. 521, 522 (2003) (citing DIANA L. ECK, A NEW RELIGIOUS AMERICA: HOW A 
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Protecting religious liberty from governmental encroachment, the First 
Amendment to the United States Constitution begins with the guarantee that 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”  Thomas Jefferson described “the 
constitutional freedom of religion as ‘the most inalienable and sacred of all 
human rights.’”7  Jefferson is not the only American then, or now, that 
would agree with this statement.  Professor Mary Ann Glendon has indi-
cated that although legal academics do not normally give religious liberty 
such primacy, the American people generally believe that religious freedom 
is the most important right enshrined in the Constitution.8 
Although the significance of religious liberty in the United States is of 
paramount importance, confusion surrounds the core of this protection be-
cause uncertainty exists as to what exactly constitutes “religion.”  Courts 
often assume religion is implicated in a case, or presume that it is not, with-
out expressly defining the term, and commentators, despite numerous 
scholarly efforts, have been unable to reach any consensus as to the mean-
ing of religion under the First Amendment.9  The United States Supreme 
Court has noted that defining what is religious is a delicate and difficult 
task.10  Courts struggling with the changing religious climate in the United 
States have offered divergent formulations and made varying assumptions 
about what constitutes a religion.  Beginning in the 1940s, courts started to 
look beyond traditional legal tools to define religion turning to psycho-
logists such as William James, and in the 1960s to theologians like Paul 
Tillich. 
This article attempts to explore from many vantage points one word 
within one context—the word “religion” in the First Amendment of the 
United States Constitution.  The article begins with placing our understand-
ing of religion in a historical context.  By exploring the history of religious 
liberty in the colonies and the Founders’ view thereof, an understanding of 
what the Founders were seeking to protect by safeguarding religious liberty 
will be gained.  Having established this framework, the article then 
 
“CHRISTIAN COUNTRY” HAS BECOME THE WORLD’S MOST RELIGIOUSLY DIVERSE NATION 
(HarperSanFrancisco, 2001)). 
7. Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional Discourse, 
140 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 153 (1991) (quoting Thomas Jefferson, Freedom of Religion at the 
University of Virginia, in THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON 957, 958 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1969)) 
[hereinafter Smith, Rise and Fall]. 
8. Id. at 153 n.12 (citing Mary Ann Glendon, Law, Communities, and the Religious Freedom 
Provisions of the Constitution, Address to the Bicentennial Conference on the Religion Clauses 
(May 30, 1991)). 
9. See Marilyn Perrin, Note, Lee v. Weisman: Unanswered Prayers, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 207, 
233 n.197 (1994). 
10. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981). 
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addresses overarching issues that complicate the quest to define religion.  
Then, the article transitions into an exploration of the development of the 
definition of religion in both federal and state courts.  Changes in the defini-
tion of religion are traced from the early interpretations to more recent 
formulations.  Next, this article addresses how courts, since the 1940s, have 
been reaching beyond the traditional tools of legal analysis to define reli-
gion by drawing upon and applying formulations of what constitutes 
religion that have been offered by scholars in disciplines outside the legal 
field.  Theologian Paul Tillich, psychologist William James, and sociologist 
Emile Durkheim are three of the most frequent sources of inspiration, but 
are not the only examples.  This article demonstrates their continuing influ-
ence on courts’ understanding of what constitutes religion.  Finally, by 
drawing on insights from other disciplines, by reaching deeper within these 
fields than the courts have already gone, this article discusses problems 
with the definitions of religion that have been embraced by courts.  But 
destroying, postmodernist deconstructionism, is easier than creating, and 
creation is necessary for the formulation of jurisprudence.11  Therefore, 
drawing on understandings reached throughout this article and insights 
from other disciplines, which have already explored some of the same 
issues that courts are struggling with, this article will offer seven principles 
that will, hopefully, lead to a better understanding of the definition of 
religion under the First Amendment. 
II. RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: THE 
COLONIES AND THE FOUNDERS 
In trying to understand the meaning of the term religion in the First 
Amendment, history is the beginning of our quest, for in this context, as 
often is the case, “[a] page of history is worth a volume of logic.”12  In 
striving to understand what religion is, the free exercise of which is pro-
tected and the establishment of which is prohibited by the First Amend-
ment, it is important to consider why the Founders chose to protect 
religious liberty.  Knowing the answer to this question helps reveal the 
contours of what it is the Founders were trying to protect and why they 
were trying to protect it.  As a general matter, 
[l]egal enactments should be interpreted to effectuate their pur-
poses.  But a law’s “purpose” arises out of, and is a projection of, 
 
11. See Owen M. Fiss, The Death of the Law?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 9-16 (1986) (criti-
cizing the deconstructionist project of critical legal studies and cautioning of its deleterious 
impact). 
12. New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921). 
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its justification.  Therefore, if we cannot articulate a convincing 
justification for the commitment to religious freedom then we 
cannot know its purpose, and we are accordingly paralyzed in our 
efforts to interpret the commitment.13 
Simply stated, because the Supreme Court, “[i]n light of America’s unique 
founding history,” has deemed “it imperative that constitutional jurispru-
dence retain a loyal faithfulness to those who were central to the conception 
and subsequent drafting of the nation’s religious liberty protections,” his-
tory cannot be ignored.14  Indeed, having noted that “[t]he word ‘religion’ is 
not defined in the Constitution,” the Supreme Court has indicated that there 
is nowhere more appropriate than history to turn for its meaning.15 
A. RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN THE COLONIES 
In examining this history, it is important to look not only at the 
Framers’ ideas of religious liberty, but also the context they were drawing 
upon, namely the traditions and practices of the colonies.  As stated by 
Justice Rutledge, “[n]o provision of the Constitution is more closely tied to 
or given content by its generating history than the religious clause of the 
First Amendment.  It is at once the refined product and the terse summation 
of that history.”16  Justice Rutledge explained that this history “includes not 
only Madison’s authorship and the proceedings before the First Congress, 
but also the long and intensive struggle for religious freedom in 
America.”17  Similarly, Justice Scalia has declared “that fortress which is 
our Constitution, cannot possibly rest upon the changeable philosophical 
predilections of the Justices of this Court, but must have deep foundations 
in the historic practices of our people.”18  Simply stated, to understand the 
First Amendment, it is important to consider the historical environment 
from which it emerged.19  The religious liberty, or lack thereof, of the 
American colonies and the changes the people of the colonies experienced 
tells us much about the context in which the First Amendment was framed 
 
13. Smith, Rise and Fall, supra note 7, at 223. 
14. Richard Albert, American Separationism and Liberal Democracy: The Establishment 
Clause in Historical and Comparative Perspective, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 867, 868 (2005).  Thus, it 
is not surprising that it has been declared that “[t]here is a seemingly irresistible impulse . . . to 
appeal to history when analyzing issues under the religion clauses.”  Id. (quoting JOHN E. NOWAK 
ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1031 (3d ed., 1986)). 
15. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162 (1878). 
16. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 33 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting). 
17. Id. 
18. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 632 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
19. Conor B. Dugan, Note, Religious Liberty in Spain and the United States: A Comparative 
Study, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1675, 1696 (2003). 
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and ratified, offering insight into “the long and intensive struggle for 
freedom in America.”20  As stated by now Tenth Circuit Judge Michael 
McConnell, the religion clauses “cannot be understood or appreciated 
without knowing what happened before.”21 
In the mother country during the seventeenth century while British 
colonization of America was beginning, religious intolerance and oppres-
sion was omni-present.22  With the Church of England as the official 
religion, the government acted to suppress dissent from both extreme 
Protestantism and Roman Catholicism.23  After a civil war that resulted in 
Charles I being deposed and executed,24 “[P]arliament took it upon itself to 
rewrite the prayer book and confession of faith, dissolve the episcopal 
structure of the Church, and confiscate the property of the bishoprics.”25  
Not only were Roman Catholics the target of suspicion and suppression, but 
“Baptist leaders were imprisoned, and ministers who insisted on frequent 
use of the prayer book were ejected from clerical office.”26  With the resto-
ration of the monarchy in 1660, the Church of England was reconstituted.27  
The Test Act of 1672 limited public and military office to Anglicans and 
“required officeholders to swear an oath in court denying transubstan-
tiation[,] . . . acknowledging the King’s supremacy over the Church[,] and 
to present proof that they had taken communion within the preceding year 
in accordance with the rites of the Church of England.”28  Under the 
Toleration Act of 1688, Anglicans retained a favored position and Catholics 
continued to be targeted with repressive measures, but official suppression 
of Protestant sects ceased.29 
 
20. Everson, 330 U.S. at 33. 
21. Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of 
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1421 (1990). 
22. See id. 
23. Id. 
24. See generally Kings and Queens of the United Kingdom, Charles I, http://www. 
royal.gov.uk/OutPut/Page76.asp (last visited Mar. 22, 2006) (providing background information 
on Charles I and the Civil War that led to his removal from power and execution). 
25. McConnell, supra note 21, at 1421. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. at 1421-22. 
29. Id. at 1422.  The Act for Further Preventing the Growth of Popery is one example of the 
continuing suppression of Roman Catholicism in Britain.  See CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA, Penal 
Laws, available at http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/11611c.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2006). 
The “Act for further preventing the growth of Popery” (11 & 12 Gul. III, 4), passed in 
1699, introduced a fresh hardship into the lives of the clergy by offering a reward of 
100 pounds for the apprehension of any priest, with the result that Catholics were 
placed at the mercy of common informers who harassed them for the sake of gain, 
even when the Government would have left them in peace.  It was further enacted that 
any bishop or priest exercising episcopal or sacerdotal functions, or any Catholic 
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A variety of approaches to the relationship between religion and the 
government developed in the colonies, in part because “English religious 
policy did not automatically extend to the colonies.”30  As a result, in the 
period before the proposal and ratification of the religion clauses, the 
colonies 
experienced 150 years of a higher degree of religious diversity 
than had existed anywhere else in the world.  They had . . . seen 
the results of religious conflict in England and of a variety of 
approaches to church-state relations in the colonies, ranging from 
near-theocracy to religious pluralism to state domination of the 
church.31 
Experiences in the American colonies would serve “as laboratories for the 
exploration of different approaches to religion and government.”32 
When English settlers arrived in America, the idea of separation of 
church and state was largely without precedent and perhaps even beyond 
contemplation.33  Founded largely for economic rather than religious mo-
tives,34 the charter for Jamestown, the first permanent English colony in 
North America, nevertheless, demonstrated a deep concern for bringing 
Christianity to the native population.35  Virginia, originally governed under 
a royal charter that was granted to a group of investors who held governing 
rights over the colony, became a royal colony in 1624, which placed it 
under the direct control of the English Crown.36  In becoming a royal 
colony, the Anglican Church became the official church and would remain 
 
keeping a school, should be imprisoned for life; that any Catholic over eighteen not 
taking the Oaths of Supremacy and Allegiance, or making the Declaration against 
Popery, should be incapable of inheriting or purchasing any lands; and any lands 
devised to a Catholic who refused to take the oaths should pass to the next of kin who 
happened to be a Protestant.  A reward of 100 pounds was also offered for the 
conviction of any Catholic sending children to be educated abroad. 
Id. 
30. McConnell, supra note 21, at 1422. 
31. Id. at 1421. 
32. Id. 
33. CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES ON FREEDOM OF RELIGION: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1 
(John J. Patrick & Gerald P. Long eds., 1999) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES]. 
34. Although Jamestown was not founded for religious purposes, from the outset religious 
law was applied in the Jamestown colony.  Arlin M. Adams & Charles J. Emmerich, A Heritage 
of Religious Liberty, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1559, 1562-63 (1989) (“[T]he first English legal code in 
the New World, required daily church attendance and imposed harsh penalties for blasphemy, 
Sabbath-breaking, and speaking maliciously against the Trinity, God’s holy word, or Christian 
doctrine.”). 
35. THE FIRST CHARTER OF VIRGINIA (Apr. 10, 1606), available at http://www. 
yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/states/va01.htm. 
36. 13 ORIGINALS: FOUNDING THE AMERICAN COLONIES, available at http://www. 
timepage.org/spl/13colony.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2006). 
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so until the American Revolution.37  The Anglican Church’s position as the 
official church meant that taxes had to be paid through the colonial govern-
ment to support the Anglican Church and its ministers; also, conformity 
with church laws was required, including mandatory church attendance, and 
the colonial government was enlisted to punish deviance or dissent from 
Anglican rules.38  The Anglican Church itself, however, was not dominant; 
rather, the colonial government controlled the official Church in the colony 
and utilized it as a means of social control.39  During the seventeenth cen-
tury, few dissenters came to the colony of Virginia, which resulted in few, 
but significant, acts of overt religious coercion by the government.40  By 
“the eighteenth century, Virginia was the most intolerant of the colonies.”41  
It developed this reputation when the eighteenth century brought increased 
immigration to Virginia including immigration by religious dissenters, 
especially by Presbyterians and Baptists, who were confronted by authori-
ties that blocked their ability to preach as well as by acts of violence.42 
New England’s settlers were Puritans, Congregationalist Calvinists, 
who had suffered persecution for their dissent against Anglican beliefs and 
practices.43  They had tried, but had been unsuccessful in attempting to 
eliminate what they regarded as Roman Catholic elements from the Church 
of England.44  Seeking to gain freedom for their Congregationalist faith and 
to establish what they believed would be truly a Christian Common-
wealth,45 the Puritans adhered to a religiously dictated governance of their 
 
37. CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES, supra note 33, at 1. 
38. Id. at 1-2; see Adams & Emmerich, supra note 34, at 1563 (“This establishment was 
demonstrated by public support, glebe lands, compulsory church attendance, punishment of 
blasphemy, religious test oaths, and the suppression of dissenting views.”). 
39. McConnell, supra note 21, at 1423. 
40. Id.  Lord Baltimore, who was Catholic, and Puritan ministers attempting to serve a small 
Puritan community in Virginia were expelled.  Id.  The government also approved of laws allow-
ing for the expulsion of Quakers, but there is little evidence to suggest that this was actually 
carried out.  Id. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. 
43. CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES, supra note 33, at 2. 
44. Adams & Emmerich, supra note 34, at 1562-63. 
45. See Mark G. Valencia, Take Care of Me When I Am Dead: A Examination of American 
Church-State Development and the Future of American Religious Liberty, 49 SMU L. REV. 1579, 
1585 (1996). 
Puritans believed that God created society as a unified whole.  Church and state, the 
individual and the public, are not unrelated spheres of life but are complementary, 
intimately connected by God’s acts of creation and his continuing providence.  This 
conviction lay behind the Puritan effort to reform all of English society.  It also 
provided the stimulus for the Puritan effort to fashion colonies in the New World in 
which all parts of colonial life would reflect the glory of God. . . . [I]t led to the high-
handedness and intolerance that Puritans sometimes displayed in both Britain and 
America when they were in control.  Since they presumed to know the will of God so 
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churches and governmental institutions.46  Each town constituted a 
congregation that would select its own minister and maintain its minister 
and his church through taxes.47  Calvinist ministers “were accorded a high 
degree of autonomy from civil control, and indeed frequently lectured 
colonial authorities on their civic and spiritual derelictions.”48 
New England’s Puritans, “[h]aving carved their communities out of the 
rocky wilderness of a distant land[,] . . . saw no reason to allow ungodly 
individuals to spoil their vision of a Christian commonwealth.”49  Having 
“fled England from fear of religious oppression, [the Puritans] replicated 
the very conditions of religious intolerance from which they sought safe 
harbor in America.”50  The Puritans “who crossed the Atlantic did so not to 
found a civilization where all religions would be tolerated, but rather to live 
 
clearly, they felt it was only right that they could force others to comply, even if those 
others did not understand God the same way they did. 
Id. 
46. McConnell, supra note 21, at 1422.  Plymouth Bay’s separatist Puritans entirely rejected 
the Church of England and its teachings demonstrating 
their commitment to higher law, a social compact based on covenantal theology, and 
government by consent in the Mayflower Compact of 1620.  The nonseparatist 
Puritans who founded the Massachusetts Bay Colony still recognized the Anglican 
establishment and were less tolerant than their Pilgrim brethren, setting up a 
theocentric commonwealth premised on Old Testament law.  Their magistrates and 
ministers cooperated in expelling dissenters, enforcing church attendance, limiting the 
electoral franchise to church members, and supporting the Congregational churches 
through taxation. 
Adams & Emmerich, supra note 34, at 1563. 
47. McConnell, supra note 21, at 1422. 
48. Id. 
49. Id.  Nathaniel Ward, who was an attorney, minister, and compiler of the code of statutes 
for the colonial Massachusetts’ The Body of Liberties, strongly criticized any notion of toleration 
of incorrect religions.  Answers.com, Nathaniel Ward, http://www.answers.com/topic/ward-
nathaniel (last visited Mar. 25, 2006).  Ward argued “[t]hat State is wise, that will improve all 
paines and patience rather to compose, then tolerate differences in Religion.”  Nathaniel Ward, 
The Simple Cobbler of Aggawamm in America (London, 1647), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN 
HISTORY TOLD BY CONTEMPORARIES 393-96 (Hart ed., 1898), available at http://www. 
swarthmore.edu/SocSci/bdorsey1/41docs/55-war html.  See Valencia, supra note 45, at 1587 
(citing THE AMERICAN PURITANS 98 (Perry Miller ed., 1956)). 
John Cotton, a seventeenth century Puritan leader, explained that “toleration made the 
world anti-Christian.”  He went on to exhort: “My heart has naturally detested . . . 
toleration of diverse religions, or of one religion in segregate shapes.”  Cotton further 
stated that the only liberty the established sect owed to dissidents was “the liberty to 
keep away from us.” 
Id. 
50. Albert, supra note 14, at 882.  “[A]s one scholar has commented with regard to the 
American experience, ‘persecuted groups, when they finally escape and gain an ascendancy of 
their own, have a tendency to persecute others with the same enthusiasm from which they had 
previously suffered.’”  Id. at 895 (citing Wendy Dackson & Richard Hooker, American Religious 
Liberty, 41 J. CHURCH & ST. 117 (1999)); see Valencia, supra note 45, at 1585 (“Puritans, aside 
from a few exceptions, adopted a creed that turned out to be contrary to the interests of religious 
liberty and as oppressive as the Church of England.”). 
      
2007] DEFINING RELIGION 133 
according to their own religious beliefs free from oppression.”51  Thus, they 
created a framework in which religious freedom existed for Congregation-
alists, but not other faiths.52  As but one of many examples, for the first 
sixty years of the colony, only Puritans were allowed to vote; even 
Anglicans, members of the official religion of the mother country, were 
denied the franchise.53  Initially, there was no room in the Puritans’ vision 
for religious pluralism or tolerance; dissenters were persecuted to such an 
extent that banishment and execution were not unknown.54  Nevertheless, 
their rejection of ecclesiastical courts and distinguishing between civil and 
religious authority contributed to the future course of religious liberty in the 
colonies.55 
New England was not without dissent.  Roger Williams, who had been 
banished from Massachusetts along with John Clarke,56 gathered dissenters 
 
51. Albert, supra note 14, at 882. 
52.  CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES, supra note 33, at 2. 
53. Ann M. Burkhart, The Constitutional Underpinnings of Homelessness, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 
211, 235-36 (2003). 
Decades of royal pressure were required to eliminate the religious voting restriction.  
The Crown was disturbed that an English colony denied political rights to Church of 
England members and that restrictions on religious practices were more stringent in 
Massachusetts than in England.  In 1662, King Charles II ordered the Puritans to 
eliminate the religious restriction on the vote.  After two years of royal pressure, the 
Puritans purported to eliminate the restriction but, in reality, did not do so.  In lieu of 
an express religious requirement, the vote was limited to men who were (1) at least 
twenty-four years old, (2) admitted as an inhabitant by a town in the colony, (3) a 
householder, (4) a freeholder, (5) a property taxpayer, (6) religiously orthodox, (7) 
“not vicious,” (8) in possession of “a certificate from all the ministers of his town 
proving his religious and moral qualifications” and of a certificate from a majority of 
the local government officials confirming his status as a freeholder and taxpayer, and 
(9) accepted by a majority vote of the general court.  Understandably, the King and his 
commissioners were not amused. The commissioners were particularly appalled that 
“those who came to America to establish liberty of conscience . . . later denied it to 
others, in order that their own enjoyments might not be disturbed.”  In 1691, after 
sixty years of the Puritans’ monopolistic control of government and decades of royal 
pressure, the religious restriction on the franchise was eliminated in Massachusetts. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
54. McConnell, supra note 21, at 1423. 
55. Adams & Emmerich, supra note 34, at 1563-64. 
56. Two ministers Roger Williams, a Puritan, and John Clarke, a Baptist, founded Rhode 
Island.  Williams devoted himself to setting forth in writing a theological condemnation of 
religious persecution and the separation of church and state.  Id. at 1564-65.  In his work The 
Bloudy Tenent, of Persecution, for Cause of Conscience, in 1644, Williams argued: 
[A]n enforced uniformity of religion throughout a nation or civil state, confounds the 
civil and religious, denies the principles of Christianity and civility, and that Jesus 
Christ is come in the flesh.  [And that], the permission of other consciences and 
worships than a state professes, only can (according to God) procure a firm and lasting 
peace, (good assurance being taken according to the wisdom of the civil state for 
uniformity of civil obedience from all sorts.). 
Id. at 1565. 
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together in creating Rhode Island.57  Williams preached that a variety of 
paths existed to God, and that people should be free to select their own 
path.58  The royal charter Williams obtained from King Charles II in 1663 
contained a guarantee of the separation of religion and government and 
freedom of conscience.59  Despite the broadness of its charter’s guarantee, 
Rhode Island imposed restrictions on both Jews, who could not become 
citizens, and Catholics, who could not hold public office.60  Nevertheless, 
Rhode Island became a haven for many religious dissenters.61 
Rhode Island, however, was not the only new world haven for 
dissenters; rather, Maryland initially offered religious toleration to all sects 
of Christianity.62  George Calvert, also known as Lord Baltimore, and his 
son Cecilus Calvert founded Maryland in the hopes of providing a place for 
Catholics to escape the persecution that they endured in England and in 
other American colonies.63  The Maryland Toleration Act of 1649 provided, 
in part: 
no person . . . whatsoever within this Province . . . professing to 
believe in Jesus Christ, shall . . . be any ways troubled, Molested 
or discountenanced for or in respect of his or her religion nor in 
the free exercise thereof . . . nor any way compelled to the belief or 
exercise of any other Religion against his or her consent . . . .64 
However, the Maryland Toleration Act did not survive long, and by 1689 
“the proprietor was removed and the Protestant majority in Maryland 
established the Church of England and initiated a program of discrimination 
and intolerance toward dissenters, particularly Roman Catholics.  In the 
eighteenth century, Maryland rivaled Virginia for the narrowness and 
intolerance of its laws.”65 
 
57. CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES, supra note 33, at 3. 
58. Id. 
59. Id.  The Rhode Island Charter of 1663 provides, in part, as follows: 
No person, within said colony, at any time hereafter, shall be any wise molested, 
punished, disquieted, or called in question, for any differences in opinion in matters of 
religion, and do not actually disturb the civil peace of our said colony; but that all and 
every person and persons may . . . have and enjoy his and their own judgments and 
consciences, in matters of religious concernments; . . . they behaving themselves 
peaceable and quietly and not using this liberty to licentiousness and profaneness, nor 
to the civil injury or outward disturbance of others; any law . . . . 
Rhode Island Charter (1663), in CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES, supra note 33, at 16. 
60. McConnell, supra note 21, at 1425-26. 
61. CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES, supra note 33, at 3. 
62. McConnell, supra note 21, at 1424. 
63. CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES, supra note 33, at 14. 
64. Maryland Toleration Act (1649), in CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES, supra note 33, at 15. 
65. McConnell, supra note 21, at 1424. 
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A similar fate befell efforts at toleration in the Carolinas.  Inspired by 
John Locke, who helped the influential Lord Ashley write the Fundamental 
Constitutions of the Carolinas in 1669, the Carolinas proprietors, though 
declaring the Church of England to be the true church, attempted to provide 
religious liberty to colonists of different faiths.66  Other than atheists, “per-
sons of ‘different opinions concerning matters of religion,’” were welcomed 
into the Carolinas.67  The Fundamental Constitutions, which were never ful-
ly put into effect, included protection for “‘Jews, heathens, and other 
dissenters from the purity of Christian religion,’ as well as to the ‘natives of 
that place.’”68  However, the protection for religious liberty did not extend 
to those who failed to embrace any religion, nor did it cover individu-
alistic/non-institutionalized belief.69  All residents had to be a member of a 
church and could not join multiple churches.70  As to what could constitute 
a church, “any seven or more persons agreeing in any religion, shall 
constitute a church or profession.”71  However, to be a religion, three tenets 
had to be embraced: (1) the existence of God; (2) that God is to be publicly 
worshipped; and, (3) every church or profession of faith needed an outward 
manner in which their members were to publicly worship God.72  The 
system of the Fundamental Constitutions was never fully implemented or 
put into effect, but the Carolinas did serve for a period of time as a religious 
haven for dissenters in the seventeenth century before becoming more 
restrictive in the early eighteenth century.73 
Like the Carolinas and Virginia, Georgia eventually became a state in 
which the Church of England was the official established religion.  The 
Trustees of Georgia supported the Church of England by financing and 
supervising ministers, building churches, and encouraging attendance and 
support for religion.74  However, unlike in Virginia, “the Georgia Trustees 
demonstrated remarkable tolerance toward Protestant dissenters [and] Jews. 
 
66. Id. at 1428. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. at 1429.  The Fundamental Constitutions even extended protection for the religious 
liberty of slaves, who were to be “free to select ‘what church or profession any of them shall think 





73. Id. at 1425.  Disagreement exists about the state of affairs in the Carolinas.  Judge 
McConnell argues that by the early eighteenth century, North and South Carolina “instituted a 
rigid establishment of the Church of England along lines parallel to Virginia’s.”  Id.  Judge Adams 
insists that establishment in the Carolinas was not formidable, more akin to Georgia than Virginia.  
Adams & Emmerich, supra note 34, at 1567. 
74. McConnell, supra note 21, at 1424. 
      
136 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 83:123 
(Savannah contained a substantial Jewish community, which was allowed 
to worship in peace and participate in public affairs.)”75  Catholics, how-
ever, were excluded from the colony.76  From its founding, Georgia was 
home to and welcomed adherents of a broad variety of faiths, including 
numerous Anglicans, Lutherans, Presbyterians, and Jews.77  One of the 
more intriguing elements of Georgia’s government/religion relationship 
was that non-established religious groups also “received governmental 
funding and support for their own endeavors (including land grants, salaries 
for ministers, and some control over church and civil governance).”78 
Religious pluralism experienced its strongest adherence and greatest 
impact in the middle colonies “where no church was established (except in 
the four counties of metropolitan New York) and the widest range of 
religious persuasions lived in relative harmony.”79  William Penn’s80 
colony of Pennsylvania was particularly associated with religious liberty, in 
part, because of Penn’s popular and widely read work The Great Case of 
Liberty of Conscience, which had been published in 1670.81  Under the 
1701 Charters of Privileges, though limiting public office to Christians, 
Pennsylvania protected the religious practice of all theists.82  
Pennsylvania’s assurances of toleration contributed to generating 
immigration levels higher than any other colony, resulting in great 
prosperity.83  Pennsylvania’s approach to religious liberty was therefore 
noticed by citizens of neighboring colonies.84  For example, Madison came 




77. Joel A. Nichols, Religious Liberty in the Thirteenth Colony: Church-State Relations in 
Colonial and Early National Georgia, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1693, 1694 (2005). 
78. Id. 
79. McConnell, supra note 21, at 1429-30. 
80. William Penn had been punished in England for his Quaker religious beliefs. 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES, supra note 33, at 4.  While Penn was in prison for his preaching, he 
wrote a defense of religious liberty entitled The Great Case of Liberty of Conscience.  Id.  He 
argued that religious liberty was critical because coerced religion was of little, or no value.  Id.  
With the British Monarch in debt to Penn’s father, he was released and was awarded an area of 
America that would become Pennsylvania.  Id.  Penn moved forward with plans to make this area 
into a haven for Quakers and other dissenters, who had been persecuted by established faiths.  Id. 
81. McConnell, supra note 21, at 1430.  “Combining the roles of religious leader and politi-
cal statesman, Penn expounded his views on religious liberty in numerous tracts.  In the most 
famous of these, The Great Case of Liberty of Conscience (1671), he stressed that coercion of 
conscience destroyed authentic religious experience and ‘directly invade[d] the Divine Preroga-
tive.’”  Adams & Emmerich, supra note 34, at 1566-67. 
82. McConnell, supra note 21, at 1430. 
83. Id.; Adams & Emmerich, supra note 34, at 1567 (“Penn’s holy experiment flourished, 
tending to prove that social stability could be enhanced by religious freedom.”). 
84. McConnell, supra note 21, at 1430. 
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thinking as to the rights of conscience’ . . . encouraged commerce, 
immigration, virtue, industry, the arts, and a productive love of fame and 
knowledge.”85  While these benefits accrued from religious liberty, its 
converse, “[r]eligious bondage,” in Madison’s view, “shackles and 
debilitates the mind and unfits it for every noble enterprise, every expanded 
project.”86  In a discourse with a fellow Princeton classmate who was from 
Pennsylvania, Madison, reflecting upon the lack of religious liberty in 
Virginia, conceded, “I have . . . nothing to brag of.”87  Although 
Pennsylvania was receiving more attention from Madison and others who 
would found the United States, religious liberty was also to a great extent 
being enjoyed in New York and New Jersey, though these colonies, unlike 
Pennsylvania, were not founded as havens for religious dissenters.88  With 
extraordinary religious diversity existing in New York and New Jersey, for 
the most part an approach to government/religion relations emerged that 
afforded religious toleration for Protestants and Jews, though Catholics 
continued to be targeted.89 
The original colonists had “a curious idea of religious liberty, one that 
invited (or banished, as it were) dissenters to enjoy religious liberty else-
where in the New World or stay, risking great persecution were they not to 
conform.”90  Nevertheless, by the eighteenth century, Pennsylvania started 
to become the leader in a trend towards increased religious liberty in the 
colonies.91  Catholics and Jews were generally outsiders, but variations 
between the colonies as to who were outsiders and insiders in the various 
colonies, and the greater degree of religious liberty than existed in Europe, 
created a rapidly growing diversity of sects and churches in the United 
States.92  Additionally, the Great Awakening, an evangelical movement that 
impacted a variety of sects beginning in the 1730s and 1740s,93 also gener-
ated opposition to established religious orthodoxy and created organized 
 
85. LANCE BANNING, THE SACRED FIRE OF LIBERTY: JAMES MADISON & THE FOUNDING 
OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC 81 (1995) (quoting James Madison to Bradford, April 1, 1774, in 1 
THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 112-13 (William T Hutchinson et al. eds., 1962)). 
86. Id. 
87. Id. 
88. McConnell, supra note 21, at 1424. 
89. Id. 
90. Albert, supra note 14, at 895. 
91. CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES, supra note 33, at 5. 
92. See id. at 6. 
93. CHRISTINE LEIGH HEYRMAN, THE FIRST GREAT AWAKENING, http://www.nhc.rtp.nc.us: 
8080/tserve/eighteen/ekeyinfo/grawaken.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2006). 
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political power behind dissenters.94  As the revolution approached, the 
adherence to a concept of enforcing religious belief was weakening, and the 
trend was towards religious liberty.95  This trend would be accelerated by 
the ideology of the Revolution and severing of ties with England.96 
B. THE FOUNDERS’ VIEW OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 
It has been argued that “[f]or the founders, the substantive idea of 
religious liberty—whatever its precise boundaries—was rooted not in 
secular philosophy, but in theology.”97  Disagreement exists though as to 
whether the desire to protect religious liberty was primarily a product of 
secular or religious thinking.98  For a number of reasons, the dichotomy, 
however, is a false one in terms of eighteenth century thought on religious 
liberty.99  One, the founding generation was deeply influenced by religious 
thought, and the distinction between civil and religious authority drawn 
upon by the Founders was itself related to the Protestant concept of two 
kingdoms, one an earthly, the other a heavenly realm.100  Two, even 
 
94. See CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES, supra note 33, at 7; Adams & Emmerich, supra note 
33, at 1567-68 (“[T]he establishments were eroded by the increased diversity arising during the 
Great Awakening.”). 
95. See CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES, supra note 33, at 7-8. 
96. See id. 
97. DANIEL O. CONKLE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE RELIGION CLAUSES 30 (2003). 
98. Smith, Rise and Fall, supra note 7, at 156-66. 
99. Id. at 158.  Both the approach described sometimes as secular, and the religious approach 
“were centrally dependent upon religious, indeed theistic, assumptions.”  Id. at 160.  The more 
explicitly religious style was biblical and evangelical, while the more secular approach adhered 
more closely to natural religion being more philosophical in its approach to religion.  Id. “[T]he 
critical point is that although the religious justification is not universally persuasive, that 
justification carried considerable weight with Americans of the founding generation. . . . Its 
influence is hardly surprising given the pervasively religious world view then prevailing.”  Id. at 
156-57. 
100. Id. at 157; Adams & Emmerich, supra note 33, at 1561-62. 
The American Founders were influenced profoundly by philosophers and theologians 
who reflected on the religious conflicts that occurred in the wake of the Reformation.  
From Martin Luther and John Calvin they inherited the view that God had instituted 
“two kingdoms”—a heavenly one where the church exercised its spiritual authority 
and an earthly one where the civil magistrates exercised temporal authority.  A liberal 
Roman Catholic tradition represented by Erasmus and Thomas More also exerted 
significant influence in the colonies, inspiring the Lords Baltimore and the Carrolls of 
Maryland to rethink the proper relationship between church and state.  The Puritan 
poet John Milton, confidant of Oliver Cromwell and friend of Roger Williams, shaped 
colonial thought by seeking to prove in 1659 that “for belief or practice in religion 
according to this conscientious persuasion no man ought be punished or molested by 
any outward force on earth whatsoever.”  From Roger Williams and William Penn, the 
Founders learned that state control of religion corrupted faith and that coercion of 
conscience destroyed true piety.  From theorists such as John Locke, they appropriated 
concepts such as inalienable rights and toleration for the religious beliefs of others. 
These diverse ideas, derived largely from the intellectual currents flowing from the 
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Founders like Jefferson, who deviated from Christian orthodoxy, viewed 
the world in strongly religious terms.101  Three, “in eighteenth-century 
America—in city, village, and countryside—the idiom of religion pene-
trated all discourse, underlay all thought, marked all observances, gave 
meaning to every public and private crisis.”102  The variance in approaches 
to religious liberty “is more accurately described as a difference in kinds or 
styles of religious thinking, not as a conflict between ‘religious’ and ‘secu-
lar’ thought in the contemporary sense of those terms.”103 
Although at the time of the framing of the Constitution there were a 
variety of arguments in favor of religious liberty, “the central justification 
[among the founding generation] for religious liberty was distinctly relig-
ious, resting on the combination of two theological principles: first, that 
religious duties are more important than secular duties, and second, that 
individuals must undertake their religious duties voluntarily, not under legal 
compulsion.”104  These two principles have been described as the priority 
claim and the voluntariness claim.105  The priority claim asserts that “‘relig-
ious goods’—that is, the distinctive goods, benefits, or blessings toward 
which religious beliefs and practices are directed—are more valuable or 
more important than most or perhaps all other human goods.”106  This claim 
can also be stated as religious duties have a priority over nonreligious legal 
or social duties.107  “The voluntariness claim asserts that religious goods or 
duties by their nature entail freedom of choice.”108  Accordingly, consistent 
with the voluntariness view, “[i]t is futile, at least from a religious perspec-
tive, to force a person to profess a religious creed or conform to a religious 
practice because compulsory faith lacks religious efficacy.  Compelled 
religion, the voluntariness claim insists, is a contradiction in terms . . . .”109 
 
Reformation, influenced the colonists in developing not only their religious, but also 
their political institutions. 
Id. 
101. Smith, Rise and Fall, supra note 7, at 158. 
102. Id. at 157-58. 
103. Id. at 160. 
104. CONKLE, supra note 97, at 30. 




109. Id. at 154-55.  There is a distinction to be drawn between a voluntariness claim and a 
view of salvation being achieved through the volitional acts of an individual.  Id.  While that view 
of salvation was accepted by Madison and Jefferson, it was not commonly embraced by many of 
their Calvinist allies, who were so critical in helping to promote and advance the cause of 
religious liberty.  Id. at 155 n.19.  “The impact of Puritanism on colonial thought can hardly be 
overstated, for as a prominent historian indicates, it ‘provided the moral and religious background 
of fully 75 percent of the people who declared their independence in 1776.’”  Adams & 
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In combination, the priority and voluntariness claims support the con-
stitutional commitment to religious liberty.110  “If religious goods or duties 
take precedence over other goods or duties, as the priority claim asserts, 
then the state should not interfere with religion in the interest of other 
matters that are necessarily less weighty.”111  However, while this priority 
claim calls for government’s respect of religion, it does not necessarily lead 
to a conclusion that religious liberty or freedom should be the government’s 
approach to religion.112  To “the contrary, if religion is the source of 
supremely important goods or duties, then it might seem that a government 
concerned for the welfare of its citizens should require them to accept such 
goods or to perform such duties.”113  Acting as a protector of their citizens, 
sometimes almost as a parental figure, “governments commonly oblige 
citizens with compulsory education laws, mandatory social security with-
holding, seat belt requirements, and substance abuse prohibitions, at least in 
part on the ground that such compulsion is good even for those citizens who 
 
Emmerich, supra note 34, at 1564.  An important link in the alliance connecting the two forces 
was the work of Calvinist Issac Backus: 
Backus repudiated the social contractarian view that the individual surrenders some 
natural liberties by submitting to government.  [He] maintained that fallen man in a 
“state of nature” is a slave and attains freedom only by entering into government.  
Backus divided this freedom-through-government into two types: Christian and civil.  
As to Christian freedom, unregenerate “natural” men are not free but slaves to Satan, 
ruled by sin.  They will attain Christian freedom only by conversion, when they are 
brought under direct rule by God to obey the rule of love written in their hearts by the 
divine finger. True liberty is doing not as one chooses but as God chooses one to do.  
Divine government of the unruly heart is thus necessary for Christian freedom.  Civil 
freedom, on the other hand, is possible only under a civil government, because 
without order sinners will naturally prey upon one another and upon those who have 
received grace.  God therefore allows men to form governments so as to restrain the 
sinners and preserve civil peace.  Human governments are formed primarily by 
unregenerate men for necessarily limited purposes. The unconverted can have no 
authority over true religion, and so they cannot transfer any such authority to merely 
civil governments.  They exist only to keep the peace, not to promote salvation.  God 
Himself has assumed complete rule over His own church, leaving no room for human 
ordinances . . . . 
Thus, in diametric opposition to the argument of Jefferson and Madison, Backus’s 
rationale for religious freedom rests on the utter inefficacy of human choice. Backus 
believed that civil governments have no power over religion precisely because human 
governments are the products of human choice, from which no good can come.  Only 
God can save man, and so man must be subject only to divine government in religion.  
The goal of religious liberty is thus not to leave man free to seek his salvation, but to 
leave the Spirit free to act within man without external constraint. The prerogative 
protected by the principle of religious freedom is not man’s but God’s. 
David C. Williams & Susan H. Williams, Volitionalism and Religious Liberty, 76 
CORNELL L. REV. 769, 872-73 (1991). 
110. Smith, Rise and Fall, supra note 7, at 155. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. (emphasis in original). 
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fail to appreciate the wisdom in these measures.”114  With only the priority 
claim supporting religious liberty, the question arises, “[w]hy should 
government impose these mundane benefits on its citizens and at the same 
time neglect their incomparably greater interest in the salvation of their 
souls?”115  Such governmental action historically was considered one of, if 
not the primary duties of the state, and remains so in some countries to this 
day.116 
It is by combining the priority claim and the “voluntariness claim with 
its insistence upon the futility of compulsory religion that justifies a public 
commitment not just to religion, but to religious freedom.”117  Like the 
priority claim, the voluntariness claim alone is insufficient to establish 
religious liberty or freedom.118  Because compulsory religion is, under the 
voluntariness approach, futile and even self-contradictory, the government 
should be discouraged “‘from interfering with citizens’ religious beliefs and 
practices in order to secure religious benefits for these citizens.”119  The 
voluntariness claim suggests little concern for the practice of religion, 
simply prohibiting forcing religion upon citizens.120  If the “government has 
nonreligious reasons for regulating religious practices, the voluntariness 
claim gives no reason for restraint.  Only the priority claim provides such a 
reason.”121  Taken together, the priority and voluntariness claims 
form a cogent justification for extending special legal protection to 
religious freedom.  The priority claim suggests that government 
should respect religion and avoid subordinating religious goods 
and duties in favor of secular concerns.  The voluntariness claim 
suggests that the way in which government should respect religion 
is by securing religious freedom.122 
Examples of these two claims in the Founders’ justification and under-
standing of religious liberty are numerous among the writings, speeches, 
and letters of the founding generation.  The Founders believed that “indi-
viduals had a duty to adhere to their religious beliefs—a duty they owed to 




116. See Jeffrey Usman, Note, The Evolution of Iranian Islamism from the Revolution 
through the Contemporary Reformers, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1679, 1683-84 (2002) (dis-
cussing the Islamic goals included in the Iranian Constitution). 
117. Smith, Rise and Fall, supra note 7, at 155 (emphasis omitted). 
118. Id. 
119. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
120. Id. at 155-56. 
121. Id. at 156. 
122. Id. 
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seemed inalienable not only physically, but also morally.  It neither could 
nor ought to be submitted to government.”123  Prominent examples of 
Framers who had this view, Jefferson and Madison,124 “based their defense 
of religious liberty on the assumption that religion is volitionalist: individ-
uals reserve the right to religious freedom from the social contract so that 
they may be free to please God (or Providence) and win a reward for their 
conduct.”125  The voluntariness claim is featured prominently in Jefferson’s 
The Virginia Act For Establishing Religious Freedom: 
Well aware that Almighty God hath created the mind free; that all 
attempts to influence it by temporal punishments or burdens, or by 
civil incapacitations, tend only to beget habits of hypocrisy and 
meanness, and are a departure from the plan of the Holy Author of 
our religion, who being Lord both of body and mind, yet chose not 
to propagate it by coercions on either, as was in his Almighty pow-
er to do; that the impious presumption of legislators and rulers, 
civil as well as ecclesiastical, who, being themselves but fallible 
and uninspired men, have assumed dominion over the faith of 
others, setting up their own opinions and modes of thinking as the 
only true and infallible, and as such endeavoring to impose them 
on others, hath established and maintained false religions over the 
greatest part of the world, and through all time; that to compel a 
man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of 
opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical.126 
Jefferson also made the priority claim; for example, he argued that “[t]he 
rights of conscience we never submitted, we could not submit.  We are 
answerable for them to our God.”127 
James Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious 
Assessments stands as one of the finer examples of the synthesis of the 
priority and voluntariness arguments for religious liberty.  Responding to a 
 
123. Philip Hamburger, More is Less, 90 VA. L. REV. 835, 843 (2004). 
124. Justice Rutledge suggested the history of religious liberty debates in Virginia is critical 
to the framing of religious liberty under the First Amendment.  Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 
1, 33-34 (Rutledge, J., dissenting); see Valencia, supra note 45, at 1587 n.46 (“Virginia is clearly 
the Constitutional genesis of the First Amendment’s Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses. 
Consequently, although other colonial developments (for example, Massachusetts and Plymouth) 
are relevant, they are not as material to the ideology behind American religious liberty 
development.”). 
125. Williams & Williams, supra note 109, at 852. 
126. THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE VIRGINIA ACT FOR ESTABLISHING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM  
(1786), available at http://religiousfreedom.lib.virginia.edu/sacred/vaact.html (last visited March 
17, 2006). 
127. Hamburger, supra note 123, at 844 (citing THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE 
OF VIRGINIA 159 (Query 17) (William Peden ed., Univ. of N.C. Press 1982) (1784)). 
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bill that would establish a provision for paying teachers of Christianity in 
Virginia, Madison stated his opposition in the Virginia General Assembly.  
He asserted: 
Because we hold it for a fundamental and undeniable truth, “that 
Religion or the duty which we owe to our Creator and the Manner 
of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, 
not by force or violence.”  The Religion then of every man must 
be left to the conviction and conscience of every man; and it is the 
right of every man to exercise it as these may dictate.  This right is 
in its nature an unalienable right.  It is unalienable, because the 
opinions of men, depending only on the evidence contemplated by 
their own minds cannot follow the dictates of other men: It is 
unalienable also, because what is here a right towards men, is a 
duty towards the Creator.  It is the duty of every man to render to 
the Creator such homage and such only as he believes to be 
acceptable to him.  This duty is precedent, both in order of time 
and degree of obligation, to the claims of Civil Society.  Before 
any man can be considered as a member of Civil Society, he must 
be considered as a subject of the Governor of the Universe: And if 
a member of Civil Society, do it with a saving of his allegiance to 
the Universal Sovereign.  We maintain therefore that in matters of 
Religion, no man’s right is abridged by the institution of Civil 
Society and that Religion is wholly exempt from its cognizance.128 
In this argument, Madison “used the language of social contract and 
obligation to assert the priority of religious duties over other duties.  If our 
obligation to the Creator precedes our assumption of the obligations im-
posed by civil society, then the latter obligations are subject or subordinate 
to our religious duties.”129  Madison also addressed and asserted the volun-
tariness argument—arguing that religion is a matter for the conscience of 
every individual, as opposed to a matter for the enforcement of the state.130 
Although the priority and voluntariness claims are potent forces behind 
the Founders’ protection of religious liberty, it would be a mistake to 
analyze the First Amendment protection of religious liberty without con-
sidering federalism131 and the practical attendant element of merging a 
 
128. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (1785), 
available at http://religiousfreedom.lib.virginia.edu/sacred/madison_m&r_1785.html (last visited 
Sept. 9, 2007). 
129. Smith, Rise and Fall, supra note 7, at 161. 
130. Id. 
131. Adams & Emmerich, supra note 34, at 1605-12 (providing an excellent discussion of 
the federalism groundings of the First Amendment). 
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complicated patchwork of diverse church/state relations in the various 
states into a unified national whole.  During the ratification debates in 
Virginia, Madison argued that “there is not a shadow of right in the general 
government to intermeddle with religion. Its least interference with it, 
would be a most flagrant usurpation.”132  It has been argued that the politi-
cal situation was such “because of the multiplicity of sects existing at the 
founding, [that] any leaning or partiality toward one religion would have 
been politically unthinkable.”133  Nevertheless, there was considerable con-
cern that, absent express protection, federal interference would occur.134  
Thus, the drafters of the Constitution were required to assure, as Madison 
did in the Virginia ratification debates, that the federal government would 
promote a policy of neutrality towards the diverse faiths of the states.135  
The First Amendment was designed to assure concerned citizens that the 
federal government would not discriminate, persecute, or show financial 
prejudice on the basis of religion.136  Through ratifying the First Amend-
ment, action was taken not only to limit national power, but also “to 
preserve the power of the states to address religion and religious liberty as 
the states saw fit.”137  As noted by Justice Story, “the whole power over the 
subject of religion is left exclusively to the state governments, to be acted 
upon according to their own sense of justice, and the State Constitu-
tions.”138  In the attempt to explore the definition of religion, the historical 
framework of the emergence of religious liberty, and the purposes of the 
First Amendment protection thereof, will regularly be considered and help 
frame the subsequent analysis. 
III. OVERARCHING ISSUES IMPLICATED IN DEFINING RELIGION 
A. SHOULD RELIGION BE DEFINED? 
As noted by the United States Supreme Court, “[t]he word ‘religion’ is 
not defined in the Constitution.”139  The Founders did not expressly define 
 
132. James Madison, Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 12, 1788), in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ 
CONSTITUTION 88 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987). 
133. Albert, supra note 14, at 900; see WILLIAM LEE MILLER, THE BUSINESS OF MAY 
NEXT: JAMES MADISON AND THE FOUNDING 12-13 (1992); Valencia, supra note 45, at 1587 
(asserting that religious diversity was extremely important in advancing religious liberty). 
134. Albert, supra note 14, at 899-900. 
135. Id. at 900. 
136. Id. at 900-01. 
137. CONKLE, supra note 97, at 19. 
138. Douglas G. Smith, The Establishment Clause: Corollary of Eighteenth-Century 
Corporate Law?, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 239, 291 (2003) (quoting 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES 
ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §1873 (1833)). 
139. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162 (1878). 
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the term, and a number of commentators have argued that religion should 
not, or even cannot, be defined by the courts.140  The arguments against 
defining religion can be largely classified into three categories: (1) religions 
vary significantly, and there is nothing about them at the core that is com-
mon or shared that would lend itself to a definition; (2) courts are not 
qualified to define religion, and in so doing pose a danger of bias; and, (3) 
defining religion would violate the Constitution by interfering with relig-
ious liberty and establishing religion. 
The commentators and academics in the first category submit that a 
search for a definition of religion is misguided because “[t]here simply is no 
essence of religion, no single feature or set of features that all religions have 
in common and that distinguishes religion from everything else.”141  Be-
cause there is no it—no “religion”—somewhere out there, there is nothing 
to be deduced from, thus any definition of religion will be inherently arbi-
trary.142  Having seen the difficulties in reaching a satisfactory definition, 
some scholars have concluded that “[t]he fact is that no definition of relig-
ion for constitutional purposes exists, and no satisfactory definition is likely 
to be conceived.”143  For these scholars, “[f]ashioning a general definition 
of religion seems virtually impossible.”144 
Even if a definition of religion could be reached, commentators in the 
second category argue the courts are not sufficiently competent or unbiased 
to generate a proper definition.145  Some courts themselves have even ques-
tioned their own competence in making this determination.  For example, a 
Delaware court noted that the state had argued that “Black Muslim beliefs 
and teachings are not a religion [and even indicated that] [s]ome plausible 
arguments are made in support of their contention;” however, the court did 
 
140. Questions as to whether religion should be defined also arise in the context of 
international law.  Robert Bejesky, United States Obligations Under International Law and the 
Falun Gong v. Jiang Zemin Lawsuit: A Justified Reaction to a Threat to Public Security or 
Genocide? You Decide, 11 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 295, 327-28 (2005).  “One of the 
problems in protecting an international right to freedom of religion is establishing how that right 
should be defined.  There is no international consensus on what constitutes a religion; some even 
claim that the term ‘religion’ should not be defined.”  Id. 
141. George C. Freeman, III, The Misguided Search for the Constitutional Definition of 
“Religion,” 71 GEO. L.J. 1519, 1565 (1983). 
142. Gidon Sapir, Religion and State—A Fresh Theoretical Start, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
579, 632-33 (1999) (citing Anita Bowser, Delimiting Religion in the Constitution: A 
Classification Problem, 11 VAL. U. L. REV. 163, 164 (1977)). 
143. Philip E. Johnson, Concepts and Compromise in First Amendment Religious Doctrine, 
72 CALIF. L. REV. 817, 832 (1984). 
144. Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment 
Neutrality and the “No Endorsement” Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266, 298 (1987) [hereinafter Smith, 
Symbols]. 
145. Sapir, supra note 142, at 633. 
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not consider this argument because it is “clear this court cannot-or should 
not-undertake to define or rule on what is or what is not a religion.”146  
Similarly, a New Jersey court concluded that “[t]here is no right in a state 
or an instrumentality thereof to determine that a cause is not a religious 
one.”147 
Still other commentators assert that defining religion is itself a 
violation of the religious liberty protected by the First Amendment.  It has 
been submitted that any “attempt to define religion, even for purposes of 
increasing freedom for religions, would run afoul of the ‘establishment’ 
clause, as excluding some religions, or even as establishing a notion re-
specting religion.”148  Under this interpretation, no definition of religion is 
possible, because by defining religion the court is establishing what religion 
is.  Thus, defining religion would be contrary to the entire concept of relig-
ious liberty because “any definition of religion would seem to . . . dictate to 
religions, present and future, what they must be.”149  Furthermore, any 
definition offered by the court would likely discriminate against unusual 
religions that the court was not familiar with or failed to account for, and by 
fixing the definition of religion, the court would create stagnancy by 
restricting the present and future growth of religion.150  As a result, it has 
been argued that a problem will occur “[a]s soon as the Court says that 
religion is this, and only this, [because] someone will appear with a religion 
that does not fit the definition, and the Establishment Clause may be 
violated.”151 
Nor is this viewpoint simply some academic wandering; quite to the 
contrary, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) through its General Counsel 
has embraced this understanding.152  The IRS General Counsel stated: 
 
146. State ex rel. Tate v. Cubbage, 210 A.2d 555, 562 (Del. Super. Ct. 1965); see Glen O. 
Robinson, Communities, 83 VA. L. REV. 269, 311 n.97 (1997). 
147. Kolbeck v. Kramer, 202 A.2d 889, 892 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1964). 
148. Jonathan Weiss, Privilege, Posture and Protection “Religion” in the Law, 73 Yale L.J. 
593, 604 (1964); see Kolbeck, 202 A.2d at 892 (“Such a censorship of religion as the means of 
determining its right to survive is a denial of liberty protected by the First Amendment and 
included in the liberty which is within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
149. Weiss, supra note 148, at 604. 
150. Mary Harter Mitchell, Secularism in Public Education: The Constitutional Issues, 67 
B.U. L. REV. 603, 631 (1987) (citing M. KONVITZ, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND CONSCIENCE 51-72, 
97 (1968)); see Timothy L. Hall, Note, The Sacred and The Profane: A First Amendment 
Definition of Religion, 61 TEX. L. REV. 139, 160 (1982) [hereinafter Hall, Sacred] (“The danger 
in defining religion lies in the possibility of violating the very purpose of the [F]ree [E]xercise 
[C]lause by proposing a definition that excludes nontraditional religious beliefs from the 
protective canopy of the first amendment.”). 
151. Deborah K. Hepler, The Constitutional Challenge to America Civil Religion, 5 KAN. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 93, 104 (1996). 
152. Christine Roemhildt Moore, Religious Tax Exemption and the “Charitable Scrutiny” 
Test, 15 REGENT U. L. REV. 295, 306-07 (2003); see Reka Potgieter Hoff, The Financial 
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An analysis of the First Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States indicates that it is logically impossible to define 
“religion.” It appears that the two religious clauses of the First 
Amendment define “religious freedom” but do not establish a 
definition of “religion” within recognized parameters. An attempt 
to define religion, even for purposes of statutory construction, 
violates the “establishment” clause since it necessarily delineates 
and, therefore, limits what can and cannot be a religion.153 
However, despite the view expressed in this memorandum, the IRS has, 
nevertheless, continued to apply a set of factors to determine if a group 
constitutes a church for purposes of tax benefits.154 
Despite the intriguing arguments presented by various academics and 
embraced by at least some courts, ultimately we should and in fact must 
give some meaning to the word religion.  According to the Merriam-
Webster Dictionary, to define something is “to determine or identify the 
essential qualities or meaning of; . . . to discover and set forth the meaning 
of; . . . to fix or mark the limits of; . . . to make distinct, clear, or detailed 
especially in outline, [or to] characterize[/]distinguish.”155  This article 
moves forward with this understanding of what it means to define religion.  
While a short pithy statement is not likely to suffice, the term religion must 
be defined.  Despite the third group of commentators fear that a definition is 
unconstitutional, courts have repeatedly concluded that there is no constitu-
tional prohibition or restriction upon defining religion or assessing if 
particular practices or beliefs are religious.156  Furthermore, by defining 
religion, discrimination between religions is less likely to be subtly hidden 
through court presumptions.157 
More fundamentally though, despite difficulties, the term must be 
defined because “the definition of ‘religion’ plays as integral a role in the 
articulation of any well-developed doctrine governing the constitutional 
separation of church and state as does the content to be assigned to the 
religion clauses’ two substantive terms—‘establishment’ and ‘free 
 
Accountability of Churches for Federal Income Tax Purposes: Establishment or Free Exercise?, 
11 VA. TAX REV. 71, 100 n.145 (1991). 
153. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,993 (Feb. 3, 1977). 
154. Dmitry N. Feofanov, Defining Religion: An Immodest Proposal, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
309, 317 n.39 (1994). 
155. MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/define 
(last visited June 21, 2007). 
156. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Wilkinson, 946 F. Supp. 522, 525 (N.D. Ohio 1996) (citing Jones 
v. Bradley, 590 F.2d 294, 295 (9th Cir. 1979)). 
157. See Stanley Ingber, Religion or Ideology: A Needed Clarification of the Religion 
Clauses, 41 STAN. L. REV. 233, 290-91 (1989). 
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exercise.’”158  Failure to define religion would not only be a problem in 
particular cases, it would be “a fundamental gap in [F]irst [A]mendment 
theory.”159  Without a definition of religion, it would be difficult to say 
anything about the First Amendment’s protection of religious liberty.160  
Thus, “the Constitution itself requires that we provide a definition [by] . . .  
protect[ing] the free exercise and prohibit[ing] establishment of something 
called ‘religion.’”161  Accordingly, a definition is needed; even though the 
definition would not determine what constitutes free exercise or establish-
ment, “it determines what is protected and what is not.”162  A definition is 
critical to determining “whether such diverse beliefs as Confucianism, 
political philosophy, Marxism, Communism, . . . being a millionaire, and 
even atheism, are, in fact, religions.”163  Whether there is an unstated 
understanding or an express definition, “it is clear that the religion clauses 
cannot be applied without at least a working concept of religion. Because 
some such working definition is necessary, claims that definition is impos-
sible, undesirable, or unconstitutional must be reduced to admonitions” 
suggesting caution in defining religion.164  Succinctly stated, “[t]he Court 
can no more escape saying what is religion than it can escape saying what is 
speech or press or assembly under other provisions of the [F]irst 
[A]mendment.”165 
 
158. Jesse H. Choper, Defining “Religion” in the First Amendment, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 
579, 580 (1982). 
159. Johnson, supra note 143, at 839. 
160. Id.; Ivan E. Bodensteiner, The Demise of the First Amendment as a Guarantor of 
Religious Freedom, 27 WHITTIER L. REV. 415, 426 (2005) (“[B]ecause the religion clauses pro-
tect ‘religion,’ it seems implausible that the clauses could be meaningful without a definition of 
‘religion,’ or a definition that includes anything one asserts is a religion.  Even if it is offensive to 
religions to have the courts decide the meaning of a term in the Constitution, it is less offensive 
than having the courts interpret the [F]ree [E]xercise [C]lause in a manner that provides no 
meaningful protection to religion.”). 
161. Feofanov, supra note 154, at 315. 
162. Id. at 313. 
163. Id. at 313-15. 
164. Mitchell, supra note 150, at 632-33.  These admonitions would include “that the 
definition used should be flexible, should aim away from narrow parochialism, should not enmesh 
the courts too deeply in theology or in a believer’s mind, and might need to be adjusted from one 
context to another.”  Id. at 633. 
165. John H. Mansfield, Book Review, 52 CALIF. L. REV. 212, 215-16 (1964) (reviewing 
PHILIP B. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW (1962)); see T. Jeremy Gunn, The Complexity of 
Religion and the Definition of “Religion” in International Law, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 189, 191 
(2003) (“While academics have the luxury of debating whether the term ‘religion’ is hopelessly 
ambiguous, judges and lawyers often do not.”). 
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B. THE FUNDAMENTAL DIFFICULTY IN DEFINING RELIGION 
However, just because religion must be defined does not mean arriving 
at a definition will be without difficulty.  When trying to define religion, the 
fundamental problem is that the definition arrived at generally is “either too 
narrow and excludes many belief systems which most agree are religions, 
or [it is] too vague and ambiguous, suggesting that just about anything and 
everything is a religion.”166  An extremely broad definition of religious 
liberty may be difficult for courts to apply or essentially meaningless be-
cause it fails to exclude that which is not religion.167  Thus, a broad defini-
tion may fail to separate religion from psychology, philosophy, or even 
economics.168  Too narrow a definition of religion threatens to exclude non-
traditional faiths, minority religions, and create stagnancy stifling the 
possibility of future growth and development in religion.169  Furthermore, 
with an enormous variety of religious practice, a narrow definition is likely 
to be tied to the cultural and religious perspective of the judge performing 
the defining task and fail to recognize other cultural or religious 
perspectives.170 
C. TWO DEFINITIONS OF RELIGION 
Another difficulty in defining religion stems from the two protections 
afforded by the First Amendment.  The First Amendment guarantees, in 
part, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, 
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”171  Uncertainty exists as to whether 
there should be one or two definitions of the word religion; the Supreme 
 
166. AUSTIN CLINE, WHAT IS RELIGION? DEFINING THE CHARACTERISTICS OF RELIGION, 
available at http://atheism.about.com/od/religiondefinition/p/WhatReligion.htm (last visited Mar. 
20, 2006).  A similar difficulty has been seen in the context of international law.  Bejesky, supra 
note 140, at 328. 
A very narrow definition may include solely the five religions that have an extended 
history and an overwhelming global membership—Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, 
Islam and Judaism.  On the other hand, a narrow definition may screen other groups 
from attaining recognition as a legitimate religion.  If the broadest definition were 
employed, arguably over six billion religions could exist in the world, as freedom of 
conscience preferences of each and every human being might be unique. 
Id. 
167. Jeffrey L. Oldham, Note, Constitutional “Religion” A Survey of First Amendment 
Definitions of Religion, 6 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 117, 154 (2001). 
168. PAUL CONNELLY, DEFINITION OF RELIGION AND RELATED TERMS: WHAT IS 
RELIGION, available at http://www.darc.org/connelly/religion1.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2007). 
169. Mitchell, supra note 150, at 631 (citing Konvitz, supra note 150, at 97). 
170. Carl H. Esbeck, A Restatement of the Supreme Court’s Law of Religious Freedom: 
Coherence, Conflict, or Chaos?, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 581, 624 n.189 (1995); Samuel J. 
Levine, Toward a Religious Minority Voice: A Look at Free Exercise Law Through a Religious 
Minority Perspective, 5 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 153, 176 (1996). 
171. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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Court has not decided the issue.172  Those who support a singular meaning 
point out that the word religion appears only once in the First Amend-
ment.173  This singular appearance led Justice Rutledge to conclude that 
“the word governs two prohibitions and governs them alike. It does not 
have two meanings, one narrow to forbid ‘an establishment’ and another, 
much broader, for securing ‘the free exercise thereof.’”174  Under his textual 
analysis, the unifying use of the term “‘thereof’ brings down ‘religion’ with 
its entire and exact content, no more and no less, from the first into the 
second guaranty, so that Congress and now the states are as broadly re-
stricted concerning the one as they are regarding the other.”175  From a 
natural reading of the First Amendment, it is difficult to conceive of the 
term religion as having two different meanings, one for purposes of free 
exercise and one for purposes of establishment.176 
Nevertheless, Professor Tribe has in the past argued that religion for 
free exercise purposes clearly “must be expanded beyond the closely 
bounded limits of theism to account for the multiplying forms of recog-
nizably legitimate religious exercise.”177  He found it “equally clear, how-
ever, that in the age of the affirmative and increasingly pervasive state, a 
less expansive notion of religion is required for [E]stablishment [C]lause 
purposes lest all ‘humane’ programs of government be deemed constitu-
tionally suspect.”178  Tribe’s Free Exercise Clause analysis emerged from 
the premise that a more limited definition of religion will hew too closely to 
orthodox religion excluding the unorthodox.  His Establishment Clause 
analysis was alternatively pervaded by concern that “if everything can be 
religion, then anything the government does can be construed as favoring 
one religion over another, . . . [leaving] the government . . . paralyzed . . . 
by the Establishment Clause.”179  To avoid this end, “Tribe argued that the 
[F]ree [E]xercise [C]lause should apply to any beliefs or practices that are 
 
172. Francis J. Beckwith, Public Education, Religious Establishment, and the Challenge of 
Intelligent Design, 17 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 461, 486 (2003) (citing ERWIN 
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 973 (1997)). 
173. Id. 
174. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 32 (1946). 
175. Id. 
176. Knechtle, supra note 6, at 528. 
177. Anand Agneshwar, Note, Rediscovering God in the Constitution,  67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
295, 311-12 (1992) (citing LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 827-28 
(1978)). 
178. Id. 
179. James M. Donovan, God is as God Does: Law, Anthropology, and the Definition of 
“Religion,” 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 23, 70 (1995). 
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‘arguably religious,’ whereas the Establishment Clause should not apply to 
beliefs or practices that are ‘arguably nonreligious.’”180 
Tribe was not alone in this view.  Some courts and commentators con-
fronting an increasingly diversified religious society, but concerned about 
overly restricting government action, have embraced Tribe’s argument for 
the definition of religion being broader for the purposes of free exercise 
analysis than for establishment purposes.181  Proponents of the dual defini-
tion approach argue four basic premises.  First, like Tribe, they warn of the 
practical consequences, which include not protecting people’s religious 
beliefs under the Free Exercise Clause with too narrow a definition of 
religion and overly restricting the government with too broad a definition 
under the Establishment Clause.182  Second, they “argue that the two 
religion clauses should be interpreted in light of their distinct purposes.”183  
Critics offer a wide variety of interpretations of these purposes and diver-
gent explanations for why these purposes suggest that a narrower definition 
of religion is appropriate for the Establishment Clause and a broader one for 
the Free Exercise Clause.184  Three, they assert that utilizing a dual 
 
180. Mitchell, supra note 150, at 653 n.236 (citing TRIBE, supra note 176, at 828-31). 
181. See, e.g., State v. Olsen, 315 N.W.2d 1, 8 (Iowa 1982) (explaining the court’s broad 
interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause); Grove v. Mead Sch. Dist. No. 354, 753 F.2d 1528, 
1537 (9th Cir. 1985) (Canby, J., concurring); United States v. Allen, 760 F.2d 447, 450 (2d Cir. 
1985). 
182. Mitchell, supra note 150, at 652-53. 
Accordingly, many advocate a broad free exercise definition of religion in order to fit 
that clause’s libertarian purposes to a wide variety of religious beliefs.  They argue for 
a narrower definition of religion for the [E]stablishment [C]lause, however, partly 
because they conceive the purposes of that clause narrowly and partly because they 
fear that in these days of pervasive government activity too broad a definition would 
make that clause an “awful engine of destruction” and hobble many of the govern-
ment’s “humane” programs.  To these arguments proponents of a unitary definition 
respond that the aims of the [E]stablishment [C]lause are broader than supposed and 
that the dangers of unduly hampering government’s activities can be avoided by 
appropriately narrowing the concept of “establishment.” 
Id.; see Donovan, supra note 179, at 32. 
If . . . religion is anything in the role of personal ultimate concern, which only the 
most compelling of state concerns can override, then almost any statute can be 
construed to affect religious beliefs and be subject to constitutional challenge. Thus, 
plaintiffs may make First Amendment challenges on the ground that such statutes 
infringe upon their personal beliefs and practices or encourage one set of beliefs at the 
expense of all others. Such litigation would present a formidable obstacle to the 
implementation of any new legislation. 
Id. 
183. Mitchell, supra note 150, at 652. 
184. Id. at 652-53 (citing TRIBE, supra note 177, at 827; Paul Freund, Public Aid to 
Parochial Schools, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1680, 1686 n.14 (1969); Marc Galanter, Religious Freedom 
in the United States: A Turning Point?, 1966 WIS. L. REV. 217, 265-68 (1966); Gail Merel, The 
Protection of Individual Choice: A Consistent Understanding of Religion Under the First 
Amendment, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 805, 830-36 (1978); William Van Alstyne, Constitutional 
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definition “reduces the analytic tension between those clauses and enables 
judges to decide in one context without concerns about how it might affect 
cases arising in the other context.”185  Whatever the linguistic or semantic 
complexities, proponents argue that “the dual definition approach does have 
the virtue of potentially minimizing the conflict between competing 
constitutional interests” that are contained in the free exercise and 
establishment protections.186  Fourth, some proponents have suggested that 
multiple definitions of religion are needed because the term should be 
interpreted in the context of the legal dispute in which it arises.187  This, 
therefore, does not require two definitions—one for establishment and one 
for free exercise—but instead multiple definitions to fit the particular 
circumstances.188  It has been asserted that: 
Because different aspects of religions are relevant in different legal 
contexts, what qualifies for protection . . . depends upon the legal 
context.  In other words, even if there were a uniquely correct 
definition of the term “religion” as it occurs in ordinary English, it 
should not fix the definition in the religion clauses because what 
qualifies as a religion should differ across differing legal 
contexts.189 
Thus, according to at least one opponent of a unitary definition, the defini-
tion of religion should be able to change and diversify in as many ways as 
there are contexts in which First Amendment religious liberty issues arise. 
Some courts have embraced and utilized the dual definition approach.  
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the issue in a challenge to 
 
Separation of Church & State: The Quest for a Coherent Position, 57 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 865, 
874 (1963); Harvard Note, supra note 3, at 1083-86; Note, Transcendental Meditation and the 
Meaning of Religion Under the Establishment Clause, 62 MINN. L. REV. 887, 904 n.67 (1978). 
185. Knechtle, supra note 6, at 528. 
186. Donovan, supra note 179, at 33; see Troy L. Booher, Finding Religion for the First 
Amendment, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 469, 472 (2004).  Cf. Oldham, supra note 167, at 167. 
Although some scholars have argued that a dual definition is more practical and will 
make the two clauses work together more cohesively, these arguments seem mis-
guided.  The fact that there has been any friction between the two clauses at all is, at 
least in part, because the Court has expanded the definition of religion so broadly.  
When a narrower definition was used, the two clauses were complementary and did 
not contradict each other.  From a pragmatic perspective, a narrow conception can 
alleviate the conflict between the two clauses because there will not be the problem of 
having some “religious” groups protected under the Free Exercise Clause but not 
subject to Establishment Clause requirements, such as secular humanism. 
Id. 
187. Booher, supra note 186, at 472. 
188. Id. 
189. Id. 
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convictions of anti-nuclear activists.190  The activist argued the government 
was establishing the religion of “nuclearism.”191  The Second Circuit con-
ceded “the concept of religion has certainly broadened [noting that] [n]ot 
long ago we defined an individual’s religion as his ‘ultimate concern’-
whatever that concern be.”192  The court went on to state that “[t]his 
expansive definition of religion has been developed primarily to protect an 
individual’s free exercise of religion, recognizing that an individual’s most 
sincere beliefs do not necessarily fall within traditional religious cate-
gories.”193  The court, however, concluded that for purposes of the 
Establishment Clause “nuclearism” did not constitute a religion.194  The 
court expressly indicated that “[i]n so holding, we adopt for [E]stablishment 
[C]lause purposes the conventional, majority view, rather than appellants’ 
view, of what is religious and what is political.  Consequently, we must 
acknowledge that ‘religion’ can have a different meaning depending on 
which religion clause of the First Amendment is at issue.”195  The court 
then discussed and cited Professor Tribe’s dual definition analysis 
indicating that the judges found “his analysis helpful and provocative.”196  
The United States District Court for the District of Arizona also declared 
that the Establishment Clause “looks to the majority’s concept of the term 
religion” while the Free Exercise Clause looks to the minority’s concept.197  
In a concurring opinion, Judge Canby of the Ninth Circuit indicated “there 
is much to be said for the view that the definition of religion should vary 
with the clause under review.”198  The Ninth Circuit moved forward with 
this conclusion in a subsequent Establishment Clause case, relying upon 
reasoning set forth by Professor Tribe and the Second Circuit, and 
determined that secular humanism for Establishment Clause purposes could 
not be a religion.199  The District of Columbia Court of Appeals and the 
Georgia Court of Appeals have also concluded that the definition of 
 
190. United States v. Allen, 760 F.2d 447, 450 (2d Cir. 1985). 
191. Id. 
192. Id. at 449-50 (quoting Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Barber, 650 F.2d 
430, 440 (2d Cir. 1981)). 
193. Id. at 450. 
194. Id. at 450-51. 
195. Id. at 450. 
196. Id. at 450-51. 
197. Sheldon v. Fannin, 221 F. Supp. 766, 774-75 (D. Ariz. 1963). 
198. Grove v. Mead Sch. Dist. No. 354, 753 F.2d 1528, 1537 (9th Cir. 1985) (Canby, J., 
concurring). 
199. Peloza v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 37 F.3d 517, 521 n.5 (9th Cir. 1994).  In dicta 
in a subsequent decision, the Ninth Circuit indicated that this apparent dual definition embrace in 
Peloza was merely dicta itself.  Alvarado v. City of San Jose, 94 F.3d 1223, 1230 n.6 (9th Cir. 
1996). 
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religion is narrower for purposes of Establishment Clause analysis and 
more expansive for free exercise purposes.200 
Furthermore, even where courts do not explicitly embrace the dual 
definition approach, there is an apparent distinction that repeatedly emerges 
in many courts’ analysis as to whether something is or is not a religion 
based upon whether the challenge is under the Establishment Clause or the 
Free Exercise Clause.201  For example, the Eleventh Circuit indicated that 
“neither the Supreme Court nor [the Eleventh Circuit] has determined that 
‘secular humanism is a religion for purposes of the [E]stablishment 
[C]lause,’”202 and the Ninth Circuit also ruled that secular humanism cannot 
be a religion for purposes of the Establishment Clause.203  But, the federal 
district court for the Western District of Wisconsin has noted that secular 
humanism is a religion for purposes of the Free Exercise Clause,204 as have 
the Ninth205 and Seventh Circuits.206 
However, as critics of the dual definition approach point out (in 
addition to referencing the textual argument), “if the free exercise definition 
is broader than the establishment definition, the result might in some sense 
discriminate in favor of religions included in the former but not the 
 
200. Gay Rights Coal. of Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. v. Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1, 30 
n.23 (D.C. 1987); McDonnell v. Episcopal Diocese of Ga., 381 S.E.2d 126, 129 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1989) (“[A] narrower definition of religion is employed in [E]stablishment [C]lause 
considerations, as compared to use of a broad definition when the [F]ree [E]xercise [C]lause is 
invoked.”). 
201. See generally Craig A. Mason, Case Comment, “Secular Humanism” and the 
Definition of Religion: Extending a Modified “Ultimate Concern” Test to Mozart v. Hawk County 
Public Schools and Smith v. Board of School Commissioners, 63 WASH. L. REV. 445, 445 
(1988); Peter D. Schmid, Comment, Religion, Secular Humanism and the First Amendment, 13 S. 
ILL. U. L.J. 357, 359 (1989); Thomas Marvan Skousen, Case Comment, The Lemon in Smith v. 
Mobile County: Protecting Pluralism and General Education, 1997 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 69, 75-77 
(1997); Theologos Verginis, Case Comment, ACLU v. Capitol Square Review and Advisory 
Board: Is there Salvation for the Establishment Clause? “With God All Things are Possible,” 34 
AKRON L. REV. 741, 741 (2001); Andrew A. Cheng, The Inherent Hostility of Secular Public 
Education Toward Religion: Why Parental Choice Best Serves the Core Values of the Religion 
Clauses, 19 U. HAW. L. REV. 697, 703 (1997). 
202. McGinley v. Houston, 361 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 2004); cf. Newdow v. U.S. 
Congress, 313 F.3d 500, 504 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002) (“As the Supreme Court has acknowledged, 
recognized religions exist that do not teach a belief in God, e.g., secular humanism.”). 
203. See Alvarado v. City of San Jose, 94 F.3d 1223, 1227 (9th Cir. 1996) (interpreting 
Peloza as “holding that neither evolution nor secular humanism may be defined as religion” for 
purposes of the Establishment Clause). 
204. Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 422 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1022 (W.D. Wis. 2006) (“[C]ourts 
have recognized that pacifism, secular humanism and other non-theistic belief systems are entitled 
to the protection of the First Amendment’s [F]ree [E]xercise [C]lause.”); Strayhorn v. Ethical 
Soc’y of Austin, 110 S.W.3d 458, 466 n.8 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003); but see Gibson v. Lee County 
Sch. Bd., 1 F. Supp. 2d 1426, 1431 (M.D. Fla. 1998) (expressing concern that insulation of public 
schools from the mention of God may establish religion of secular humanism). 
205. Newdow, 313 F.3d at 504 n.2. 
206. Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 419 F.3d 678, 682 (7th Cir. 2005). 
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latter.”207  For example, interpreting religion as having “a dual definition 
may provide more obscure religions and religious activities with special 
treatment, by protecting the free exercise of such religions, without placing 
any [E]stablishment [C]lause limits on the government’s ability to promote 
and aid such religions.”208  This is particularly problematic because equality 
between religions is the governing principle of the First Amendment, and 
accordingly should be a governing principle in First Amendment interpreta-
tion.209  The First Amendment simply cannot tolerate allowing advanta-
geous treatment for one religious group over another.  The Supreme Court 
has emphasized that it will apply strict scrutiny and reject as unconstitu-
tional state and federal laws that discriminate between religions.210 A dual 
definition approach fails even the most basic discrimination test.211  In 
adopting the dualist approach, the court would be violating a fundamental 
principle, which has been repeatedly emphasized in religious liberty cases, 
by discriminating between various religious groups and/or individuals 
based on their faith.212  There is no readily apparent reason why the court 
discriminating between religions would be of less constitutional concern 
than a state legislature or Congress engaging in the same discrimination.213  
In this vein, one critic has indicated that a dual definition approach would 
 
207. Mitchell, supra note 150, at 652 (emphasis in original). 
208. Ben Clements, Defining “Religion” in the First Amendment: A Functional Approach, 
74 CORNELL L. REV. 532, 536 (1989) (citing Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 212-13 (3d Cir. 
1979) (Adams, J., concurring)); Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 
72 CALIF. L. REV. 753, 814 (1984)). 
209. Jay Alan Sekulow et. al, Religious Freedom and the First Self-Evident Truth: Equality 
as a Guiding Principle in Interpreting the Religion Clauses, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 351, 
380-405 (1995) (arguing that equality should be/is the guiding principle for interpreting the 
religion clauses). 
210. Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 
U.S. 327, 339 (1987); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 
U.S. 97, 103-04 (1968). 
Government in our democracy, state and national, must be neutral in matters of 
religious theory, doctrine, and practice.  It may not be hostile to any religion or to the 
advocacy of no-religion; and it may not aid, foster, or promote one religion or 
religious theory against another or even against the militant opposite.  The First 
Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and 
between religion and nonreligion. 
Id.; Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 305 (1963) (Goldberg, J., 
concurring) (“The fullest realization of true religious liberty requires that government neither 
engage in nor compel religious practices, that it effect no favoritism among sects or between 
religion and nonreligion, and that it work deterrence of no religious belief.”); Zorach v. Clauson, 
343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952) (“The government must be neutral when it comes to competition 
between sects.”); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (“The ‘establishment of religion’ 
clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government . . . 
prefer one religion over another.”). 
211. Knechtle, supra note 6, at 529. 
212. Id. 
213. See id. 
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be “perceived as fundamentally unfair” and noted that no persuasive 
constitutional explanation has been offered for discriminating against older 
traditional religions in favor of newer and less conventional faiths.214  
Accordingly, a minority religion cannot expect the two-fold benefit of the 
protection of free exercise and the additional advantage over traditional 
religious groups of not being restricted by the Establishment Clause: “The 
rose cannot be had without the thorn.”215 
Furthermore, although a dual definition is a sensible approach to pre-
venting the problems of inhibiting the free exercise of unorthodox religions 
and restricting governmental action via the Establishment Clause, critics of 
the dual definition approach question whether these problems would arise 
under a unitary definition of religion.216  Professor Tribe himself eventually 
accepted this very argument, and “now reject[s] the dual approach, stating 
that it ‘constitutes a dubious solution to a problem that, on closer inspec-
tion, may not exist at all.’”217  The reason this problem “may not exist” is 
that the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence, if not eliminating, at 
least reduces the concerns voiced by proponents of a dual definition.218  The 
Establishment Clause “does not ban federal or state regulation of conduct 
whose reason or effect merely happens to coincide or harmonize with the 
tenets of some or all religions.”219  In other words, the “[Establishment 
Clause] does not . . . prevent the government from taking any action that is 
consistent with a particular religion or religious tenet.”220  For example, 
simply because the State prohibits murder, which corresponds with the pro-
hibition against killing in the Ten Commandments, it does not render that 
law an establishment of religion.221  Similarly, because a State promotes 
through the force of law the value of equality, which may be religiously 
inspired, or adopts social programs advocated for by clerics to aid the 
 
214. Ingber, supra note 157, at 289-90. 
215. Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 213 (3d Cir. 1979). 
If a Roman Catholic is barred from receiving aid from the government, so too should 
be a Transcendental Mediator or a Scientologist if those two are to enjoy the preferred 
position guaranteed to them by the [F]ree [E]xercise [C]lause. It may be, of course, 
that they are not entitled to such a preferred position, but they are clearly not entitled 
to the advantages given by the [F]irst [A]mendment while avoiding the apparent 
disadvantages. 
Id. 
216. Clements, supra note 208, at 536. 
217. Id. at 536 n.20 (citing LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-6, 
at 187 (2d ed. 1988) [hereinafter TRIBE, AMERICAN]). 
218. Id. 
219. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961). 
220. Clements, supra note 208, at 536. 
221. Id.; Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 212 (3d Cir. 1979). 
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financially poor and impoverished in spirit, such as the homeless or drug 
addicts, these actions do not mean that the State is establishing religion.222  
Quite to the contrary, State actions to prohibit religious leaders, who may 
continue acting from purely religious motivations, from attaining positions 
of power and authority in government, are unconstitutional.223 
Additionally, a dual definition is simply not the best approach to 
resolving any potential conflict between the Free Exercise and Establish-
ment Clause; rather, “the preferable perspective is to view religion as a 
unitary concept and to resolve any conflict between the clauses by refining 
each clause’s substantive mandate.”224  The question of what constitutes a 
religion should not be attached to the issue of whether “the constitutional 
mandate has been violated or, rather, whether the state interest has 
adequately overridden or circumvented the constitutional concern.”225 
D. ONE PROBLEM WITH A BROAD DEFINITION OF RELIGION 
Before a generous spirit leads one to embrace a broad unitary 
definition of religion, it should be noted that under the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence, the further the definition of religion reaches, the lesser the 
protections are that the Free Exercise Clause will afford.  When considering 
whether to apply heightened scrutiny to generally applicable laws that 
impose upon religious activities, the Supreme Court warned that adoption 
of such a system of review would breed anarchy.226  This anarchy 
“increases in direct proportion to the society’s diversity of religious beliefs, 
and its determination to coerce or suppress none of them.”227  The Court 
noted this problem is particularly acute in the United States because there is 
extraordinary religious diversity: “[W]e are a cosmopolitan nation made up 
of people of almost every conceivable religious preference.”228  The Court 
 
222. See Clements, supra note 208, at 536; Malnak, 592 F.2d at 212. 
Moreover, the [E]stablishment [C]lause does not forbid government activity 
encouraged by the supporters of even the most orthodox of religions if that activity is 
itself not unconstitutional. The Biblical and clerical endorsement of laws against 
stealing and murder do not make such laws establishments of religion. Similarly, 
agitation for social welfare programs by progressive churchmen, even if motivated by 
the most orthodox of theological reasons, does not make those programs religious. 
The Constitution has not been interpreted to forbid those inspired by religious 
principle or conscience from participation in this nation’s political, social and 
economic life. 
  Id. 
223. See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 641 (1978). 
224. Ingber, supra note 157, at 290. 
225. Id. 
226. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990). 
227. Id. 
228. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961). 
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concluded that because the Constitution requires neutral treatment of 
religious groups, strict scrutiny could not be applied in a diverse religious 
society, because anarchy would result through the undermining of a broad 
variety of laws.229  This analysis leads to the conclusion that even if free 
exercise protection was bolstered, it “is unlikely that an extremely broad 
definition of religion will be permitted to coexist with an extremely 
generous protection of the claims that fall within that definition.”230 
Seeking to increase the significance or scope of the right of free 
exercise, while balancing the court’s concerns about chaos, it has been 
suggested that a solution is “to define more narrowly what constitutes 
religion for First Amendment purposes.”231  Critics have complained that an 
expansive definition of religion, such as the “ultimate concern” definition 
adopted by the Supreme Court in Seeger (discussed in Part IV), “inevitably 
blurs the distinction between religion and non-religion” making affording 
protections under the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause an 
almost unmanageable problem.232  Accordingly, the use of “[t]oo broad a 
definition of religion tends to dilute protection for everyone.”233  Utilizing a 
definition of religion that defines it in accordance with only “the sincerity 
and the importance of a belief” to the individual, it becomes “difficult to 
understand why ‘religious’ beliefs deserve more protection than other 
sincere and important beliefs.”234  By narrowing the definition and more 
 
229. Employment Div., 494 U.S. at 888. 
230. James M. Donovan, Restoring Free Exercise Protections by Limiting Them: Preventing 
a Repeat of Smith, 17 N. Ill. U. L. REV. 1,  12 (1996) (quoting JESSIE H. CHOPER, SECURING 
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: PRINCIPLES FOR JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES 63 
(1995)). 
231. Bodensteiner, supra note 160, at 425-26. 
232. Daniel O. Conkle, The Path of American Religious Liberty: From the Original 
Theology to Formal Neutrality and an Uncertain Future, 75 IND. L.J. 1, 30 (2000).  Emily 
Delacenseri & Marvin Hill, Jr., Procrustean Beds and Draconian Choices: Lifestyle Regulations 
and Officious Intermeddlers—Bosses, Workers, Courts, and Labor Arbitrators, 57 MO. L. REV. 
51, 97 (1992) (discussing the difficulty of the Seeger/Welsh definition of religion being used in 
the workplace). 
The EEOC has been liberal in its interpretation of what constitutes a religion, adopting 
the Court’s definition in Seeger and Welsh.  What is particularly distressing for the 
practitioner is the absence of a workable definition of religion.  After Seeger and 
Welsh, one might define religion to include anything that an individual decides is 
religious in his own scheme of things.  Such a definition would avoid the courts in the 
constitutional problem of entanglement with religion, but would create havoc in the 
workplace and due process problems for employers who would have no way of 
implementing such a broad and vague scheme if charged with an affirmative duty to 
accommodate an employee’s religious observances. 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
233. Bodensteiner, supra note 160, at 426. 
234. Rebecca Rains, Can Religious Practice Be Given Meaningful Protection After 
Employment Division v. Smith?, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 687, 699 (1991). 
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clearly distinguishing religion from the secular, the result could be a greater 
protection of religious liberty.235  Proponents of narrowing the definition 
concede that this concept may offend some who regard their practices as 
religious, but argue that to allow religion to be anything one asserts it to be 
—i.e., any ultimate concern—will defeat any meaningful protection under 
the First Amendment.236  And, in weighing the level of offense, proponents 
argue that “[e]ven if it is offensive . . . it is less offensive than having the 
courts interpret the [F]ree [E]xercise [C]lause in a manner that provides no 
meaningful protection to religion.”237  Justice Goldberg asserted that “[t]he 
basic purpose of the religion clause of the First Amendment is to promote 
and assure the fullest possible scope of religious liberty and tolerance for 
all, and to nurture the conditions which secure the best hope of attainment 
of that end.”238  Although a broad definition may initially attract our default 
sympathy, Justice Goldberg’s goal may be better achieved by a narrower 
definition of religion that more clearly demarcates what is not religion than 
one that falls to distinguish that which is non-religious. 
IV. HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT OF RELIGION 
The definition of religion has not been static.  Quite to the contrary, 
how religion is understood and how it has been defined has changed in 
different eras.  From the Founders’ understanding of what a religion is, state 
courts drew their initial inspiration in defining the term.  In its first 
attempts, the Supreme Court provided a narrow, theistic definition in Davis 
v. Beason239 in the late 1800s.  In the mid-twentieth century, the Supreme 
Court would broaden its understanding of religion in United States v. 
Ballard,240 Torcaso v. Watkins,241 United States v. Seeger,242 and Welsh v. 
United States,243 before narrowing the definition somewhat in Wisconsin v. 
Yoder.244  In the wake of these Supreme Court decisions, the circuit courts 
of appeals and state courts have offered various formulations of what 
constitutes religion. 
 
235. Bodensteiner, supra note 160, at 426. 
236. Id. 
237. Id. 
238. Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 305 (1963) (Goldberg, J., 
concurring). 
239. 133 U.S. 333 (1890). 
240. 322 U.S. 78 (1944). 
241. 367 U.S. 488 (1961). 
242. 380 U.S. 163 (1965). 
243. 398 U.S. 333 (1970). 
244. 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972). 
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A. THE FOUNDERS 
Having explored why the Founders protected religious liberty, this 
article now turns to how they actually defined religion.  Although the 
Founding Fathers themselves were uniformly theists,245 the historical evi-
dence stands in conflict with regard to whether they viewed religious 
protections as applying only to theistic religions or towards a broader pro-
tection that includes non-theistic faiths.246  Most of the Founders appear to 
have considered theism and religion to be synonymous and coextensive.247  
James Madison and George Mason utilized a theistic definition of religion: 
“[T]he duty which we owe to our creator, and the manner of discharging 
it.”248  Benjamin Franklin argued that the “essentials of every religion” are 
belief in “the Deity; [and] that he made the world, and govern’d [sic] it by 
his Providence.”249  Even Thomas Paine, the most radical of the founding 
generation, defined religion in theistic terms, describing it as “man bringing 
to his Maker the fruits of his heart.”250  While not displacing the connection 
between theism and religion, Paine’s writings on religion serve to under-
mine any notion of the necessity of organization for a belief or practice to 
be deemed religious.251  Paine eloquently articulated his embrace of the 
individuality of religion: “I do not believe in the creed professed by the 
 
245. “Theism” is “a belief in the existence of a god or gods.”  MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S THIRD 
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2370 (3d ed. 2002). 
246. Harvard Note, supra note 3, at 1060. 
247. Freeman, supra note 141, at 1520-21. 
248. Harvard Note, supra note 3, at 1060 n.26 (citing JAMES MADISON, A MEMORIAL AND 
REMONSTRANCE ON THE RELIGIOUS RIGHTS OF MAN, in CORNERSTONES OF RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM IN AMERICA 84 (J. Blau ed., 1964)); Freeman, supra note 141, at 1520 (citing K. 
ROWLAND, THE LIFE OF GEORGE MASON 244 (1892)).  Madison and Mason’s definition of 
religion should not be confused with religion meaning exclusively Christianity or various 
Christian sects.  Quite to the contrary, Madison articulated a position that appears to indicate a 
strong opposition to the concept of establishing Christianity as a State religion.  Madison poses 
the question in his Memorial and Remonstration on the Religious Rights of Man, “[w]ho does not 
see that the same authority which can establish Christianity, in exclusion of all other Religions, 
may establish with the same ease any particular sect of Christians, in exclusion of all other Sects?”  
Madison continues, “the proposed establishment [of Christianity] is a departure from that 
generous policy, which, offering an asylum to the persecuted and oppressed of every Nation and 
Religion, promised a lustre to our country, and an accession to the number of its citizens.”  David 
Reiss, Jefferson and Madison as Icons in Judicial History: A Study of Religion Clause 
Jurisprudence, 61 MD. L. REV. 94, 105 n.55 (2002). 
249. Freeman, supra note 141, at 1520 (citing BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 
ON RELIGION, in PROFILE OF GENIUS: POOR RICHARD PAMPHLETS 14 (N. Goodman ed., 1938) 
(pamphlet IX)). 
250. Ingber, supra note 157, at 250-51 n.95 (citing Thomas Paine, Rights of Man, in 4 LIFE 
AND WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 92 (D. Wheeler ed., 1908)). 
251. R.P. NETTELHORST, NOTES ON THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE SEPARATION OF 
CHURCH AND STATE, http://www.theology.edu/journal/volume2/ushistor.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 
2006) (quoting Richard Emery Roberts, Excerpts from The Age of Reason, in SELECTED 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 362 (1945)). 
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Jewish Church, by the Roman Church, by the Greek Church, by the Turkish 
Church, by the Protestant Church, nor by any church that I know of.  My 
own mind is my own church.”252 
Some of the strongest historical support for a non-theistic under-
standing of religion appears in the writings of the nation’s third President, 
the pen of the Declaration of Independence.  Thomas Jefferson questioned 
the ability of the courts to define religious orthodoxy.253  He stated, “I 
cannot give up my guidance to the magistrate; because he knows no more 
of the way to heaven than I do & [sic] is less concerned to direct me right 
than I am to go right.”254  Referring to the Act for Establishing Religious 
Freedom in Virginia,255 Jefferson indicated that it “was meant to be 
universal . . . to comprehend within the mantle of its protection the Jew and 
the Gentile, the Christian and Mahometan,256 the Hindoo,257 and the infidel 
of every denomination.”258  Jefferson, however, was inconsistent in his 
conceptualization of religion; on some occasions his writings provide a 
theistic definition of religion.  For example, he wrote that religion is “a 
matter which lies solely between man and his God.”259  Furthermore, 
 
252. Id. 
253. Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025, 1030 n.7 (3d Cir. 1981) (citing Jefferson, Notes 
and Proceedings on Discontinuing the Establishment of the Church of England (1776), in I THE 
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 525, 547 (J. Boyd ed., 1950)). 
254. Id. 
255. See Bruce E. Lowry, Jr., The New Discrimination in America: In Defense of the 
Religious Equality Amendment, 16 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 205, 209 (1996) (indicating that the 
Virginia Act for Establishing Religious Freedom provides a guidepost for First Amendment 
analysis). 
256. The author intends no offense to Muslims with this incorrect reference; rather, the 
author is merely trying to accurately preserve the historical material given the context of 
discussing the historical viewpoint. 
257. The author intends no offense to Hindus with this incorrect reference; rather, the author 
is merely trying to accurately preserve the historical material given the context of discussing the 
historical viewpoint. 
258. Harvard Note, supra note 3, at 1060 (citing AMERICAN STATE PAPERS BEARING ON 
SUNDAY LEGISLATION 133 n.1 (W. Blakely ed., 1911) (emphasis in original)); see Freeman, 
supra note 141, at 1520 (citing THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 66-67 (1903)).  Roger 
Williams also embraced a broad collection of individuals within the ambit of religious liberty 
notably “Jews, Turks, Papists, Protestants, [and] pagans.”  Edward J. Eberle, Roger Williams on 
Liberty of Conscience, 10 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 289, 294-95, & n.20 (2005).  The 
writings of Thomas Jefferson and Roger Williams, who wrote on religious liberty nearly a century 
before Jefferson, suggest that by the time of the founding the understanding of religion had 
evolved beyond the view of religion held by former Alabama Supreme Court Chief Justice Roy S. 
Moore.  Former Chief Justice Moore suggested that the Supreme Court erred by embracing an 
understanding “that religion could include Buddhism, Hinduism, [and] Taoism.”  The Honorable 
Roy S. Moore, Religion in the Public Square, 29 CUMB. L. REV. 347, 356-57 (1999).  Both 
Thomas Jefferson and Roger Williams offered analysis that diverges from Moore’s understanding 
of religion. 
259. Freeman, supra note 141, at 1521 (citing Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Nehemiah 
Doge, Ephraim Robins & Stephen Nelson, A Committee of the Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. 
1, 1802), reprinted in 16 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 281 (1903)). 
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although Jefferson’s statement including Hinduism is generally interpreted 
as incorporating a broader view of religion than the theistic understanding 
of Madison,260 this conclusion does not necessarily follow from his 
statement.  Christianity, Judaism, and Islam are theistic religions.  Whether 
Hinduism is a theistic religion raises complicated theological questions,261  
but even if a resolution could be reached on whether Hinduism constitutes a 
theistic religion, it is almost impossible to assess Jefferson’s understanding 
of Hinduism, complicating any analysis of what he meant by including 
Hinduism as a protected religion.  While we know that Jefferson intended 
to protect Hindus within the ambit of religion, we are not sure what 
Jefferson knew of the beliefs and practices of Hindus. 
 
260. See Timothy L. Hall, Religion, Equality, and Difference, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 14 (1992) 
[hereinafter Hall, Religion] (“But Jefferson’s inclusive vision remained subordinate to a continued 
emphasis on the exclusive language of theism which ruled judicial rhetoric until well into the 
twentieth century.”); Karen F.B. Gray, An Establishment Clause Analysis of Webster v. 
Reproductive Health Services, 24 GA. L. REV. 399, 409 n.52 (1990) (“The [F]ounding [F]athers 
took an expansive view of religious freedom, believing that it should protect non-theistic as well 
as traditional belief systems.”); Clements, supra note 207, at 534; Bruce J. Casino, “I Know It 
When I See It”: Mail-Order Ministry Tax Fraud and the Problem of a Constitutionally Acceptable 
Definition of Religion, 25 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 113, 130 (1987) (indicating that Jefferson embraced 
a broader view than theism); Norman Dorsen, The Religion Clauses and Nonbelievers, 27 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 863, 867 n.18 (1987) (“Evidence of a desire to protect individuals other than 
theists through the [F]irst [A]mendment also exists.”); Sherryl E. Michaelson, Religion and 
Morality Legislation: A Reexamination of Establishment Clause Analysis, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 301, 
318 (1984) (Jefferson “suggests his intent to . . . transcend theistic boundaries in ensuring 
religious liberty.”); Richard O. Frame, Belief in a Nonmaterial Reality—A Proposed First 
Amendment Definition of Religion, U. ILL. L. REV. 819, 822 (1992) (“[C]ertain remarks by 
Jefferson . . . indicate that he may have been willing to regard nontheistic belief systems as 
religious. . . .  While this statement does not indicate clearly that Jefferson would have considered 
some nontheistic belief systems to be religious, it does at least enlarge the notion of religion 
beyond traditional Christianity.”). 
261. James P. Dawson, Hinduism, available at http://www.jpdawson.com/modrelg/ 
hinduism.html (last visited July 2, 2007). 
Hinduism is not one religion, but rather a family of religions . . . it is fluid and 
changing.  Hinduism is a very complex set of beliefs and instructions that they have 
derived from ancient scriptures, the Vedas.  Hindus have a very wide selection of 
beliefs and practices to choose from: they can be pantheists, polytheists, monotheists, 
agnostics and even atheists, but to reach the next level in their reincarnation they must 
choose and adhere to the teachings that they choose. 
Id.; see Koppelman, supra note 3, at 124 (“Hinduism is theistic.”); Alan E. Brownstein, 
Harmonizing the Heavenly and Earthly Spheres: The Fragmentation and Synthesis of Religion, 
Equality, and Speech in the Constitution, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 89, 111 n.106 (1990) (“Hinduism is a 
polytheistic religion countenancing the worship of numerous Gods and Goddesses through rituals 
revering their images.  Buddhism, by contrast, is in essence an atheistic faith.”); Eduardo 
Peñalver, Note, The Concept of Religion, 107 YALE L.J. 791, 817 (1997) (indicating certain Hindu 
sects are theistic); Harold J. Berman, Law and Logos, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 143, 148 n.24 (1994) 
(indicating that Hinduism is a non-theistic faith); see also Sri Siva Vishnu Temple, Frequently 
Asked Questions About Hinduism, http://www.ssvt.org/Education/Hinduism%20FAQ.asp (last 
visited Apr. 1, 2006) (discussing how complicated the questions and answers are as to whether  
Hinduism is monotheistic, polytheistic, or non-theistic). 
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What is clear, however, is that Jefferson did not stop protection for 
those whose beliefs were extremely different from his own or even 
heretical, for unlike John Locke,262 from whom Jefferson otherwise took 
much inspiration,263 Jefferson concluded that atheists warranted protec-
tion.264  This protection of atheists is an extremely important departure from 
the writings of Locke and the prevailing ethos of colonies.  As seen in the 
discussion of religious liberty in the colonies, even in Pennsylvania, the 
colony that provided the broadest protection of religious liberty, atheists 
were not protected.  And, even under the Carolinas Fundamental Constitu-
tion, which recognized almost any group as being religious, belief in a deity 
was still required. 
Nor was Jefferson alone among the Founders in his embracing of 
atheists as falling within the protection of religious liberty.  Madison, like 
his fellow Virginian, afforded atheists the protections of religious liberty.  
Madison argued to his fellow Virginia legislators: 
Whilst we assert for ourselves a freedom to embrace, to profess, 
and to observe the religion which we believe to be of divine origin, 
we cannot deny an equal freedom to those whose minds have not 
yet yielded to the evidence which has convinced us.  If this free-
dom be abused, it is an offense against God, not against man: To 
God, therefore, not to man, must an account of it be rendered.265 
Thus, any definition of religion that we arrive at, if it is to be true to the 
Founders’ guarantee, must encompass a protection for the beliefs of 
atheists.  However, if we think of atheism as only constituting a religious 
belief insofar as it takes a position on the existence of God, then we have 
not answered whether non-theistic faiths would fall within the Founders’ 
understanding of religion. 
 
262. In his A Letter Concerning Toleration, John Locke expressed no toleration for atheists.  
Locke stated: 
[T]hose are not to be tolerated who deny the being of God.  Promises, covenants, and 
oaths, which are the bonds of human society, can have no hold upon an atheist.  The 
taking away of God, though but even in thought, dissolves all.  Besides also, those that 
by their atheism undermine and destroy all religion, can have no pretense of religion 
whereupon to challenge the privilege of a Toleration. 
John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration (1689), in CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES, supra note 
32, at 21-22. 
263. Thomas “Jefferson carefully read and made notes on Locke’s The Reasonableness of 
Christianity and his Letters on Religious Toleration.  Major portions of Jefferson’s Bill for 
Establishing Religious Freedom derived from passages in Locke’s first Letter Concerning 
Toleration.”  McConnell, supra note 21, at 1430-31. 
264. Id. at 1450-51 (citing THOMAS JEFFERSON, Notes on Locke and Shaftesbury, in 1 THE 
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 550 n.2 (J. Boyd ed., 1950)). 
265. BANNING, supra note 85, at 93 (quoting JAMES MADISON, A MEMORIAL AND 
REMONSTRANCE (1785)). 
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Regardless, even if the Founders understood religion merely in theistic 
terms, the conclusion does not necessarily follow that they intended to ex-
clude non-theistic religions.  First, the founding fathers irrespective of their 
understanding of what constituted religion did not act to support any partic-
ular religion.266  Consequently, in defining religion, it can be argued that 
“the Founders sought simply to describe what religion itself is like, not to 
prescribe which religion or religions people should practice.”267  One argu-
ment in favor of non-theistic religions being included in the Founders’ 
original protection is essentially that the true intent of the Framers was to 
create a neutral definition of religion that did not discriminate against the 
unorthodox believer.268  During the Founders’ generation, unorthodox be-
lievers were, nevertheless, theists.269  However, “[h]ad there been 
nontheists among them, the Founders, in the interest of neutrality, might 
very well have conceived of religion in broader terms.  This seems 
especially likely in view of the fact that most non-theistic religions 
resemble their theistic counterparts in emphasizing the importance of 
worship, rituals, deities, and the transcendent.”270  The Founders strongly 
emphasized neutrality in the treatment of religions; thus, it seems plausible 
to assume that neutrality is the most critical factor in constructing a 
definition of religion based upon original intent.271  Furthermore, even 
though the evidence set forth in writings of the Founders primarily, if not 
exclusively, defines religion in theistic terms, no clear indication exists that 
the Founders denied the religious nature of non-theistic religions.272  And, 
the Founders’ “views assist modern courts . . . insofar as they evidence an 
intent to construe liberally the scope of religious freedom.”273  As stated by 
the United States Supreme Court, 
[t]he Fathers of the Constitution were not unaware of the varied 
and extreme views of religious sects, of the violence of disagree-
ment among them, and of the lack of any one religious creed on 
which all men would agree.  They fashioned a charter of 
 
266. Reiss, supra note 248, at 105 n.55; see Freeman, supra note 140, at 1520 (citing 
Thomas Jefferson, Autobiography, in THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 66-67 (1903)). 
267. Freeman, supra note 141, at 1521. 
268. Id.; see Harvard Note, supra note 3, at 1068 n.71. 
269. Freeman, supra note 141, at 1521. 
270. Id. 
271. Id. 
272. Harvard Note, supra note 3, at 1060. 
273. Adams & Emmerich, supra note 34, at 1666. 
      
2007] DEFINING RELIGION 165 
government which envisaged the widest possible toleration of 
conflicting views.274 
The Founders’ actions and beliefs are entirely consistent with the idea 
of embracing changes in the nature of religion, such as including non-
theistic faiths within the family of protected beliefs.  Considering the avail-
able historical information, an originalist could certainly argue that the 
Constitution restricts religious liberty to theists.  But, one could also draw 
on this same information, still looking from an originalist perspective, and 
strongly argue that it is more consistent with the Founders’ intent to protect 
non-theistic faiths as religions due to the Founders’ desire for a neutral 
approach to religion, their expansive liberal approach, and their rejection of 
static restrictions on religion.  Thus, although there are those who argue the 
Founders understanding of religion must be rejected because it limits 
religion in manner that proves inadequate to modern America,275 this con-
tention seems inaccurate.  The Founders anticipated an America in which 
religion would grow and develop.  Their emphasis on neutrality and liberal-
ity, in this regard, seems to create a structure that readily allows for 
cohesion and consistency between the Founders’ theistic views and modern 
religious practice. 
B. STATE COURTS DEFINING RELIGION IN THE MID-NINETEENTH 
CENTURY 
The first judicial attempts at defining religion in the United States 
arose not in federal courts, but in state courts. These early forays into the 
subject of what constitutes religion provide a meaningful sense of early 
judicial interpretations of the term religion.  In considering these decisions, 
there is certainly some cause for concern about whether religion means the 
same thing under a state constitution as it does under the Federal 
Constitution, especially given that states were not at this time obligated to 
adhere to the First Amendment.  However, given the Supreme Court’s 
interest in the debates and practices of states for purposes of free exercise 
and establishment jurisprudence, and that these state court decisions reveal 
no indication that the courts believed multiple meanings of the word 
religion existed, there is much to suggest that these opinions are an 
important first step in the attempt by the judiciary to define religion in the 
United States. 
 
274. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944). 
275. Adams & Emmerich, supra note 34, at 1666. 
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In 1848, the South Carolina Court of Appeals relied upon a definition 
of religion provided by former New Jersey governor and founding father 
William Livingston.  The court interpreted religion as “an habitual rever-
ence for, and devotedness to the Deity, with such external homage, public 
or private, as the worshipper believes most acceptable to him.”276  The 
court noted that the South Carolina Constitution included “the free exercise 
and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination 
or preference.”277  Furthermore, the court recognized the state constitution 
as guaranteeing 
that a man might be of any order of religious worshippers, or of 
none at all; that he might worship God, or not, as he pleased; that 
his worship might be in any form, at any time or place, or none at 
all; and that for these differences in faith or practice, no difference 
in civil condition should ever be made by law.278 
This abolition of disabilities on the basis of religion extended to the “the 
Christian, Israelite,279 Mahometan, Pagan and Infidel, [for] all stand alike, 
in the Government and people of S[outh] Carolina.”280 
Similarly, in 1846, the General Court of Virginia explored the contours 
of religious liberty within the Commonwealth.  The court described religion 
“as the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of discharging 
it.”281  By safeguarding religious liberty, the court indicated that the 
Virginia Constitution declared “to the Christian and the Mahometan, the 
Jew and the Gentile, the Epicurean and the Platonist, (if any such there be 
amongst us,) that . . . all are equally objects of its protection; securing safety 
to the people, safety to the government, safety to religion.”282  In reaching 
this conclusion, the court was interpreting Virginia’s constitutional protec-
tion of religious liberty, which as previously noted has been extremely 
influential in shaping the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
the First Amendment’s guarantees.  By embracing both Epicureanism and 
Platonism as religions, depending on how this reference is understood, the 
 
276. City Council of Charleston v. Benjamin, 33 S.C.L. 508, *12 (S.C.App. L. 1848) 
(quoting William Livingston) (emphasis in original). 
277. Id. 
278. Id. 
279. As previously discussed with regard to incorrect historical references to Hindus and 
Muslims, the author intends no offense to members of the Jewish faith with this incorrect 
reference; rather, the author is merely trying to accurately preserve the historical material given 
the context of discussing the historical viewpoint. 
280. City Council of Charleston, 33 S.C.L. at *12. 
281. Perry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. 632, 1846 WL 2406, at *5 (Va. Gen. Ct. 1846). 
282. Id. 
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Virginia court may have offered one of the broadest definitions of religion 
set forth by any court. 
C. ORTHODOXY IN THE LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY 
While Pagans were protected in South Carolina and Platonists in 
Virginia, by the late 1800s, when the United States Supreme Court began to 
address what constituted religion under the First Amendment, its under-
standing and application of the definition of religion was narrow.  In the 
late 1800s, the Supreme Court indicated that “[t]he ‘religion’ valued by the 
First Amendment . . . was the sort of theistic belief widely recognized and 
long revered by mainstream America—and nothing more.”283  The 
Supreme Court defined the term religion in purely theistic terms: “‘religion’ 
has reference to one’s views of his relations to his Creator, and to the 
obligations they impose of reverence for his being and character, and of 
obedience to his will.”284  However, as applied by the Court, the definition 
of religion proved to be even narrower than theism generally.  For example, 
the Court concluded in Davis v. Beason that the beliefs of the Mormon 
Church, also known as the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, did 
not constitute religious beliefs.285  Justice Field reasoned that because 
Mormonism advocated polygamy, which he viewed as conduct that all 
rational religious thinkers would view as immoral, it could not be 
considered a religion.286  If a belief was “against the enlightened sentiment 
of mankind,” then it was merely offered in the “pretense” of being derived 
from religious conviction.287  “In other words, any practice claimed to be 
religious, while arguably motivated by religious-type sentiments, must meet 
a certain level of enlightenment to be considered religious.”288  Essentially, 
the Court of this era excluded from the definition of religious beliefs and 
 
283. David D. Meyer, Self-Definition in the Constitution of Faith and Family, 86 MINN. L. 
REV. 791, 811 (2002). 
284. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890). 
285. Id. at 341-42; see Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. 
United States, 136 U.S. 1, 46 (1890) (upholding the repeal of the Mormon Church charter); see 
also Meyer, supra note 283, at 811 n.95 (“[T]he claims of religious minorities received little 
serious attention from the Supreme Court through the first part of this century.” (citing 4 RONALD 
D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND 
PROCEDURE § 21.7, at 532 (1992)); TRIBE, AMERICAN, supra note 217, at 1179 (“In order to be 
considered legitimate, religions had to be viewed as ‘civilized’ by Western standards.”). 
286. See Davis, 133 U.S. at 341-42 (“[T]o call their advocacy a tenet of religion is to offend 
the common sense of mankind.”); see also Meyer, supra 283, at 811 (“Thus, in a succession of 
cases toward the end of the Nineteenth Century, the Court placed Mormons effectively outside the 
scope of protected religion . . . .”). 
287. Late Corp., 136 U.S. at 50. 
288. Lee J. Strang, The Meaning of “Religion” in the First Amendment, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 
181, 200 n.97 (2002). 
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practices those that did not fit neatly within a mainstream Christian 
perspective. 
D. BROADENING THE DEFINITION OF RELIGION IN THE MIDDLE OF 
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 
However, this understanding of religion did not last because “[t]he 
Court’s narrow . . . conception of ‘religion’ began to give way . . . midway 
through the Twentieth Century, following a period of dramatic diversifica-
tion of American religious life.”289  Courts began expanding the definition 
of religion in the 1940s.  Discussing what constituted religious belief in the 
context of a conscientious objector statute, the Second Circuit stated: 
[T]he content of the term is found in the history of the human race 
and is incapable of compression into a few words.  Religious 
belief arises from a sense of the inadequacy of reason as a means 
of relating the individual to his fellow-men . . . in the most 
primitive and in the most highly civilized societies.  It accepts the 
aid of logic but refuses to be limited by it.  It is a belief finding 
expression in a conscience which categorically requires the 
believer to disregard elementary self-interest and to accept 
martyrdom in preference to transgressing its tenets.290 
The Second Circuit’s more expansive approach to religion began to 
spread.  For example, in a dissenting opinion, United States Supreme Court 
Justice Felix Frankfurter utilized the Second Circuit definition rather than 
the 1890 Supreme Court’s definition of religion.291  However, the move-
ment of the definition of religion away from theism was not immediate.  
For example, three years later, interpreting the same conscientious objector 
statute as the Second Circuit had, the Ninth Circuit declared: 
There are those who have a philosophy of life, and who live up to 
it.  There is evidence that this is so in regard to appellant.  How-
ever, no matter how pure and admirable his standard may be, and 
no matter how devotedly he adheres to it, his philosophy and 
morals and social policy without the concept of deity cannot be 
said to be religion . . . .”292 
The Supreme Court made a pronouncement in United States v. Ballard 
that is sometimes considered a break with its Beason jurisprudence which 
 
289. Meyer, supra note 283, at 812. 
290. United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703, 708 (2d Cir. 1943). 
291. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 658-59 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting). 
292. Berman v. United States, 156 F.2d 377, 381 (9th Cir. 1946). 
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defined religion in terms of theism;293 however, this interpretation is an 
incorrect, or at least a not completely correct, view of the case.294  The 
Court did begin to widen its understanding of religion, but the theistic defi-
nition in Beason was not abandoned.  However, the Court would not deem 
some religions as real religions that warranted protection, and some re-
ligions as untrue religions, which were not worthy of protection.295  There 
would be no inquiries allowed into the truth or falsity of religious beliefs or 
doctrines.296 
The language that occasionally attracts commentators to state that 
Ballard rejected a theistic definition of religion is the Court’s statement that 
“[f]reedom of thought, which includes freedom of religious belief, is basic 
in a society of free men.  It embraces the right to maintain theories of life 
and of death and of the hereafter which are rank heresy to followers of the 
orthodox faiths.”297  However, the Court further stated that the Founders, by 
protecting religious liberty, were ensuring that “[m]an’s relation to his God 
was made no concern of the state.  He was granted the right to worship as 
he pleased and to answer to no man for the verity of his religious views.”298  
The Court added: 
[a]s stated in Davis v. Beason “[w]ith man’s relations to his Maker 
and the obligations he may think they impose, and the manner in 
which an expression shall be made by him of his belief on those 
subjects, no interference can be permitted, provided always the 
laws of society, designed to secure its peace and prosperity, and 
the morals of its people, are not interfered with.”299 
 
293. See Strang, supra note 288, at 201 (stating that the Supreme Court in Ballard 
“implicitly expanded beyond theism the definition of religion”); Hall, Sacred, supra note 150, at 
145 (“[T]he Supreme Court in United States v. Ballard emphasized the breadth of religious 
freedom in such a way as to call into question future attempts to define religion according to the 
measuring rod of theism.”); Casino, supra, note 260, at 130-31 (regarding the Supreme Court’s 
treatment of the Beason definition, the Court noted that “[t]his theistic notion of religion was 
dominant until the 1940’s, when the Supreme Court, in a series of decisions, changed direction in 
regard to both the belief/action distinction and the theistic definition of religion”). 
294. See Eli A. Echols, Note, Defining Religion for Constitutional Purposes: A New 
Approach Based on the Writings of Emanuel Swedenborg, 13 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 117, 126-27 
(2003) (“[Ballard] does not actually repudiate the theistic definition of religion.  Rather, it impli-
citly embraces this definition by explaining that the First Amendment removed ‘man’s relation to 
his God’ from the State’s concerns.”). 
295. See Meyer, supra note 283, at 812 (indicating that in Ballard “the Court insisted that the 
First Amendment valued unorthodox faiths as well as conventional religion.”). 
296. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 88 (1944). 
297. Id. at 86 (internal citations omitted). 
298. Id. at 87. 
299. Id.  (internal citations omitted). 
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What the Ballard Court did change in the definition of religion was 
perspective.  In looking at theories of life, death, and the hereafter, the 
Court was looking at what the faith was oriented towards: what types of 
questions it was asking and what answers it was providing.  With regard to 
theism, the Court’s understanding of religion in Ballard can best be 
described in terms of having “offered the possibility that nontheistic faiths 
would be entitled to [F]irst [A]mendment protection.”300  Justice Rutledge 
in his Everson dissent would embrace this understanding, viewing religion 
as an expression of the practitioner’s “feeling toward ultimate issues of 
existence.”301  What the Ballard Court and Justice Rutledge had empha-
sized were “generic areas of religious belief—life after death, for example 
—rather than specific beliefs—faith in a supreme being, for example—that 
must be held in order for the belief system to be considered religious.”302  
Although Ballard has also been described as having stripped content from 
the definition of religion,303 “the language of Ballard [actually] remained 
content-oriented.”304  But, it began moving that content analysis in an 
intriguing direction that presented an as yet unresolved issue insofar as the 
Court “left uncertain the extent to which the protected beliefs must embrace 
what have been termed ‘extratemporal consequences’ or ‘transcendent 
realities.’”305 
Whether Ballard embraced a non-theistic definition of religion or 
simply helped pave the way towards one being embraced, the Court clearly 
expanded its understanding of religion beyond theistic belief in a god or 
gods in the 1961 case of Torcaso v. Watkins.306  The Court included within 
its definition of religion Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, and Secular 
Humanism, which are faiths that do not embrace a traditional Western 
concept of God or Gods or, arguably, any concept of god whatsoever.307  
While the Supreme Court concluded in Torcaso that the government could 
not discriminate to favor religions that embraced a concept of god against 
those that do not, and provided a list of religions not based on a belief in 
God, the Court did not explain why these particular beliefs constituted 
religions nor did it provide a definition that would allow for determining 
 
300. Sherryl E. Michaelson, Note, Religion and Morality Legislation: A Reexamination of 
Establishment Clause Analysis, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 301, 322 (1984). 
301. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 45 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting). 
302. Michaelson, supra note 300, at 322. 
303. See Echols, supra note 294, at 127 n.64. 
304. Michaelson, supra note 300, at 322. 
305. Id. at 322-23. 
306. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n.11 (1961). 
307. Id. 
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what other beliefs constituted religions.308  Thus, although it was clear that 
religion was not limited to theism, it was not entirely clear what religion 
was. 
In two conscientious objector cases, the Court provided a definition of 
religion.  The Court in Seeger adopted the following understanding as the 
test of belief: “whether a given belief that is sincere and meaningful 
occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the 
orthodox belief in God of one who clearly qualifies.”309  In Welsh, the 
plurality indicated that to be religious, this sincerity must “stem from the 
registrant’s moral, ethical, or religious beliefs about what is right and 
wrong[,] and . . . these beliefs [must] be held with the strength of traditional 
religious convictions.”310  The plurality determined, 
[i]f an individual deeply and sincerely holds beliefs that are purely 
ethical or moral in source and content but that nevertheless impose 
upon him a duty of conscience to refrain from participating in any 
war at any time, those beliefs certainly occupy in the life of that 
individual a place parallel to that filled by God in traditionally 
religious persons.311 
Thus, purely moral and ethical beliefs, both in their source and content, 
were religious beliefs.312 
However, with Justice Blackmun not participating, four justices 
rejected this view.313  Justice Harlan would have found the exemption for 
conscientious objectors who were opposed to the war because of their 
religious beliefs to be an Establishment Clause violation.314  Such a viola-
tion occurred in his view because the conscientious objector legislation 
preferred theists to those who ascribed to a non-theistic religion, and as 
applied to the plaintiff, over those with strong, but secular, conscience 
based opposition.315  Even defining religion so as to include non-theists 
would not resolve the problem, for the basic difficulty was a preference for 
religion over non-religion.316  For Justice Harlan, the plaintiff’s beliefs were 
 
308. Id. at 495. 
309. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 166 (1965); see Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 
333, 340 (1970) (plurality opinion). 
310. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 340. 
311. Id. 
312. Id.; see Seeger, 380 U.S. at 166 (holding that meaningful and sincere beliefs are 
religious beliefs). 
313. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 333. 
314. Id. at 345. 
315. Id. at 356-66 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
316. Id. 
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clearly secular, not religious.317  Justice White, writing for Justice Stewart 
and Chief Justice Burger, like Justice Harlan, similarly did not regard the 
plaintiff’s beliefs as religious.318  Justice White’s dissenting opinion, 
however, rejected Justice Harlan’s conclusion that an exemption for 
religious objectors without including those with passionate, but secular, 
non-religious, beliefs would be unconstitutional.319 
Although the Court in Seeger and the plurality in Welsh were 
construing the terms of a statute, the Court strongly suggested that this 
understanding of religion carried over to the First Amendment.320  There 
have, however, been questions raised as to whether the Court truly intended 
the Seeger and Welsh definitions of religion to be applied to the First 
Amendment as opposed to being limited to the conscientious objector 
statutory provision.321  Regardless of the Court’s original intent, Seeger and 
Welsh have had and continue to have a significant influence on how courts 
approach and understand what religion means for purposes of the First 
Amendment.322 
Despite the continuing impact of these decisions, “[i]n subsequent 
cases, the Court appears to have retreated somewhat from the most expan-
sive implications of Seeger’s functional approach to defining religion and 
that of Welsh.”323  In Yoder, the Court indicated that a “way of life” would 
not amount to religion, nor would philosophical beliefs.324  “Thus, if the 
Amish asserted their claims because of their subjective evaluation and 
rejection of the contemporary secular values accepted by the majority, 
much as Thoreau rejected the social values of his time and isolated himself 
 
317. Id. 
318. Id. at 367-74 (White, J., dissenting). 
319. Id. 
320. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176, 188 (1965) (Douglas, J., concurring); 
see also Jesse H. Choper, Defining “Religion” in the First Amendment, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 579, 
589 (1982) (analyzing Seeger as “hav[ing] significant constitutional portents, particularly because 
the Court’s straining of the language of the statute . . . was prompted by its desire to [avoid] 
imputing to Congress an intent to classify different religious beliefs, exempting some and 
excluding others”); Donald A. Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal 
Development Part I, The Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1425 (1967) 
(“[Seeger] seems to suggest the Court’s ultimate definition of religion for constitutional 
purposes.”). 
321. Kalka v. Hawk, 215 F.3d 90, 98 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“Whether Seeger meant to define 
religion as used in the First Amendment is doubtful.  Instead of discussing the history of the First 
Amendment, the Court there discussed the history of the draft.”). 
322. See, e.g., Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 419 F.3d 678, 681-82 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing and 
applying the definition of religion set forth in Seeger and by the plurality in Welsh); Kong v. 
Scully, 341 F.3d 1132, 1138 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing the Seeger definition of religion). 
323. Meyer, supra note 283, at 813. 
324. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215, 216 (1972). 
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at Walden Pond, their claims would not rest on a religious basis.”325 
Distinguishing between philosophy and religion, the Court indicated that 
“Thoreau’s choice was philosophical and personal rather than religious, and 
such belief does not rise to the demands of the Religion Clauses.”326  The 
Court’s discussion of how to treat views such as those of Thoreau, although 
merely dicta, embodies the change in the Supreme Court’s understanding of 
religion from Seeger to Yoder.  Justice Douglas sounds this retreat, noting 
that the type of personal and philosophical choice made by Thoreau would 
have fallen within the definition of religion provided by Seeger.327  
Torcaso, a 1961 decision, and Yoder, a 1972 decision, in both of which the 
Court’s discussion of defining religion is merely dicta, and Seeger and 
Welsh, two statutory interpretation cases from 1965 and 1970 respectively, 
stand as the last significant pronouncements from the Supreme Court on 
what constitutes a religion.  None of these decisions offer a commanding 
pronouncement of what the law is, instead they serve only as loose 
guidance for the state courts and lower federal courts.328 
E. RESPONSE OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURTS TO A BROADER 
DEFINITION OF RELIGION 
Without definitive guidance from the Supreme Court, the various 
Circuit Courts of Appeals have responded to this vacuum by creating a 
variety of tests, which generally, but not completely, overlap.  There are 
five primary approaches.  In Africa v. Pennsylvania,329 the Third Circuit 
Court of Appeals offered a three part-test: 
First, a religion addresses fundamental and ultimate questions 
having to do with deep and imponderable matters.  Second, a 
religion is comprehensive in nature; it consists of a belief-system 
as opposed to an isolated teaching.  Third, a religion often can be 
recognized by the presence of certain formal and external signs.330 
 
325. Id. at 216. 
326. Id. 
327. Id. at 247-48 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).  William James also found Thoreau’s 
philosophy to be religious.  See WILLIAM JAMES, THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 222 
(1985) (providing Thoreau’s work as an illustration of personal spirituality). 
328. See, e.g., Bodensteiner, supra note 160, at 421 n.31 (explaining the heterogeneous 
religious composition of the United States); Caroline L. Kraus, Note, Religious Exemptions—
Applicability to Vegetarian Beliefs, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 197, 214 (2001); Val D. Ricks, To God 
God’s, To Caesar Caesar’s, and to Both the Defining of Religion, 26 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1053, 
1065-66 (1993); William D. Palmer, Time to Exorcise Another Ghost From the Vietnam War: 
Restructuring the In-Service Conscientious Objector Program, 140 MIL. L. REV. 179, 220 (1993). 
329. 662 F.2d 1025 (3d Cir. 1981). 
330. Africa, 662 F.2d at 1032. 
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This Third Circuit definition, which grew out of a concurring opinion by 
Judge Arlin Adams in Malnak v. Yogi,331 has been enormously influential 
with other circuit courts, federal district courts, and state courts.332  The 
United States Court of Appeals for District of Columbia Circuit views 
religion as belief systems that address “underlying theories of man’s nature 
or his place in the Universe.”333  In United States v. Meyers, the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, navigating the unsettled waters surrounding what 
is and is not a religion, adopted a test composed of a variety of religious 
factors that various courts have identified.334  These factors include ultimate 
ideas, metaphysical beliefs, a moral or ethical system, comprehensiveness 
of beliefs; and the accoutrements of religion, which includes a founder, 
teacher or prophet, important writings, gathering places, keepers of 
knowledge, ceremonies and rituals, structure or organization, holidays, diets 
or fasting, prescribed appearance and clothing, and propagation.335  The 
 
331. 592 F.2d 197, 207-10 (3d Cir. 1979). 
332. See, e.g., Udey v. Kastner, 644 F. Supp. 1441, 1443 (E.D. Tex. 1986) (providing a two-
part test for deciding whether a prisoner’s religious dietary demands could be denied); Cutter v. 
Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257, 267-68 (6th Cir. 2003); see also Jane M. Ritter, The Legal Definition of 
Religion: From Eating Cat Food to White Supremacy, 20 TOURO L. REV. 751, 776-777 (2004). 
333. Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 409 F.2d 1146, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 
1969). 
334. United States v. Meyers, 95 F.3d 1475, 1482-84 (10th Cir. 1996). 
335. Id.  The Tenth Circuit explained these terms as follows: 
1. Ultimate Ideas: Religious beliefs often address fundamental questions about life, 
purpose, and death.  As one court has put it, “a religion addresses fundamental and 
ultimate questions having to do with deep and imponderable matters.”  These matters 
may include existential matters, such as man’s sense of being; teleological matters, 
such as man’s purpose in life; and cosmological matters, such as man’s place in the 
universe. 
2. Metaphysical Beliefs: Religious beliefs often are “metaphysical,” that is, they 
address a reality which transcends the physical and immediately apparent world.  
Adherents to many religions believe that there is another dimension, place, mode, or 
temporality, and they often believe that these places are inhabited by spirits, souls, 
forces, deities, and other sorts of inchoate or intangible entities. 
3. Moral or Ethical System: Religious beliefs often prescribe a particular manner of 
acting, or way of life, that is “moral” or “ethical.”  In other words, these beliefs often 
describe certain acts in normative terms, such as “right and wrong,” “good and evil,” 
or “just and unjust.”  The beliefs then proscribe those acts that are “wrong,” “evil,” or 
“unjust.”  A moral or ethical belief structure also may create duties—duties often 
imposed by some higher power, force, or spirit—that require the believer to abnegate 
elemental self-interest. 
4. Comprehensiveness of Beliefs: Another hallmark of “religious” ideas is that they are 
comprehensive.  More often than not, such beliefs provide a telos, an overreaching 
array of beliefs that coalesce to provide the believer with answers to many, if not 
most, of the problems and concerns that confront humans.  In other words, religious 
beliefs generally are not confined to one question or a single teaching. 
5. Accoutrements of Religion: By analogy to many of the established or recognized 
religions, the presence of the following external signs may indicate that a particular set 
of beliefs is “religious:” 
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Second Circuit Court of Appeals looked at religion not in a systematic or 
cultural manner, but instead psychologically, defining religion as “the 
feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as 
they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may 
consider the divine.”336  Thus, expressly relying on Seeger, the Second 
Circuit held that for beliefs to be considered religious, “[a]n individual 
claiming violation of free exercise rights need only demonstrate that the 
beliefs professed are ‘sincerely held’ and in the individual’s ‘own scheme 
of things, religious.’”337 
 
a. Founder, Prophet, or Teacher: Many religions have been wholly founded or 
significantly influenced by a deity, teacher, seer, or prophet who is considered to 
be divine, enlightened, gifted, or blessed. 
b. Important Writings: Most religions embrace seminal, elemental, fundamental, 
or sacred writings.  These [sic] writing often include creeds, tenets, precepts, 
parables, commandments, prayers, scriptures, catechisms, chants, rites, or 
mantras. 
c. Gathering Places: Many religions designate particular structures or places as 
sacred, holy, or significant.  These sites often serve as gathering places for 
believers.  They include physical structures, such as churches, mosques, temples, 
pyramids, synagogues, or shrines; and natural places, such as springs, rivers, 
forests, plains, or mountains. 
d. Keepers of Knowledge: Most religions have clergy, ministers, priests, 
reverends, monks, shamans, teachers, or sages. By virtue of their enlightenment, 
experience, education, or training, these people are keepers and purveyors of 
religious knowledge. 
e. Ceremonies and Rituals: Most religions include some form of ceremony, 
ritual, liturgy, sacrament, or protocol.  These acts, statements, and movements 
are prescribed by the religion and are imbued with transcendent significance. 
f. Structure or Organization: Many religions have a congregation or group of 
believers who are led, supervised, or counseled by a hierarchy of teachers, 
clergy, sages, priests, etc. 
g. Holidays: As is etymologically evident, many religions celebrate, observe, or 
mark “holy,” sacred, or important days, weeks, or months. 
h. Diet or Fasting: Religions often prescribe or prohibit the eating of certain 
foods and the drinking of certain liquids on particular days or during particular 
times. 
i. Appearance and Clothing: Some religions prescribe the manner in which 
believers should maintain their physical appearance, and other religions 
prescribe the type of clothing that believers should wear. 
j. Propagation: Most religious groups, thinking that they have something 
worthwhile or essential to offer non-believers, attempt to propagate their views 
and persuade others of their correctness.  This is sometimes called “mission 
work,” “witnessing,” “converting,” or proselytizing. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
336. United States v. Sun Myung Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1227 (2d Cir. 1983) (citing 
WILLIAM JAMES, THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 31 (1910)) (emphasis in original); 
see Patrick v. LeFevre, 745 F.2d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 1984) (citing WILLIAM JAMES, THE VARIETIES  
OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 31 (1910)). 
337. Ford v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 582, 588 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Fifth Ave. Presbyterian 
Church v. City of New York, 293 F.3d 570, 574 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting  United States v. Seeger, 
380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965))). 
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Although also referencing Seeger and the plurality definition from 
Welsh, in framing its own definition of religion, the Seventh Circuit’s 
approach to religion is somewhat different than the Second Circuit’s 
approach.  In the Seventh Circuit’s definition, “when a person sincerely 
holds beliefs dealing with issues of ‘ultimate concern’ that for her occupy a 
‘place parallel to that filled by . . . God in traditionally religious persons,’ 
those beliefs represent her religion”338 for purposes of free exercise.339  The 
court, however, also noted Yoder and indicated that “[t]he Supreme Court 
has said that a religion, for purposes of the First Amendment, is distinct 
from a ‘way of life,’ even if that way of life is inspired by philosophical 
beliefs or other secular concerns.”340  For the Seventh Circuit the definition 
of religion that results from combining these two decisions appears to be 
more content-based than the Second Circuit’s definition.  In the Seventh 
Circuit, religion is something that is “taking a position on divinity”341 and 
an issue of “ultimate concern,”342 rather than simply sincere beliefs that are 
in the “individual’s own scheme of things, religious” as the Second Circuit 
holds.343  These views represent the five primary approaches with other 
circuits generally deferring to and applying one of these respective 
viewpoints,344 although occasionally only using a test for purposes of the 
particular case—assuming arguendo the test properly defines religion.345 
F. STATE COURTS’ RESPONSE TO A BROADER DEFINITION OF 
RELIGION 
State courts have addressed a variety of statutory provisions that relate 
to exemptions for religious activity and religious organizations. 
If a state court is addressing an issue to which both the U.S. 
Constitution and the applicable state constitution have applicable 
 
338. Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 419 F.3d 678, 681-82 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing Fleischfresser v.  
Dirs. of Sch. Dist. 200, 15 F.3d 680, 688 n.5 (7th Cir. 1994)) (internal citation and quotation 
omitted); see Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 340 (1970) (plurality opinion); United States 
v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 184-88 (1965). 
339. Fleischfresser, 15 F.3d at 688 n.5. 
340. Kaufman, 419 F.3d at 681-82; see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972). 
341. Kaufman, 419 F.3d at 682 (“If we think of religion as taking a position on divinity, then 
atheism is indeed a form of religion.” (citing Reed v. Great Lakes Cos., 330 F.3d 931, 934 (7th 
Cir. 2003))). 
342. Id. at 681. 
343. Ford v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 582, 588 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Fifth Ave. Presbyterian 
Church v. City of New York, 293 F.3d 570, 574 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Seeger, 
380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965))). 
344. See, e.g., Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257, 267-68 (6th Cir. 2003); Doswell v. Smith, 
1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 4644, at *9-10 (4th Cir. Mar. 13, 1998). 
345. See Love v. Reed, 216 F.3d 682, 687 (8th Cir. 2000); Alvarado v. City of San Jose, 94 
F.3d 1223, 1229 (9th Cir. 1996). 
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clauses—such as free speech, free exercise and nonestablishment 
of religion, or equal protection—then the court has some 
obligation to use the federal authority to define the minimum 
applicable threshold concerning individual rights.346 
Furthermore, the state courts have needed to define religion and to 
approach it in a manner that is consistent with the First Amendment. 
Of the various definitions of religion set forth by state courts, the 
Supreme Court of Missouri has provided one of the more controversial 
formulations.347  The Missouri state tax commission had concluded that 
although the Missouri Church of Scientology 
has some of the trappings and accouterments of an organized 
religion, it appears to be more an applied philosophy which has a 
certain religious connotation, but which falls short of being 
devoted to the worship of the Supreme Being, which [the] 
Commission [concluded was] necessary for the property owner to 
have its property considered exclusively for religious worship.348 
The state tax commission determined that “‘an applied religious 
philosophy’ is not identical for purposes of exemption ‘with an organized 
religion devoted to religious worship.’”349  Thus, the Commission decided 
that the Church of Scientology’s use of land was not for religious 
purposes.350 
Relying upon Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda,351 the 
Missouri Church of Scientology argued that the Missouri Supreme Court 
should have rejected the tax commission’s definition and instead adopt the 
understanding of religion and religious worship delineated by a California 
appellate court in the aforementioned case.352  The California court in 
Fellowship of Humanity, indicated that “the proper interpretation of the 
terms ‘religion’ or ‘religious’ in tax exemption laws should not include any 
reference to whether the beliefs involved are theistic or nontheistic.”353  
Thus, “[r]eligion simply includes: (1) a belief, not necessarily referring to 
supernatural powers; (2) a cult, involving a gregarious association openly 
 
346. Jim Rossi, Institutional Design and the Lingering Legacy of Antifederalist Separation of 
Powers Ideals in the States, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1218 (1999). 
347. See David Young, The Meaning of “Religion” in the First Amendment: Lexicography 
and Constitutional Policy, 56 UMKC L. REV. 313, 322 (1988). 
348. Mo. Church of Scientology v. State Tax Comm’n, 560 S.W.2d 837, 840 (Mo. 1977) (en 
banc) (emphasis in original). 
349. Id. 
350. Id. 
351. 315 P.2d 394 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957). 
352. Alameda, 315 P.2d at 406. 
353. Id. 
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expressing the belief; (3) a system of moral practice directly resulting from 
an adherence to the belief; and, (4) an organization within the cult designed 
to observe the tenets of belief.”354  For the California court, “[t]he content 
of the belief is of no moment.  Assuming this definition of ‘religion’ is cor-
rect, then it necessarily follows that any lawful means of formally observing 
the tenets of the cult is ‘worship,’ within the meaning of the tax exemption 
provision.”355  The Missouri Supreme Court, however, did not find this 
argument persuasive, and instead affirmed the tax commission’s conclusion 
that the practices of the Missouri Church of Scientology did not constitute 
religious worship.356  The court concluded that to warrant an application of 
tax-exempt status accorded to property dedicated to religious worship, an 
organization as a “minimum requirement [must have] a belief in the 
Supreme Being.”357  The court reasoned that “[g]enerally religious worship 
is expressed by prayers, reverence, homage and adoration paid to a deity 
and include the seeking out by prayer and otherwise the will of the deity for 
divine guidance.”358  Although indicating that a religious organization did 
not need to use the term God or Supreme Being, the Missouri Supreme 
Court concluded that the United States Supreme Court in Seeger had not 
“excised the concept of a Supreme Being from ‘religion.’”359  Quite to the 
contrary, the court stated that “it can reasonably be said that when [the 
United States Supreme Court] spoke of ‘claimed belief’ as occupying ‘the 
same place in the life of the objector as an orthodox belief in God holds in 
the life of one clearly qualified for exemption,’ . . . the term necessarily 
includes God or Supreme Being.”360  For the court, the United States 
Supreme Court’s decision in Seeger was more a matter of semantics: that 
the religious group or individual might not refer to their god or gods as God 
or a Supreme Being was of no import so long as they nevertheless had a 
God or a Supreme Being included in their beliefs.361  Furthermore, the court 
noted that “[t]he Seeger definition is not one of constitutional construction 
but of statutory interpretation” of the Universal Military Training and 




356. Mo. Church of Scientology v. State Tax Comm’n, 560 S.W.2d 837, 840 (Mo. 1977). 
357. Id. at 842. 
358. Id. at 840. 
359. Id. at 842. 
360. Id. (emphasis in original). 
361. Id. 
362. Id. at 841-42. 
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religious, belief in a Supreme Being or God, although not under that 
particular name, remains an essential component of religion.363 
In a case presenting issues similar to those before the Missouri 
Supreme Court, the Rhode Island Supreme Court in Church of Pan, Inc. v. 
Norberg considered whether the Church of Pan (Pan) was a “church” or 
“other religious organization,” which would entitle it to a tax-exempt status 
under Rhode Island law.  The trial court had determined Pan was operated 
for purely religious purposes and was therefore entitled to the tax exemp-
tion.364  In analyzing the trial court’s findings, the Rhode Island Supreme 
Court viewed the following facts as being important to its analysis:  Pan 
had a founder, who served as the church’s senior minister,365 but none of 
the members of the group’s ministry were formally trained in theology.366  
“The church’s doctrines include[d] belief in ‘the natural god’ [and] [c]entral 
to the organization’s teachings is a duty to serve this god through the study, 
care, and preservation of nature.”367  As part of this mission, Pan main-
tained 150 acres as a preserve for wildlife and the ecosystem, and its pri-
mary activities consisted of “forestry, wildlife care and recycling programs 
in which both members and nonmembers participate.”368  The organization 
also made “monetary contributions to such organizations as the Audubon 
Society and the Sierra Club.”369  Members of the twenty-five person 
congregation were free to adhere to other faiths, and many members were 
actually practicing members of other religions.370  Pan conducted monthly 
services, which consisted of a “general discussion, usually forty-five 
minutes to one hour in length, on a topic chosen by the senior minister.”371  
During these services, “[n]o hymns are sung, no prayers are recited, and 
there are no scripture readings.”372  As for physical facilities, Pan “has no 
church building or other formal place of worship.  Weather permitting, 
monthly services are conducted in a meadow or in woodlands on 200 acres 
 
363. Id. at 842.  Subsequent decisions and commentators have reiterated that Missouri law 
requires belief in a Supreme Being to qualify for a religious tax exemption.  See, e.g., Ozark 
Avalon v. Lachner, 2001 WL 909165, at *8 (Mo. St. Tax. Comm’n 2001); Sch. of Metaphysics v. 
McIntire, 1992 WL 18304, at *6 (Mo. St. Tax. Comm’n 1992); GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT ET 
AL., THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 401, n.20 (Rev. 2d ed. 2006). 
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of leased property. . . .  In inclement weather, services are held indoors 
wherever space is available.”373 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court framed its analysis by noting that 
“[t]he mere fact that the claimant characterizes itself [as a religious 
organization] is not determinative.”374  The court indicated it “is permitted 
to inquire into the true purposes for which the organization was established 
and is conducted.”375  Nor will the stated purpose of the organization 
suffice to demonstrate that it is a religious organization; instead, the court 
will look to the organization’s actual activities.376  Citing the 1890s 
Supreme Court decision in Beason, the court noted that religion “has 
traditionally been defined as one’s views of one’s relationship with, and 
obligations to, a supreme being.”377  Since the Supreme Court’s Torcaso, 
Seeger, Welsh, and Yoder cases have failed to provide a binding First 
Amendment definition to the contrary, the court viewed religion for 
purposes of the First Amendment as having “reference to one’s views of his 
relations to his Creator, and to the obligations they impose of reverence for 
his being and character, and of obedience to his will.”378  For the court, it 
was essential that “[o]rganizations operated exclusively for religious 
purposes must be distinguished from those organizations dedicated 
primarily to the furtherance of philosophical, scientific, sociological, 
ecological, charitable, or political principles.”379 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court concluded that even though the 
“plaintiff’s motives and the sincerity of its beliefs are not in question,” Pan 
simply was not a religion.380  The court found the following factors to 
undermine Pan’s claim that it was a religious organization: (1) “members 
are free to continue to practice other religions;” (2) the “congregation has 
neither any formally trained or ordained ministry nor any sacraments, 
rituals, or formal education courses;” (3) Pan’s “[m]onthly services consist 
simply of a general discussion rather than religious worship;” and, (4) 
“[d]uring the services no hymns are sung, no prayers are recited, and there 
are no scripture readings.”381  Considering Pan’s tenets and activities, the 









380. Id. at 1363. 
381. Id. 
382. Id. 
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The court indicated that “[t]he plaintiff’s activities, which include forestry, 
wildlife care, recycling programs and monetary support of environmental 
organizations, are best described as environmental and conservational 
programs.”383  The court determined that the “organization’s purpose is 
primarily the preservation of the environment, any religious connotation or 
purpose is merely incidental to this secular purpose.”384  These factors were 
critical to the court’s understanding of what constitutes a religion for 
purposes of its state tax laws, as interpreted in a manner consistent with the 
First Amendment. 
The Pan court drew upon the analysis utilized in a similar Minnesota 
case, Ideal Life Church of Lake Elmo v. County of Washington.385  
However, in a subsequent decision, In re Collection of Delinquent Property 
Taxes,386 the Minnesota Supreme Court, although not overruling Ideal Life, 
did further clarify the Ideal Life decision.387  The court indicated that the 
“test for determining whether an organization is properly considered [a 
religious entity] for tax purposes is a subjective one, focusing on the 
sincerity of belief and taking into account evidence on issues such as those 
articulated in Ideal Life.”388  For the issues similar to those articulated in 
Ideal Life, i.e., for the objective component of the test, the Minnesota courts 
have chosen to look to factors identified by the IRS in determining whether 
a legal entity is a church for tax purposes.389  These characteristics include: 
a distinct legal existence, a recognized creed and form of worship, a definite 
and distinct ecclesiastical government, a formal code of doctrine and disci-
pline, a distinct religious history, a membership not associated with any 
other church or denomination, an organization of ordained ministers, a pre-
scribed course of study for ordained ministers, a literature of its own, 
established places of worship, regular congregations, regular religious 
services, Sunday schools for religious instruction of the young, and schools 
for the preparation of its ministers.390  The In re Collection of Delinquent 
Real Property Taxes court continued to look to objective factors while tying 
these objective factors to its sincerity analysis.  In concluding that the 




385. 304 N.W.2d 308 (Minn. 1981). 
386. 530 N.W.2d 200 (Minn. 1995). 
387. In re Collection of Delinquent Real Property Taxes, 530 N.W.2d at 205. 
388. Id. at 205. 
389. Id. 
390. Id. (citing INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, PUBL’N NO. 1828, TAX GUIDE FOR 
CHURCHES AND OTHER RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS (Draft July 26, 1994)). 
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that while [the party seeking to be described as religious entity] 
meets several of the criteria articulated in Ideal Life, absence of 
certain other characteristics undermines an assertion of sincerity of 
belief . . . .  In particular, we note the lack of association with other 
congregations, the lack of a prescribed course of study for 
ordained ministers and the dearth of sacrament, ritual, liturgy or 
recognized form of worship.391 
The Minnesota appellate courts have also wrestled with the conver-
gence and distinctions between “conscience,” “creed,” and “religion.”  The 
Minnesota Commission on Human Rights concluded that refusal to deliver 
food to an abortion clinic violated the state’s public accommodation laws 
by discriminating based on creed.392  The Commission noted that the 
refusal to deliver to the clinic was “because of [the clinic’s] commitment to 
pro-choice beliefs” and that such action, failing to deliver food, constituted 
“discrimination based upon ‘creed.’”393  The Commission defined “‘creed’ 
as a ‘formulation or epitome of principles, rules, opinions, and precepts 
formally expressed and seriously adhered to and maintained.’”394  The 
Commission reasoned that because the head of the clinic and the organiza-
tion itself “are ‘adamantly pro-choice for women’ and are committed to 
providing abortion services, and their pro-choice position ‘demonstrates a 
seriously maintained set of principles and opinions,’”395 their “pro-choice 
position constituted a ‘creed.’”396  Reversing, the Minnesota Court of 
Appeals determined the term creed included only religion and religious 
beliefs and that “the Commission erred in defining ‘creed’ to include politi-
cal, sociological and philosophical beliefs.”397  The appeals court concluded 
that “[b]oth the ‘common meaning rule’ of statutory construction and the 
existing case law supports this court’s holding that the definition of ‘creed’ 
extends only to religion and religious beliefs and not, as the Commission 
held, to any beliefs on any subject.”398 
In Roberts v. Ravenwood Church of Wicca,399 the Georgia Supreme 
Court considered whether the Ravenwood Church of Wicca, a nonprofit 
corporation dedicated to the practice of Wicca, was a religious entity and 
 
391. Id. at 206. 
392. Rasmussen v. Glass, 498 N.W.2d 508, 510 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993). 
393. Id. 




398. Id. at 514. 
399. 292 S.E.2d 657 (Ga. 1982). 
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whether its practices constituted religious worship, which would qualify the 
organization for a tax exemption.400  Ravenwood is a particularly interesting 
case because of the distinctions drawn by the majority and the differing 
conclusions reached by the majority and the dissent, despite both applying 
the same definition of religion.  The court indicated that “in order to consti-
tute a religion, there is the requirement that there be a belief in a deity occu-
pying a place parallel to that occupied by God in traditional religions.”401  
These beliefs must be sincerely held, and there must be a dedication on the 
part of the adherent to the practice of those beliefs.402 
In applying this definition and determining that Wicca constituted a 
religion, the majority looked to the Wicca doctrine, training of ministers, 
and its ceremonial or cultural aspects.  With regard to doctrine, the court 
relied on the deposition testimony of Lady Sintana, the head of the 
Ravenwood Church, wherein she stated that in Wicca “there is a belief in a 
deity, but not in the sense of an anthropomorphic God.  Rather, the Wiccan 
belief is that there is a primordial, supernatural force which is the creator of 
the world and universe and which permeates everything therein.”403  She 
further indicated that in Wicca “there is a deification of this force, and all 
individuals are seen as divine sparks from this divinity with a concomitant 
moral and ethical responsibility to themselves and to everything in 
nature.”404  The duty owed “arises from the fact that each individual is 
connected to all things in the universe in what is known as the ‘karmic 
circle,’ and each individual both causes the events occurring within the 
circle and is affected thereby.”405  The court also found it important that 
Lady Sintana was trained for ten years before being ordained as a Wiccan 
minister.406  In looking to the ceremonial and cultural aspects of the 
religion, the court noted that Wicca has eight Sabbaths that mark festivals 
for various seasonal changes.407  The court also noted the existence of 
sacraments and ceremonies “of the Wiccan doctrinal theology [which] 
include: honoring the deity through reverence and homage, communion, 
marriages (referred to as ‘hand fastings’), funeral ceremonies, and 
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ceremonies for naming babies.”408  Moreover, last but certainly not least, 
the court considered that the State of Georgia permitted Lady Sintana to 
perform marriages recognized by the State.409 
The Georgia Supreme Court determined that “[a]dherents to the 
Wiccan faith do not practice the stereotypical ‘bubble, bubble, toil and 
trouble’ witchcraft, and Voodoo-like curses and hexes play no part in the 
Wiccan philosophy.”410  To be considered a religious organization, it was 
important that the Wiccans differed from such groups because the majority 
concluded that “demonology and stereotypical witchcraft most 
emphatically do not constitute religion.”411  Justices Jordan and Clarke, the 
dissenting justices, agreed with the majority’s definition of religion that the 
“essence of religion is belief in a relation to God involving duties superior 
to those arising from any human relation.”412  The dissenting justices, 
however, concluded that Wicca “does not meet this test;” they believed that 
Wicca did not escape the majority’s distinction.413  The dissenters noted 
that, 
Lady Sintana, the founder of Ravenwood, refers to herself as “a 
pagan and a witch.”  Male followers are called “warlocks.”  Each 
individual is connected to everything in the universe by what is 
known as the “karmic circle.”  There is no belief in a deity in the 
sense of an anthropomorphic God, only a belief in some strange 
supernatural force which permeates the world.414 
For the dissenters, the majority’s approach raised a clear concern that, 
under what the dissent considered a “nebulous” understanding of religion, 
“there could be as many ‘places of religious worship’ as there are homes or 
tents where humans meditate on the mysteries of life.  It would certainly 
include places in which Satanic cults worship a supernatural evil force 
which dominates the world.”415  The dissenters did not believe that “such 
cults or beliefs” were religious.416 
Although the majority and dissent differed in their conclusion on 
whether Wicca is a religion, they both agreed on a general understanding of 
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essential component.  This view is largely reflective of the states’ general 
approach to this issue.  Although there is certainly variance between states 
as to what they consider to be a religion, in general, states have been 
reluctant and resistant to embracing the potentially radical implications of 
the Supreme Court’s definition of religion in Seeger.  They often note that 
Seeger and Welsh are merely statutory interpretations and sometimes look 
to Yoder as modifying the United States Supreme Court’s understanding of 
religion. 
The Texas Court of Appeals, however, is an exception, embracing 
Seeger and Welsh.417  In Strayhorn v. Ethical Society of Austin,418 the 
Ethical Society of Austin sought tax-exempt status as a religious 
organization under the Texas state tax code.419  The Texas Comptroller 
denied the Ethical Society’s application “on the ground that the Ethical 
Society must demonstrate that it requires belief in a ‘God, Gods, or higher 
power’ . . . in order to qualify.”420  The question before the court was 
“whether a state government may, consistent with the First Amendment to 
the United States Constitution, require a group to demonstrate its belief in a 
‘Supreme Being’ in order to be considered a religion for statutory pur-
poses.”421  The court concluded that “[b]ecause the Comptroller’s test fails 
to include the whole range of belief systems that may, in our diverse and 
pluralistic society, merit the First Amendment’s protection, we will affirm 
the trial court’s judgment.”422 
Members of the Ethical Society view themselves as being ethical 
humanists, who place ethics at the center of human relations.423  The Texas 
Comptroller argued that its test—requiring belief in god, gods, or a higher 
power—created “a necessary bright-line rule protecting the state from being 
required to award tax exemption to any group that calls itself 
‘religious.’”424  Relying on Yoder, the state argued that its rule adheres to 
the principle that religious beliefs and personal or philosophical beliefs are 
not synonymous.425  In reaching this conclusion, “[t]he Comptroller relies 
on the [S]upreme [C]ourt’s declaration in . . . Yoder that a way of life, 
however virtuous and admirable, will not have First Amendment protection 
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unless it is rooted in ‘religious belief.’”426  The state argued that Yoder 
“counteracts any expansive reading of religion undertaken in the 
conscientious objector cases, because it focuses the First Amendment 
analysis squarely, and exclusively, on the distinction between religious and 
personal or philosophical beliefs.”427  The Comptroller believed its test to 
be the only adequate means of distinguishing between 
personal/philosophical beliefs and religious beliefs.428  The Ethical Society, 
however, argued that this definition presents too narrow an understanding 
of religion.429  Relying on Torcaso, Seeger, and Welsh, the Ethical Society 
asserted that the state’s definition of religion “does not adequately account 
for the range of belief systems which comprise the broad spectrum of 
religious faith in contemporary society.”430 However, “because the test 
encompasses the generic concept of a supernatural reality, the Comptroller 
assert[ed] that it is sufficiently broad to account for the various diverse 
religious views existing in contemporary society.”431 
In analyzing these arguments, the court began with an indication “that 
the State has a compelling interest in insuring that only qualified religious 
organizations receive the tax exemption—it cannot be sufficient for a group 
simply to label itself as a religion in order to enjoy tax-exempt status.”432  It 
noted that Ethical Culture Societies “have no creed of theology or 
metaphysics, no set doctrines concerning the unknown mysteries of life.  
There is no claim to a belief in a supernatural universe or Supreme 
Being.”433  However, the court also referenced a book setting forth Ethical 
Society thought: 
What ultimate reality is we do not know; but we have the faith that 
it expresses itself in the human world as the power which inspires 
in men moral purpose.  Thus the ‘God’ that we love is not the 
figure on the great white throne, but the perfect pattern, envisaged 
by faith, of humanity as it should be, purged of the evil elements 
which retard its progress toward “the knowledge, love, and 
practice of the right.”434 
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Although stating that only religion, not personal belief, is protected under 
Yoder, the Texas Court of Appeals indicated that the Yoder decision fails 
“[to] articulate a workable test for distinguishing personal from religious 
beliefs.”435  The Texas court agreed with Justice Clark’s statement in 
Seeger that “the distinction between personal and religious beliefs is 
inherently difficult because ‘in no field of human endeavor has the tool of 
language proved so inadequate.’”436  The court also expressed concern that 
“[a]ny inquiry that delves . . . closely into the textual references made by a 
religion to the existence of God puts the courts in danger of making 
determinations based on dimly understood, and perhaps misconceived, 
characterizations of unfamiliar religions.”437  To protect “the full range of 
religious belief, as expressed in Seeger,” the court concluded that it had to 
reject the Comptroller’s test.438  The court reasoned that “[a]lthough the 
Ethical Society’s tenets and beliefs may not explicitly reference a divinity, 
they evidence enough of a sense of spiritual feeling that the Society’s claim 
to religious status should be carefully assessed.”439  Citing the Third Circuit 
decision in Malnak, the Texas Court of Appeals found the test therein to be 
an appropriate measure of whether an entity constituted a religion: 
The test requires that a set of beliefs: (1) address fundamental and 
ultimate questions having to do with deep and imponderable 
matters such as the meaning of life and death or man’s role in the 
universe; (2) be broad in scope and comprehensive in nature; and 
(3) be accompanied by the presence of certain formal and external 
signs.440 
Under this test, the court concluded that the Ethical Society constituted a 
religion.441  Thus, while the presence of a deity has been critical to many 
state courts in assessing whether an organization constituted a religious 
entity, the Texas Court of Appeals rejected this conclusion.  In reaching its 
definition of religion, the Texas Court of Appeals, like the United States 
Supreme Court in Seeger, looked to the understanding of religion provided 
by academics outside the legal profession, raising the question of why the 
views of non-legal experts are of such importance. 
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V. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF OTHER DISCIPLINES’ DEFINITIONS 
OF RELIGION 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes stated: 
[T]he provisions of the Constitution are not mathematical formulas 
having their essence in their form; they are organic, living 
institutions transplanted from English soil.  Their significance is 
vital, not formal; it is to be gathered not simply by taking the 
words and a dictionary, but by considering their origin and the line 
of their growth.442 
In endeavoring to find or present a legal definition of religion, while look-
ing beyond a dictionary is necessary, why should the legal community care 
or consider what other disciplines have to say regarding what constitutes a 
religion, especially since there are a number of reasonable concerns 
associated with doing so?  For example, it has been argued that “[r]eligion 
is one thing to the anthropologist, another to the sociologist, another to the 
psychologist, another to the theologian, and another to the philosopher.”443  
These variations between academics in their respective fields, specifically 
the differences in their understanding of what constitutes a religion, is at 
least in part attributable to the type of inquiry being conducted.444  “[P]ost-
modern . . . theory contends that ‘[e]very field is defined by its own special 
devices . . . by existence theorems, arguments from invisible hands, and 
appeals to textual probabilities or archives. . . .’”445  Thus, for example, 
because a sociologist is looking more to the cultural dynamic, her vision 
will be limited by tools of her discipline, and because a theologian is 
focused more upon doctrine, her understanding will be confined by the 
lenses of her analysis.  Thus, we may expect that in any discipline we are 
getting only part of the picture of what constitutes a religion, and that 
picture will be taken standing from a particular vantage point.  While this 
concern cautions restraint in simply embracing the wholesale theological, 
philosophical, or sociological definition of religion, it does not counsel 
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against trying to utilize the insights of these fields in framing a legal 
definition of religion. 
Although as a general matter, originalists may be opposed to con-
sulting commentators outside the legal profession, there are reasons why 
they would not necessarily be opposed to doing so in this instance.  
Originalists normally “eschew an approach that would consider the values 
of a modern interpreter.”446  Approaching the Constitution using 
“[o]riginalism requires that we give effect to the Framers’ values, as ex-
pressed in the language of the document itself.”447  Thus, “[i]n determining 
whether an interpretation would conform with the purposes of a provision, 
one may consider the normative effects of that interpretation, but only if 
they are of the kind that the framers’ generation would have embraced.”448  
In contrast, “normative effects reflecting modern sensibilities that would be 
alien to the Framers are not relevant to an originalist interpretation.”449  But 
as previously discussed the Founders had concern for the emergence of new 
religious groups and included them within the ambit of the protections of 
religious liberty, rather than merely imposing a stagnant, preservative pro-
tection of the contemporary religious faiths.  Moreover, theology and 
philosophy inspired the Founders’ creation of religious liberty, and a pre-
formal variant of sociology inspired an awareness on the part of the 
Founders of some of the religious diversity in their colonies, states, and the 
emerging nation.  If it is helpful to look to those disciplines that study reli-
gion to understand the contemporaneous practice of religion in the United 
States, and that assists in fulfilling the Founders’ values of preserving 
religious liberty by safeguarding growth and changes in religious belief and 
practice, then considering the insights of other disciplines should not 
necessarily be deemed an improper project from an originalist perspective. 
There are at least five reasons for looking at other fields’ understanding 
of religion in the quest for a legal definition of religion.  One, the United 
States Supreme Court and various federal and state courts have already 
looked to other fields in defining religion.  In endeavoring to understand the 
definitions of religion used by the courts, it can be advantageous to under-
stand the definition provided by the particular theorist relied upon by the 
court.  Thus, there already has been a move by courts to consider these 
other disciplines and their insight into what constitutes religion.  In order to 
apprehend what these courts are doing, it would be wise to consider the 
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sources they are utilizing.  The influence of theorists and scholars in various 
fields on the courts will be discussed more fully in the next section of this 
article.  Two, knowledge is not limited to any particular discipline.  To 
develop a more complete picture or understanding of religion, it would be 
prudent to draw upon knowledge, regardless of whether its source is across 
an academic discipline border.  Three, many of the questions that courts are 
struggling with in defining religion have also been challenges and questions 
that other disciplines dedicated to studying religion have confronted and 
explored.  By looking to these other disciplines, it becomes easier to avoid 
pitfalls experienced by theorists in these various fields and to draw upon 
their considerable research and analysis.  Fourth, the United States is an 
incredibly complicated and diverse pluralistic religious country.  Judges are 
not experts in religion.  To avoid concerns about judges failing to appre-
ciate the full scope of religious diversity in the United States, it is prudent 
to draw upon experts in the field.  Fifth, drawing on advice and insights of 
religious experts in endeavoring to understand what constitutes religion is 
not unlike the influence of experts with regard to various other legal issues, 
for example psychologists’ influence in shaping the legal debate regarding 
the law’s understanding of mental defect issues. 
It has been claimed that “a profession, like an individual, has come of 
age when it has developed capacity for interdependent relationships, 
notable qualities of which are readiness to give and take without anxiety 
and without need to dominate or to suffer loss of identity.”450  By taking 
insights and understanding from various disciplines, that is, by employing 
interdisciplinary study and analysis, a better understanding may be 
reached.451  For example, it has been argued that interdisciplinary education 
can lead to “the development of the level of human cognition that stimu-
lates thought about an issue from all viewpoints, taking into account varied 
and, as yet, unthought possibilities.”452  Advocates of an interdisciplinary 
approach contend that it offers an opportunity at what can be described as 
“wisdom.”453  For these interdisciplinary proponents, “[w]isdom cannot be 
confined to a specialized field, nor is it an academic discipline; it is the 
consciousness of wholeness and integrity that transcends both.  Wisdom is 
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complexity understood and relationships accepted.”454  As an illustration, a 
family law practitioner and professor has noted that in family law “inter-
disciplinary studies are not a distraction from, but a critical part of, modern 
lawyering.  It would be futile to isolate legal doctrine and practice from 
psychology, economics, sociology, religion, and history.”455  Similarly, 
determinations on what constitutes due process and free speech in the 
public school setting are also linked to an interdisciplinary, rather than 
purely legal, discourse.456  Theologians, psychologists, and sociologists can 
provide understandings of religion that are worthy of consideration.457  
Although there are certainly reasons to be cautious in transferring insights 
and observations from one discipline to another, academic institution 
divisions “should not be allowed to stand in the way of the transfer or joint 
production of information and modes of knowledge.”458 
The Supreme Court, in defining religion in Seeger, looked beyond 
dictionaries to an understanding of religion produced by a prominent liberal 
Protestant theologian, Paul Tillich.  In exploring the discoveries and under-
standing of other disciplines, the Supreme Court should have analyzed the 
definition of religion “more deeply.  Had it done so, the Court would have 
found that while it has been grappling with the religion clauses with in-
creasing sophistication, an academic discipline called ‘religious studies’ has 
been developing rapidly.”459  Religious studies scholars have been studying 
religion using the tools of theology, sociology, psychology, anthropology, 
and history to create a methodology for understanding religion.460  “Much 
of the academic work has focused on defining, explaining, and describing 
religion in order to make sense of the place of religion in contemporary 
society.”461  But why should the legal community care what these scholars 
have to say regarding religion?  In part, because “[m]any of the questions 
addressed by these scholars are . . . identical to the questions with which the 
Supreme Court has had to grapple in construing the [F]irst 
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[A]mendment.”462  Where problems are analogous, the legal community 
should look to other disciplines for advice, techniques, data, and new 
insights.463 
Unlike theologians and philosophers, judges, who must perform the 
difficult and delicate task of defining religion, have no special competence 
with regard to religion.464  By not being experts in religion, an extra-
ordinarily complicated subject matter, the judges’ “actions in defining 
religion run the risk of establishing the Justices’ own views of religion,” 
thereby posing a threat to the free exercise rights of religious practitioners 
of unfamiliar faiths.465  However, it has been argued that by drawing on the 
work of “academics—[including] anthropologists, sociologists, historians, 
philosophers, psychologists—who have a sub-specialty in studying relig-
ious behavior,” judges may be able to avoid this danger.466  Thus “religious 
studies can help lawyers and judges to acknowledge the religiousness of 
Americans without establishing it.”467  Furthermore, even assuming one 
does not hold a view of judges’ ability that limits their approach in such 
manner, the religious environment is so complicated and pluralistic that in 
defining religion “a meaningful discussion requires references to other dis-
ciplines such as philosophy.”468 By deriving their understanding from the 
experiences of individuals, a common tool in these disciplines, the possi-
bility is also presented of arriving at a more phenomenological definition—
learning what religion is from the ground up, rather than imposing a top-
down definition.469 
Additionally, the incorporation of religious studies into the examina-
tion of what constitutes religion is consistent with practices in a wide 
variety of legal fields, which provide for including the insights and observa-
tions of experts outside the legal field to add a more scientific element to 
the analysis.  United States Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson, in 
referencing a religious studies scholar, noted that the individual offered a 
scientific approach to the study of religion.470  It has been argued that “[u]se 
of a generalized scientific concept as part of a legal rule or standard 
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presumptively fosters correct and consistent adjudication.”471  However, we 
should expect these advantages to be lesser where the legal term is skewed 
by or attached closely with policy considerations and where the science is 
of lesser sophistication in classifying the term or phenomena.472  In making 
a legal concept scientific, difficulties are particularly likely to occur where 
the science is “concerned with mental and emotional conditions.”473  Never-
theless, consulting scientific practitioners is still warranted.  For example, 
“whether the test of criminal responsibility is framed in terms of ‘mental 
disease or defect’ or in terms of capacity to know ‘right from wrong,’ 
adjudication would proceed foolishly if it failed to seek guidance from the 
discipline that makes abnormal mental condition its special province of 
study.”474 
VI. CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE DEFINITION OF RELIGION FROM 
PAUL TILLICH, A THEOLOGIAN, WILLIAM JAMES, A 
PSYCHOLOGIST, AND EMILE DURKHEIM, A SOCIOLOGIST 
Whatever their reasons for drawing on insights into what constitutes 
religion from other disciplines, courts have certainly embraced the views of 
a number of different significant figures in other disciplines.  The views of 
theologian Paul Tillich, psychologist William James, and sociologist Emile 
Durkheim have been particularly influential.  Courts have used aspects of 
their theories to define religion for purposes of the First Amendment. 
A. PAUL TILLICH’S INFLUENCE ON THE COURTS 
The writings of theologian Paul Tillich profoundly influenced various 
courts’ interpretations of what constitutes a religion.475  The Third Circuit 
noted Tillich’s “thoughts have been influential both with courts and 
commentators.”476  The definition of religion adopted by the United States 
Supreme Court in Seeger and Welsh was “derived largely from Tillich.”477  
In Seeger, the United States Supreme Court sought to embrace the 
increasingly broad understanding of religion that was becoming manifest in 
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the religious community.478  To this end, on more than one occasion in 
Seeger, the Court referenced and quoted approvingly theologian Paul 
Tillich, who it described as an eminent Protestant theologian.479  The Court 
noted that Tillich “identifies God not as a projection ‘out there’ or beyond 
the skies but as the ground of our very being.”480  In trying to identify non-
traditional religions that would qualify for protection under the First 
Amendment, the Court looked to Tillich’s ultimate concern: 
And if that word [God] has not much meaning for you, translate it, 
and speak of the depths of your life, of the source of your being, 
[of] your ultimate concern, of what you take seriously without any 
reservation.  Perhaps, in order to do so, you must forget every-
thing traditional that you have learned about God . . . .481  
With religion no longer requiring a god or gods, the Seeger/Tillichian 
functional phenomenological482 approach “treats an individual’s ‘ultimate 
concern’—whatever that concern be—as his ‘religion.’”483  It is not 
“difficult to see why this philosophy would prove attractive in the 
American constitutional framework.”484  For, as noted by the Third Circuit,  
“[o]ne’s views, be they orthodox or novel, on the deeper and more 
imponderable questions—the meaning of life and death, man’s role in the 
Universe, the proper moral code of right and wrong—are those likely to be 
the most ‘intensely personal’ and important to the believer. They are . . . 
ultimate concerns.”485  Courts shifting their analysis from traditional 
definitions of religion towards an “ultimate concern” approach is indicative 
of the significant impact of Tillich. 
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B. WILLIAM JAMES’S INFLUENCE ON THE COURTS 
The writings of philosopher, psychologist, theologian, and sociologist 
William James have also profoundly affected the Courts.  Justice Jackson’s 
conclusion in Ballard “that religious faith is more a matter of emotional 
experience than of rational inquiry was heavily influenced by the psycho-
logical and phenomenological studies of religious conversions by William 
James.”486  Jackson stated that “William James, who wrote on these matters 
[religion] as a scientist, reminds us that it is not theology and ceremonies 
which keep religion going. Its vitality is in the religious experiences of 
many people.”487  Jackson’s embrace of an internal, psychological, and 
individualistic definition of religion incorporates James’s understanding of 
religion.488  Similarly, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals borrowed from 
James its definition of religion: “the feelings, acts, and experiences of 
individual men in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to 
stand in relation to whatever they may consider the divine.”489  According 
to the Second Circuit, James conceives of the divine with god or gods being 
unnecessary, instead it is used “in its broadest sense as denoting any object 
that is godlike, whether it is or is not a specific deity.”490  Consequently, the 
Second Circuit broadly construes divinity, while looking for an intense 
psychological reaction to the divine.  As noted by the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of New York, application of the Jamesian 
definition requires “the factfinder to delve into the internal operations of the 
claimant’s mind” in determining whether a belief is religious in nature.491 
C. EMILE DURKHEIM’S INFLUENCE ON THE COURTS 
Sociologist Emile Durkheim contributed his social and behavioral492 
definition of religion.  The Third Circuit’s test for determining if something 
is a religion developed out of the philosophical and sociological works of 
 
486. Michaelson, supra note 300, at 339 n.162. 
487. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 93 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
488. Michaelson, supra note 300, at 339 n.162 (1984); see Garrett Epps, What We Talk 
About When We Talk About Free Exercise, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 563, 564 (1998). 
489. United States v. Sun Myung Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1227 (2d Cir. 1983) (citing 
WILLIAM JAMES, THE VARIETIES OF RELIGION 31 (1910)); see Patrick v. LeFevre, 745 F.2d 153, 
157 (2d Cir. 1984) (citing WILLIAM JAMES, THE VARIETIES OF RELIGION 32 (1910)); Selah v. 
Goord, 255 F.2d 42, 44 (N.D.N.Y. 2003). 
490. Sun Myung Moon, 718 F.2d at 1227 (citing James, supra note 326, at 34). 
491. Keesh v. Smith, No. 9:04CU0779NAMGJD, 2006 WL 516793, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 
2006). 
492. Epps, supra note 488, at 564. 
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Emile Durkheim.493  The Third Circuit indicated that external/formal 
ritualistic elements are “helpful in supporting a conclusion of religious 
status given the important role such ceremonies play in religious life.”494  
The court specifically referenced Durkheim’s finding that these external/ 
formal ritualistic elements “are always common to a determined group 
which makes profession of adhering to them and to practicing rites 
connected with them[.]”495  A point Durkheim summarized by stating that 
“[i]n all history, we do not find a single religion without a Church.”496  
Courts utilizing Durkheim’s definition find “that religion implies commu-
nity.”497  Consequently, these courts look for an external and formal nature, 
rather than an internal one.  This is the inverse of the approach of the 
Second Circuit, which is modeled on James’s view of religion. 
VII. REACHING DEEPER INTO OTHER DISCIPLINES FOR INSIGHTS 
INTO DEFINING RELIGION FOR FIRST AMENDMENT 
PURPOSES 
By reaching deeper into other disciplines than the courts have so far, it 
becomes easier to see problems with the definitions of religion that have 
been adopted by courts, particularly the aforementioned definitions based 
on the views of Tillich, James and Durkheim.  Furthermore, other disci-
plines have already confronted many of the same questions and difficulties 
in defining religion with which courts are currently struggling.  In doing so, 
they have achieved insights that can be helpful in formulating a better 
definition of religion for First Amendment purposes. 
A. ONE ULTIMATE CONCERN FOR EVERYONE 
A deep yearning and restlessness within the human soul forces it to 
struggle and strive for fulfillment, as it endeavors to reach beyond itself into 
the infinite.498  Paul Tillich recognizes this internal need to seek fulfillment: 
 
493. Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 209 n.44 (3d Cir. 1979); see Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 
F.2d 1025, 1032 n.12 (3d Cir. 1981) (adopting Judge Adams’s concurrence as the Third Circuit’s 
definition of religion). 
494. Malnak, 592 F.2d at 209. 
495. Id. at 209 n.44 (citing EMILE DURKHEIM, THE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF THE RELIGIOUS 
LIFE 43-44 (1915)); see Way Int’l v. Limbach, 552 N.E.2d 908, 911 (Ohio 1990) (citing EMILE 
DURKHEIM, THE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF THE RELIGIOUS LIFE 43-44 (Joseph W. Swain trans., 
1915)). 
496. Malnak, 592 F.2d at 209 n.44. 
497. Wilson v. Beame, 380 F. Supp. 1232, 1239 (N.Y.E.D. 1974) (citing DURKHEIM, supra 
note 495, at 42-47). 
498. See PAUL TILLICH, DYNAMICS OF FAITH 13 (1957) (explaining that humans seek 
fulfillment in the infinite). 
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“the human heart seeks the infinite because that is where the finite wants to 
rest.”499  However, if, as Søren Kierkegaard theorized, an infinite gulf exists 
between the infinite and finite, a problem develops when people attempt to 
bridge the gap between humanity’s finite constraints and the infinite 
itself.500  Although people may desire to rest in the infinite, their finite 
constraints prevent this happy slumber and leave them with a conditioned 
understanding of the infinite, which is itself unconditional.501  One result of 
this conditioned understanding is that certain concepts of religion become 
difficult to accept after the separation between the two spheres is shattered.  
Consequently, humans seek to reconcile and to justify certain facets of 
religion into a comprehensible, accessible form, an act which perhaps does 
not demonstrate weakness as Freud or Marx502 would argue, but which is 
instead a manifestation of an inherent and reasonable human response.  
According to Tillich, the need to be oriented by something beyond the finite 
realm is a necessity that is inherent within human existence; without it, 
people have a gap in their existence.503  An ultimate concern fills this 
gap504—religion expressed through an ultimate concern cannot be avoided 
even by the most antagonistic opponents of god or gods.  For Tillich, 
everyone has a religion because everyone possesses and is possessed by an 
ultimate concern.505 
B. LACK OF UNITY OF SELF/MORE THAN ONE ULTIMATE CONCERN 
A significant problem in Tillich’s analysis is the objection that people 
do not in this era, or perhaps any era, possess a unified sense of self.  
Consequently, they do not have a single ultimate concern, but rather a broad 
array of transitory and sometimes conflicting, important, though not ulti-
mate, concerns.  With the classical image of God being fractured under the 
potent force of materialistic progress, cultural relativism, and alternative 
scientific paradigms for defining the world, the conceptualization of self is 
being deconstructed in a corresponding manner with every fracture in the 
model of God deepening the cracks in our imaginings of the deficient 
 
499. Id.  
500. See, e.g., Lynn Poland, The New Criticism, Neoorthodoxy, and the New Testament, 65 
J. Religion 459, 474 (1985); STEPHEN TOMKINS, A SHORT HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY 223 
(2005); ARLAND USSHER, JOURNEY THROUGH DREAD 123 (1968). 
501. See TILLICH, supra note 498, at 14. 
502. Doug Padgett, Anthropology of Religion, May 1998, http://www.indiana.edu/~wanthro/ 
religion.htm (explaining Freud and Marx’s view of origins of religion). 
503. TILLICH, supra note 498, at 1-2. 
504. Id. 
505. Harvard Note, supra note 3, at 1076 (citing TILLICH, supra note 498, at 63-64). 
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reproduction: the self.506  Although Western civilization is still pervaded by 
an abundance of the assumed truths of its philosophical parents and ances-
tors, including notably Augustine’s sense of self as existing in imperfect 
reflection of God, the rise of postmodernist thought and relativistic 
understandings of the world have substantially effaced for the 
contemporary world the Augustinian model of the self as derived from 
God.507  Without a seemingly infinite singular locus of orientation for the 
self in the medium of God, individuals, it can be argued, have been 
transformed into the Platonic concept of the democratic soul.508  Plato 
conceived of the democratic soul as being the kaleidoscopic person with his 
or her orientation being directed towards a myriad of finite elements, which 
both cooperate and compete to define the concept of self.509  Thus, people 
are not unified toward one object God, nor toward one ultimate concern. 
 
506. See Augustine, supra note 2, at 19. 
507. See generally Augustine, supra note 2, at 19. 
For even then I was; I lived: I felt: even so early I had an instinct for the care of my 
own being, a trace in me of that most profound Unity whence my being was derived; 
in my interior sense I kept guard over the integrity of my outward sense perception, 
and in my small thoughts upon small matters I had come to delight in the truth.  I 
hated to be wrong, had a vigorous memory, was well trained in speech, delighted in 
friendship, shunned pain, meanness and ignorance.  In so small a creature was not all 
this admirable and reason for praise?  Yet all these were the gifts of my God, for I did 
not give them to myself.  All these were good and all these were I.  Therefore He Who 
made me is good and He is my Good: and in Him I shall exult for all the good 
qualities that even as a boy I had.  But in this lay my sin: that I sought pleasure, 
nobility, and truth not in God but in the beings He had created, myself and others.  
Thus I fell into sorrow and confusion and error.  Thanks be to Thee, my Joy and my 
Glory and my Hope and my God: thanks be to Thee for Thy gifts: but do Thou 
preserve them in me.  Thus Thou wilt preserve me, and the things Thou hast given me 
will increase and be made perfect, and I shall be with Thee: because even that I exist is 
Thy gift. 
Id. 
508. See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 252-53 (Richard W. Sterling & William C. Scott trans., 
1985) (describing the “democratic man” as analyzing everything with “the rule of equality”). 
509. Id. at 253.  Plato contends that the rise of a democratic age destroys the unity of 
people’s orientation towards any particular value.  Id. at 252.  They no longer have one goal, 
honor in the timocratic age, or wealth in the oligarchic age, but instead people have a multitude of 
orientations that reflect the unleashed confusion of a democratic state that fails to orient its people 
towards a single objective.  Id. at 253-54.  A democratic soul 
divides his expenditures of time, money, and effort equally between the necessary and 
unnecessary pleasures. . . .  He yields to each appetite as it makes its presence felt so 
that it appears to be a matter of random choice.  Then gives himself over to it until he 
is satisfied.  After that, he turns to some other pleasure, rejecting none and treating all 
as equally enjoyable.  . . .  So he lives his life day by day, indulging each appetite as it 
makes itself felt.  One day he is drinking heavily and listening to the flute; on the next 
he is dieting and drinks only water.  Then he tries some exercise, only to lapse into 
idleness and lethargy.  Sometimes he seems to want to be the philosopher.  More 
frequently, he goes in for politics, rising to say or do whatever comes into his head.  If 
he develops an enthusiasm for military men, he rushes to join them; if for 
businessmen, then he is off in that direction.  His life lacks all discipline and order, yet 
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Tom Wolfe, a prominent American writer and cultural critic, illustrates 
Plato’s point about the democratic soul. Wolfe writes, “[n]ow is a great 
time for new religions to pop up.  There are people who get religious about 
jogging, they get religious about sex. . . .  Health foods have become the 
basis of a religion.  ESP, of course, flying saucers, anything is fertile 
ground now.  There’s a new messiah born every day.”510  Depending upon 
the analyst’s perspective, either people have been freed from the monolithic 
orientation of self as an inaccurate replica of God and released into a world 
with a nearly limitless multitude of potentialities that create numerous 
ephemeral conceptualizations of self, or the self has been imprisoned within 
a relativistic funhouse with swiftly tilting mirrors that briefly reflect 
distorted images that keep people enslaved by their constantly changing 
nature.  Regardless, there is an embrace in society of the surface and the 
swiftly changing as opposed to the deeper and the unchanging.511  
Consequently, it becomes difficult to have only one ultimate concern. 
As an illustration, the deconstruction of the unity of self seems to 
culminate in the almost absolute annihilation of the unitary self as portrayed 
by Cindy Sherman in her photographic self-portraits.512  Sherman created a 
picture gallery of “self-portraits” which cannot be identified from an 
objective viewpoint as containing the same subject, namely the artist 
herself.  Although she seems to endeavor to present a visual poetry with 
every moment possessing enormous reality, truth, emotion, meaning, and 
significance, Sherman does not present the complete image of herself in any 
of her photographs.  In addition to the literal aspect of removing at least 
some part of her physical body from each photograph, Sherman does not 
present any progression between the photographs, thus leaving the audience 
with a controlled glimpse of an incomplete moment, rather than an 
extended portrayal of the self.  Her work, which does not provide enough 
information to complete any story, invites the audience to define and to 
explain, what they see in that moment.  The varying presentations of self 
provided by Sherman in her photographic self-portraits unveil an 
understanding of the self that exists in a myriad of diverse moments and 
forms, which are completely disconnected.  In her self-portraits, Sherman 
 
he calls it a life of pleasure, freedom, and happiness and is resolved to stay the 
course. . . .  He is a kaleidoscopic man, a man of many different humors, fair and 
colorful as the city itself.  Many men and women would count him fortunate as the 
one who displays the greatest diversity in personal qualities and life styles. 
Id. at 252-53. 
510.  TOM WOLFE, TWENTY YEARS OF ROLLING STONE: WHAT A LONG STRANGE TRIP IT’S 
BEEN 340 (J.S. Wenner ed. 1987). 
511. See Pamela McCorduck, Sex, Lies, and Avatars, WIRED, Apr. 1996, at 108. 
512. See CINDY SHERMAN, CINDY SHERMAN (1987). 
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appears as animals, pieces of plastic, grass, curtains, monsters, men, and 
women; she is dead, alive, elegant, tawdry, young, and old.  Her concept of 
self is imparted as a completely diverse array of unconnected elements that 
cannot be classified as different parts of the same self; rather, they are 
different notions of self, which exist independently.  Each photograph 
reveals a different self in her multiplicity of beings.  Unlike Augustine, 
whose sense of self was organized around God, Sherman destroys the 
concept of a singular orientation; thereby, she prevents the formation of a 
unitary order.  She presents a postmodern self with no clear center of 
orientation for defining the world.  Her concept is of a diverse multitude of 
selves such as would be presented by looking through a constantly 
changing kaleidoscope.  The problem raised by this concept of self for 
Tillich’s paradigm is that there is no singular ultimate concern, because the 
individual lacks the consistency necessary to have a single ultimate 
concern. 
C. DIVINE AND DEMONIC 
In his text Dynamics of Faith, Tillich imparts his view that humanity 
endeavored to create within the realm of finite understanding a clear, 
distinct dichotomy between good and evil, rather than accepting the 
complication that one God of both good and evil would present to a unified 
image of self.513  Therefore, humans have discovered a compartmentalized 
separation between the divine and demonic in various forms, for example, 
Christianity’s revelation of a God of love and Satan, a manifestation of evil.  
Consequently, people’s orientation toward God, who permeates the finite 
and relativistic world, is transformed from “both divine and demonic” into a 
quest for the “morally good and the logically true.”514  Humanity desires to 
alleviate the confusion and pain that is suffered as a result of the ambiguity 
and contradictions, which people’s finite minds perceive when attempting 
to understand a demonic and divine God.515  This causes a fight to be 
“waged against the demonic-destructive element in the holy.”516  Tillich 
describes this fight as having been “so successful that the concept of the 
holy was changed.”517  He believes, however, that this new finite conceptu-
alization of God does not provide “genuine meaning.”518  Because 
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humanity endeavors to rest in its true home, a home which its finite 
constraints prevent it from reaching, people create a false image of God and 
religion.519  This religion lacks, according to Tillich, the intimations of God, 
as “the ‘separated,’ the ‘transcending,’ the ‘fascinating and terrifying,’ the 
‘entirely other.’”520  For Tillich, this provides an indication of the lack of 
“genuine meaning” derived from such a finite conception of God.521  He 
contends that a dichotomy between good and evil results from humanity’s 
attempt to create a constrained and conditioned finite understanding of the 
infinite. 
Although Tillich understands the desire of the human soul to extend 
beyond itself into what is “true and good,” he, nevertheless, calls for the 
death of humanity’s creation of a true God, who is constrained and 
conditioned by the finite shackles imposed by our limitations.522  This, in 
his view, is necessary in order to transcend toward the infinite.  Because 
Tillich recognizes “the infinite distance of the finite from the infinite,” he 
decries any attempt to reach the infinite via finite means.523  For Tillich, 
every attempt to get deeper into a religion by eliminating the ambiguity and 
conflicts perceived by people’s finite minds in a search for the truth of God 
does not in fact bring people closer to God.524  Quite to the contrary, Tillich 
believes that the more a person understands about God, the farther away 
that person moves from the infinite.525  Every attempt to explain God pro-
duced via people’s finite minds, hearts, and souls leads to a more erroneous 
understanding of God.526  Therefore, once subjugated by the conditional, 
God is removed from a position of being and misplaced into a position of 
existence as a being, which mutates God into an “object.”527  Once finite 
limitations are placed upon God, the infinite does not exist within 
humanity’s finite realm as the All; rather, God is transformed into the all-
powerful, all-knowing, all-loving God.  This destroys the infinite separation 
between God and humanity. 
Consequently, Tillich disagrees with the view of God as divine; rather, 
for Tillich, God is “both divine and demonic.”528  He indicates that human-
ity has witnessed and endured some horrible atrocities due to orientation 
 
519. Id. at 12-17. 
520. Id. at 15. 
521. Id. 
522. Id. 
523. Id. at 13. 
524. Id. at 30-35. 
525. Id. at 30-35. 
526. Id. at 30-40. 
527. Id. at 14. 
528. Id. at 15. 
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towards a God.  More controversially, he disagrees with the dismissal of 
these actions as completely disassociated from true faith.529 
The holy which is demonic, or ultimately destructive, is identical 
with the content of idolatrous faith.  Idolatrous faith is still faith.  
The holy which is demonic is still holy.  This is the point where 
the ambiguous character of religion is most visible and the dangers 
of faith are most obvious: the danger of faith is idolatry and the 
ambiguity of the holy is its demonic possibility.  Our ultimate 
concern can destroy us as it can heal us.530 
While humanity endeavored to create a compartmentalized or clear 
dichotomy between good and evil with God only manifesting within the 
good sphere, Tillich disagrees with this separation by arguing that God is 
“both divine and demonic” and “both creative and destructive.”531  For 
example, the nation for the Nazis is an idolatrous faith, but even though 
idolatrous, the nation is an ultimate concern and Nazism a religion.532  Fur-
thermore, perhaps revealing some of his Protestant religious background, 
Tillich states, “the holy originally lies below the alternative of the good and 
the evil,” which correlates in some aspects extremely well with the Old 
Testament representation of God as a Creator and Destroyer.533  Within the 
Old Testament, God creates the world and destroys Sodom and 
Gomorrah.534  While both of these actions could be explained as a synthesis 
of creation and destruction, the story of the flood perhaps provides a better 
explanation of the intertwining of creation and destruction.535  For God with 
one act, both destroys the current state of existence of humanity via the 
flood and creates, via Noah and the Ark, a new order and a new orientation 
for humanity.536 
For Tillich, God is “both divine and demonic,” yet God is in some 
respects neither good nor evil.537  God exists beyond these finite con-
straints; God transcends our finite perceptions of what is justice, truth, real, 
 
529. Id. at 16. 
530. Id. (emphasis added). 
531. Id. at 14-15. 
532. Id. at 44 (“If the nation is someone’s ultimate concern, the name of the nation becomes 
a sacred name and the nation receives divine qualities which far surpass the reality of the being 
and functioning of the nation.”). 
533. Id. at 15. 
534. See Genesis 1:1-1:3 (“In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth.  And the 
earth was without form and void; and darkness was upon the face of the deep.  And the Spirit of 
God moved upon the face of the waters.  And God said, ‘Let there be light’; and there was 
light.”); Genesis 18:16-19:29. 
535. See Genesis 6:1-11:31. 
536. See id. 
537. TILLICH, supra note 498, at 15. 
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love, compassion, etc.  For Tillich, God remains inexplicable; the closest 
humanity can get to know God is to say that God is qualitatively beyond the 
limits of people’s finite understanding.  God does not embody the qualities 
of goodness or even complete goodness.  God exists in an unconditioned 
state, which is fundamentally indescribable.  Therefore, when Tillich argues 
that God is “both divine and demonic,” he does not simply present the Old 
Testament God, which performs acts of creation and destruction.538  God 
transcends these finite constraints.  For Tillich, God stands at a point where 
chaos and the void merge to become one unitary, absolute, infinite being: 
God is contradiction—everything yet nothing. 
William James, Emile Durkheim, and Mircea Eliade, a Romanian 
religious studies scholar, among others, would vigorously disagree with 
Tillich’s understanding of religion as being an approach to the divine and 
the demonic, the sacred and the profane.  James defined religion as “the 
feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as 
they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may 
consider the divine.”539  The Second Circuit Court of Appeals adopted this 
Jamesian definition of religion.540  To be divine, the belief in a god or gods 
is deemed unnecessary.  For James and the Second Circuit employ the word 
divine “in its broadest sense as denoting any object that is godlike, whether 
it is or is not a specific deity.”541  The Second Circuit, believing that “[i]n 
every religion there is an awareness of what is called divine and a response 
to that divinity,” accepted James’s understanding of religion as an indi-
vidual’s relation to what they consider divine.542  Helping to provide an 
indication if something is divine or not, James noted that “the individual 
feels impelled to respond to [the divine] solemnly and gravely, and neither 
by curse nor jest.”543  The key component of religion is that a person stands 
in apprehension of that which they consider to be divine or sacred, not as 
Tillich would suggest standing in apprehension of the demonic and divine. 
 
538. Id. at 16. 
539. Patrick v. LeFevre, 745 F.2d 153, 158 (2d Cir. 1984) (citing WILLIAM JAMES, THE 
VARIETIES OF EXPERIENCE 31 (1910)). 
540.  United States v. Sun Myung Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1227 (2d Cir. 1983) (citing JAMES, 
supra note 539, at 31); see Patrick, 745 F.2d at 157 (citing JAMES, supra note 539, at 31); Selah v. 
Goord, 255 F. Supp. 2d 42, 44 (N.D.N.Y. 2003). 
541. Sun Myung Moon, 718 F.2d at 1227; see WILLIAM JAMES, THE VARIETIES OF 
RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 48 (1958) (“[W]e must interpret the term ‘divine’ very broadly, as 
denoting any object that is godlike, whether it be a concrete deity or not.”) (emphasis in original). 
542. Sun Myung Moon, 718 F.2d at 1227 (citing 7 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 143 
(1972)). 
543. Donovan, supra note 178, at 80 (citing WILLIAM JAMES, THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS 
EXPERIENCE 31, 38 (1916)). 
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Similarly, Emile Durkheim defined religion as “a unified system of 
beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart 
and forbidden—beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral 
community called a Church, all those who adhere to them.”544  This “classic 
definition of religion includes the fundamental dichotomy of sacred/profane 
as universal absolute.”545  Though nothing is inherently or intrinsically 
sacred or profane, for Durkheim the distinction between the sacred and the 
profane is essential to religiosity.546  Mircea Eliade also focused on this 
distinction between the sacred and the profane.  For Eliade, the sacred “is 
identified as the source of significance, meaning, power and being, and its 
manifestations as hierophanies, cratophanies, or ontophanies accordingly 
(appearances of the holy, of power, or of being).”547  For Durkheim and 
Eliade, the distinction between the sacred and the profane was the foun-
dational cornerstone of all religion; without it, a religion does not exist. 
Tillich’s more expansive definition of religion would include within its 
ambit all that James, Durkheim, or Eliade would find to be religion, but 
they would exclude some views that Tillich would not.  Implicit within 
their more constrained view of religion as approaching the divine or the 
sacred, not the demonic or profane, rests an assumption that religion is in 
pursuit of good as opposed to evil.  Though James argued that a healthy 
religion tries to understand “pessimistic elements” and “evil facts,”548 he 
would not accept religion as pursing the purely demonic.549  If the divine is 
not the absolute whole of things, divine and demonic, religion must be in 
pursuit of “the most ideal part.”550  This viewpoint is not a denial of status 
as religion on the basis of the fact that a religious group promotes or 
engages in immoral or improper conduct.  Rather, the group that is pursuing 
the demonic and not the divine, the profane and not the sacred, would 
simply not be religious, regardless of their good morals or ethics.  
Alternatively, Tillich’s view allows for greater inclusion of groups that 
expressly embrace the demonic or the profane.  The distinction between 
 
544. Epps, supra note 487, at 569 (citing DURKHEIM, supra note 494, at 47). 
545. JOEL ELLIOTT, ÉMILE DURKHEIM AND RELIGION: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 
n.41 (1999), at http://www.unc.edu/~elliott/durkheim.html (citing Edmund Leach, Anthropology 
of Religion: British and French Schools, in II NINETEENTH CENTURY RELIGIOUS THOUGHT IN 
THE WEST 215-62 (Ninian Smart et al. eds., 1985). 
546. LEWIS A. COSER, MASTERS OF SOCIOLOGICAL THOUGHT: IDEAS IN HISTORICAL AND 
SOCIAL CONTEXT 137 (2d ed., 1977). 
547.  Bryan Rennie, Mircea Eliade, in ROUTLEDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (1998), 
available at http://www.westminster.edu/staff/brennie/eliade/mebio.htm. 
548. JAMES, supra note 541, at 151. 
549. Id. at 83-151. 
550. Id. at 126 n.4. 
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Tillich’s view of the demonic as opposed to James, Durkheim and Eliade’s 
views, leads to the question whether Satanism is a religion. 
Courts approach this issue with timidity; they have not reached a 
determination of which of the aforementioned approaches to adopt in 
addressing Satanism.  Frequently, courts will indicate that they are assum-
ing for purposes of analysis that Satanism is a religion,551 but then afford 
extremely little protection552 to its adherents or exercise little concern about 
its establishment.553  These cases generally arise in the prison context.  
Courts assume that the prisoner is a devout religious believer in Satanism 
for purposes of analysis, then find that the department of corrections or 
bureau of prisons acted for legitimate penological reasons in restricting 
access to Satanist materials, such as the Satanic Bible.554  Legitimate 
penological interests are implicated, according to some courts, because 
“large portions of The Satanic Bible have great potential for fomenting 
trouble of all kinds in a prison setting, leading to difficulty in maintaining 
security and order and in delivering rehabilitative services in the 
prisons.”555  Similarly, in at least one case, the court has assumed that 
 
551. See, e.g., Kunselman v. W. Reserve Local Sch. Dist., Bd. of Educ., 70 F.3d 931, 931 
(6th Cir. 1995) (assuming that Satanism was a religion). 
552. See Carpenter v. Wilkinson, 946 F. Supp. 522, 528, 530 (1996) (holding that a prison 
inmate’s Satanic Bible could be prohibited). 
553. Kunselman, 70 F.3d at 531. 
554. Carpenter, 946 F. Supp. at 528, 530. 
[T]his case is about a very narrow issue: whether there are legitimate penological 
reasons for prohibiting the plaintiff from possessing The Satanic Bible.  The Court 
concludes that there are.  The Court draws no conclusion regarding whether the prison 
ever can or should completely prohibit the practice of Satanism, since that has not 
been made an issue in this case.  Here, all that is concluded is that prohibiting the 
possession of The Satanic Bible does not substantially burden the plaintiff’s ability to 
practice his “religion” and is validated by legitimate penological concerns for safety 
and security. 
Id.; see McCorkle v. Johnson, 881 F.2d 993, 995-96 (11th Cir. 1989); Doty v. Lewis, 995 F. Supp. 
1081, 1086-87 (D. Ariz. 1998); Howard v. United States, 864 F. Supp. 1019, 1030 (D. Colo. 
1994). 
555. Carpenter, 946 F. Supp. at 529. 
In addition, much of the publication advocates preying on the weak in any way 
possible for one’s own gratification—clearly an extremely dangerous “teaching” in 
any setting, but especially in a prison where the weak have fewer avoidance strategies 
at their disposal.  A few examples of isolated quotations will suffice to illustrate the 
point. The Satanic Bible states: 
Hate your enemies with a whole heart, and if a man smite you on one cheek, SMASH 
him on the other!; smite him hip and thigh, for self-preservation is the highest law! 
Give blow for blow, scorn for scorn, doom for doom—with compound interest 
liberally added thereunto!  Eye for eye, tooth for tooth, aye four-fold, a hundred-fold!  
Make yourself a Terror to your adversary, and when he goeth his way, he will possess 
much additional wisdom to ruminate over.  Thus shall you make yourself respected in 
all the walks of life, and your spirit—your immortal spirit—shall live, not in an 
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Satanism is a religion and that the plaintiff was a sincere practitioner 
thereof, but allowed prison officials to restrict access to cloth and incense 
for Satanists, while at the same time the prison officials allowed Native 
American tribal religious groups in the prison to keep and use similar 
items.556  A plaintiff was also denied access to a copy of the The 
Necronomicon, a Satanic book of magic, because of fears that he would use 
it to try to cast spells on other inmates, thereby allowing him to pray on 
other prisoners by instilling fear in them.557  The same inmate was denied 
access to a Satanic Bible because of its approval of brutality, masochism, 
and racism, among other things, which could be disruptive to the penal 
institution environment.558 
The Nevada Supreme Court addressed this issue in another context, a 
death penalty case.559  In a plurality opinion, the court determined that the 
prosecutor improperly utilized the defendant’s religious beliefs in Satanism 
to demonstrate bad character in violation of the defendant’s First Amend-
ment free exercise rights as incorporated against the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment.560  In dissent, Justice Steffen did not deny that 
Satanists have First Amendment protections to the right to free speech, but 
 
intangible paradise, but in the brains and sinews of those whose respect you have 
gained. 
The seven deadly sins of the Christian Church are: greed, pride, envy, anger, gluttony, 
lust, and sloth. Satanism advocates indulging in each of these “sins” as they all lead to 
physical, mental, or emotional gratification. 
Satanism encourages its followers to indulge in their natural desires.  Only by so doing 
can you be a completely satisfied person with no frustrations which can be harmful to 
yourself and others around you.  Therefore, the most simplified description of the 
Satanic belief is: INDULGENCE INSTEAD OF ABSTINENCE[.] 
The only time a Satanist would perform a human sacrifice would be if it were to serve 
a two-fold purpose; that being to release the magician’s wrath in the throwing of a 
curse, and more important, to dispose of a totally obnoxious and deserving 
individual. . . .  The question arises, “Who, then, would be considered a fit and  proper 
human sacrifice, and how is one qualified to pass judgment on such a person?”  The 
answer is brutally simple.  Anyone who has unjustly wronged you—one who has 
“gone out of his way” to hurt you—to deliberately cause trouble and hardship for you 
or those dear to you.  In short, a person asking to be cursed by their very actions. 
Intense sexual feeling should accompany this step of the [sexual] ritual, and after 
sufficient imagery is obtained, as strong an orgasm as is possible should serve as 
climax to this step.  This climax should be attained using any masturbatory or auto-
erotic means necessary. 
Intense, calculated hatred and disdain should accompany this step of the [destruction] 
ceremony, and no attempt should be made to stop this step until the expended energy 
results in a state of relative exhaustion on the part of the magician. 
Id. at 529-30 (citing THE SATANIC BIBLE, 33, 46, 81, 88-89, 132, 134 (1969)). 
556. Doty v. Lewis, 995 F. Supp. 1081, 1085-86 (D. Ariz. 1998). 
557. Id. at 1087. 
558. Id. at 1086-87. 
559. Flanagan v. State, 846 P.2d 1053 (Nev. 1993). 
560. Id. at 1058-59 (plurality opinion). 
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denied that Satanism constituted a religion.561  He stated that generally 
accepted or popular connotations of the word religion do not include 
Satanism.562  In his dissenting opinion, Justice Steffen incorporated James, 
Durkheim, and Eliade’s rationale for excluding demonic adherences from 
being classified as religious: “The point to be made is that Satanists have 
tattooed themselves with character impressions of an unambiguous nature.  
They have embraced evil, including amorality and lawlessness, as desirable 
objectives.”563  Such considerations were certainly not far from the minds 
of the dissenting Georgia Supreme Court justices in Ravenwood when they 
accused the majority of having framed an approach to determining what 
constitutes a religion that would errantly allow “places in which Satanic 
cults worship a supernatural evil force which dominates the world” to be 
considered places of religious worship.564  Nor were such considerations far 
from the view of the Georgia Supreme Court majority when it responded to 
the dissenters by attesting that “demonology and stereotypical witchcraft 
most emphatically do not constitute religion.”565  The unambiguous pursuit 
of evil would exclude Satanism from being considered a religion in the 
Jamesian vision and under the Georgia Supreme Court and Justice Steffen’s 
viewpoints, but not in Tillich’s understanding of religiosity.566 
D. INDIVIDUALIZED OR COMMUNAL, INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL 
Another complexity in defining religion is whether religion should be 
understood as being individual or communal, and internal or external.  
Tillich’s phenomenological definition of religion stresses the importance 
that belief plays within the individual’s life both externally through symbols 
and internally through orientation.567  Religious studies scholar Lynda 
Sexson rejects the external component of this definition; she argues against 
viewing religion through the cultural dynamic or communal understanding.  
Sexson asserts that even “[i]f there is no political body to verify occur-
rences or images as religious or sacred, . . . these particularized images still 
have . . . connotations . . . sacred or . . . religious.”568  Similarly, James’s 
 
561. Id. at 1060 (Steffen, J., dissenting). 
562. Id. 
563. Id. 
564. Roberts v. Ravenwood Church of Wicca, 292 S.E.2d 657, 660 (1982). 
565. Id. at 661. 
566. JAMES, supra note 540, at 126; TILLICH, supra note 498, at 15. 
567. Harvard Note, supra note 3, at 1067. 
568. LYNDA SEXSON, ORDINARILY SACRED 3 (1992). 
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definition of religion provides a cognitive definition that is purely internal 
and individualized.569 
It is this distinctive focus on the internal attitude of religious 
believers that has made James’ psychological understanding of 
religion . . . appealing to courts and commentators who have been 
reluctant to interpret freedom of religion by reference to the 
external features of religious belief, lest by doing so they enshrine 
religious orthodoxy.570 
However, as a consequence of these definitions, which are dependent on the 
inner state of mind of the individual, “the courts [are] in the position of 
measuring the sincerity of professions of belief rather than the consistency 
of religious practices.”571 
Alternatively, Durkheim defined religion as “a unified system of 
beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart 
and forbidden—beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral 
community called a Church, all those who adhere to them.”572  This 
definition provides a “purely social and behavioral definition” of 
religion.573  Durkheim’s “definition casts religion as . . . a question of 
behavior and relationships, something that happens outside the individual 
consciousness and thus is capable of objective measurement.”574  For 
Durkheim, religion existed not as a private or individual phenomenon, but 
instead was “eminently social.”575  He asserted that “[r]eligious representa-
tions are collective representations which express collective realities. . . . 
[T]hey are rich in social elements.”576  Within this scheme, religion pro-
vides a collective attempt to overcome a sense of meaningless in order to 
bring meaning to the world.577 
It is not necessary that these collective expressions actually be a literal 
church.  Rather, a “cultural system that ‘function[s] to synthesize a people’s 
ethos—the tone, character, and quality of their life, its moral and aesthetic 
style and mood—and their world view—the picture they have of the way 
things in sheer actuality are,’ is religious.”578  Durkheim, however, would 
 
569. Epps, supra note 488, at 564. 
570. Timothy Macklem, Faith as a Secular Value, 45 MCGILL L.J. 1, 23 (2000). 
571. Epps, supra note 488, at 570. 
572. Id. at 569 (citing DURKHEIM, supra note 495, at 47). 
573. Id. at 564. 
574. Id. at 569. 
575. Michael M. Maddigan, The Establishment Clause, Civil Religion, and the Public 
Church, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 293, 318 (1993) (citing DURKHEIM, supra note 495, at 22). 
576. Id. 
577. Id. at 319. 
578. Id. (citing CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 89 (1973)). 
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not accept the proposition that the appropriate explanation for this search is 
in the form of psychology; rather, he embraced sociology and studied social 
phenomena.579  In exploring religion, he focused not on individual be-
lievers; quite to the contrary, believing religion exists outside of and 
independently of the individual, he focused on social interaction.580  
Durkheim’s “principal objective [was] . . . to extend scientific rationalism 
to human behavior.”581  By focusing on social interactions and external 
features as opposed to internal ones, Durkheim intended to provide a 
rationale means of approaching religion.582  Anything else, he concluded, 
ignored what religion is, a communal force or associational approach to 
divinity. 
“Durkheim argued that religious phenomena emerge in any society 
when a separation is made between the sphere of the profane—the realm of 
everyday utilitarian activities—and the sphere of the sacred—the area that 
pertains to the numenous, the transcendental, the extraordinary.”583  This 
distinction between the sacred and the profane cannot be made by an 
individual, but can only be created by a group or cult through social inter-
actions.584  Something becomes sacred or profane depending on valuation 
assigned by the group not by any individual.585  “Sacred activities are 
valued by the community of believers not as means to ends, but because the 
religious community has bestowed their meaning on them as part of its 
worship.”586  For example, wine in a Catholic Mass places sacred ritualistic 
significance upon communal wine as the blood of Christ.587 
Noted anthropologist Clifford Geertz continued the development of 
Durkheim’s approach to religion. 588  He argued for defining religion as a 
cultural system.589  He also vigorously challenged the predominant view in 
the academic anthropology community that “saw in religion an archaic 
mode of thought and action” standing behind the modern programs of 
 
579. COSER, supra note 546, at 137-38. 
580. Id. 
581. Id. at 142 (quoting EMILE DURKHEIM, SUICIDE xxxix (The Free Press ed., 1951)). 
582. Id. at 136-38, 142. 
583. Id. at 137. 
584. Id. at 137-38. 
585. Id. 
586. Id. at 138. 
587. Id. at 137-38. 
588. See ELLIOTT, supra note 546, at n.60, available at http://www.unc.edu/~elliott/ 
durkheim.html (citing Talcott Parsons, “Durkheim on Religion Revisited: Another Look at The 
Elementary Forms of the Religious Life,” in BEYOND THE CLASSICS? ESSAYS IN THE SCIENTIFIC 
STUDY OF RELIGION (1973)). 
589. PADGETT, supra note 502. 
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science, law, politics, and education that would one day drop away.590  
Geertz defined religion as dynamic entity that is “(1) a system of symbols 
which acts to (2) establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and 
motivations in men by (3) formulating conceptions of a general order of 
existence and (4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality 
that (5) the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic.”591  Like 
Durkheim, Geertz shifted the analysis to the external; a person’s “design for 
living” or way of life becomes the criteria for determining religiosity.592  
His definition of religion does not exclude general ideas of order or 
affirmation of something beyond the self.  However, instead of analyzing 
internally, Geertz looked to see “the empirical differentia of religious 
activity [and] religious experience.”593 
Geertz was prepared to accept a broad array of religions including 
seemingly frivolous ones such as golf.  For golf (or anything else) to be a 
religion, there must be external manifestations that denote not merely 
playing with passion or every Sunday at 10 a.m., but which are instead 
sufficient to demonstrate visibly to the observer that the would-be religion 
is “symbolic of some transcendent truth” for the person.594  Religion 
synthesizes “what is known about the way the world is, the quality of the 
emotional life it supports, and the way one ought to behave while in it.”595  
Geertz noted that “[t]hough in theory we might think that a people could 
construct a wholly autonomous value system independent of any metaphy-
sical referent, an ethics without ontology, we do not in fact seem to have 
found such a people.”596  Such a view strongly argues that moral ethical 
systems of belief to which there is practicing adherence and some form of 
communion, like the Ethical Society of Austin or a practicing society of 
Neo-Platonists or Epicureans, would necessarily be religious because their 
value structure would have a metaphysical core.  According to Geertz, 
 
590. Id. 
591. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 90 (1973); see Donovan, 
supra note 179, at 88-89 (citing Talal Asad, ANTHROPOLOGICAL CONCEPTIONS OF RELIGION: 
REFLECTIONS ON GEERTZ, 18 MAN 237 (1983)) (Asad asserts that Geertz’s essay “[is] perhaps 
the most influential, certainly the most accomplished, anthropological definition of religion to  
have appeared in the last two decades.”). 
592. Donovan, supra note 179, at 88 (citing Clifford Geertz, Religion: Anthropological 
Study, in 13 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 398, 406 (David L. Sills 
ed., 1968)). 
593. GEERTZ, supra note 591, at 98. 
594. Id. 
595. Andrew Rotstein, Good Faith? Religious-Secular Parallelism and the Establishment 
Clause, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1763, 1775 n.73 (1993) (citing Arlin M. Adams & Charles J. 
Emmerich, A NATION DEDICATED TO RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 82-83 (1990)). 
596. Id. 
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communities share these qualities externally, though they are deeply felt 
internally.  Geertz’s focus was on the communal and external nature of 
religion, not the internal view of James and the Second Circuit. 
The general response of courts to this on-going discussion of the 
existence of religion as internal or external, individualistic or communal has 
five basic components.  First, a broad declaration is made that religion may 
exist without any formal external or communal signs of traditional religions 
such as formal services, ceremony, presence of clergy, structure or 
organization, propagation efforts, holidays being observed, and other 
similar activities.597  Second, courts refuse to allow religion to become a 
limitless self-defining category or classification.598  Third, courts consider 
the sincerity of the religious belief of the party,599 which is sometimes 
termed the devotional component of the definition of religion.600  Fourth, 
the courts look to communal and external elements as proof of the sincerity 
of the person’s belief.601  Fifth, even if this belief is sincerely held, many 
courts include these external and communal elements as factors in deter-
mining whether the belief is religious.602  Thus, although courts assert that 
these external or formal elements are not essential for beliefs or practices to 
be religious, courts are, nevertheless, skeptical of the sincerity of beliefs 
when the individual’s practice of their faith does not include these external 
or communal elements, and they are uncertain that the belief is even 
religious if it does not include such public communal expressions. 
Nevertheless, Judge Arlin Adams, who has been extremely influential 
in defining religion,603 concedes that the worldviews of Seeger and Welsh, 
 
597. See, e.g., Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 209 (3d Cir. 1979); Africa v. Pennsylvania, 
662 F.2d 1025, 1036 n.21 (3d Cir. 1981); Stevens v. Berger, 428 F. Supp. 896, 900 (E.D.N.Y. 
1977) (“[N]either the trappings of robes, nor temples of stone, nor a fixed liturgy, nor an extensive 
literature or history is required to meet the test of beliefs cognizable under the Constitution as 
religious.”). 
598. Malnak, 592 F.2d at 209; Africa, 662 F.2d at 1035; Johnson v. Pa. Bur. of Corr., 661 F. 
Supp. 425, 437 (W.D. Pa. 1987). 
599. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 337, 340 (1970) (plurality opinion); United States 
v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965) (“[T]here remains the significant question whether it is ‘truly 
held.’ This is the threshold question of sincerity which must be resolved in every case.”); see 
Vetter v. Farmland Indus., 120 F.3d 749, 751 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Meyers, 95 F.3d 
1475, 1482 (10th Cir. 1996). 
600. United States v. Ward, 989 F.2d 1015, 1018 (9th  Cir. 1993). 
601. Malnak, 592 F.2d at 209; Int’l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Barber, 650 F.2d 
430, 441 (2d Cir. 1981); Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 409 F.2d 1146, 1156 
(D.C. Cir. 1969); Washington Ethical Society v. District of Columbia, 249 F.2d 127, 128 (D.C. 
Cir. 1957); Marria v. Broaddus, 200 F. Supp. 2d 280, 292-93 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
602. Malnak, 592 F.2d at 209; Meyers, 95 F.3d at 1482-84. 
603. Peñalver, supra note 261, at 799; Jeffrey L. Oldham, Note, Constitutional “Religion” A 
Survey of First Amendment Definitions of Religion, 6 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 117, 139-44 (2001); 
Feofanov, supra note 154, at 375-77; see Friedman v. S. Cal. Permanente Medical Group, 125 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 663, 678 (Cal. App. 2002).  An analysis conducted by a California State Appellate 
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which were determined by the Supreme Court to be religious, are not 
supported by any external or communal ceremonial, ritualistic, or organiza-
tional elements.604  He admits that it is possible to be religious without 
these external or communal elements: “Of course, a religion may exist 
without any of these signs, so they are not determinative, at least by their 
absence, in resolving a question of definition.”605  However, Judge Adams 
notes that these elements “can be helpful in supporting a conclusion of 
religious status given the important role such ceremonies play in religious 
life. . . .  Thus, even if it is true that a religion can exist without rituals and 
structure, they may nonetheless be useful signs that a group or belief system 
is religious.”606  As applied by circuit and district courts, these external and 
communal elements are more important to determining if something is a 
religion or not, or if a particular person is religious, than the conscientious 
objector cases would seem to suggest.607 
 
Court found that “[a]lthough Judge Adams’s analysis only appeared in a concurring opinion, his 
discussion immediately began to find direct as well as indirect acceptance with other federal 
appellate court decisions.”  See, e.g., DeHart v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47, 52, n.3 (3d Cir. 2000); Love v. 
Reed, 216 F.3d 682, 687 (8th Cir. 2000)  (providing an analysis based on a Third Circuit ruling 
premised on Judge Adams’s concurring opinion in Malnak); United States v. Meyers, 95 F.3d 
1475, 1483 (10th Cir. 1996) (analyzing a religion issue using in part a Third Circuit ruling 
premised on Judge Adams’s Malnak concurring opinion); Alvarado v. City of San Jose, 94 F.3d 
1223, 1227 (9th Cir. 1994); Dettmer v. Landon, 799 F.2d 929, 931 (4th Cir. 1986); Grove v. Mead 
School Dist. No. 344, 753 F.2d 1528, 1534 (9th Cir. 1985); Wiggins v. Sargent, 753 F.2d 663, 
666 (8th Cir. 1985) (adopting Third Circuit test); Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025, 1033-34 
(3d Cir. 1981).  Similarly, district court judges have relied upon Judge Adams’ concurring opinion 
in whole or in part.  See, e.g., Mitchell v. Angelone, 82 F. Supp. 2d 485, 492 (E.D. Va. 1999); 
Altman v. Bedford Cent. Sch. Dist., 45 F. Supp. 2d 368, 378 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), aff’d in part, 
vacated in part, & rev’d in part on other grounds, 245 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v. 
Meyers, 906 F. Supp. 1494, 1503 (D. Wyo. 1995), aff’d, 95 F.3d 1475 (10th Cir. 1996); Church of 
Scientology Flag Services v. City of Clearwater, 756 F. Supp. 1498, 1509-1510 (M.D. Fla. 1991), 
aff’d in part, vacated in part, & rev’d in part on other grounds, 2 F.3d 1514 (11th Cir. 1993); 
May v. Cooperman, 572 F. Supp. 1561, 1568-69 (D.N.J. 1983), aff’d, 780 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 
1985); Jacques v. Hilton, 569 F. Supp. 730, 733 (D.N.J. 1983), aff’d, 738 F.2d 422 (3d Cir. 1984); 
Church of the Chosen People v. United States, 548 F. Supp. 1247, 1252-53 (D. Minn. 1982); Van 
Schaick v. Church of Scientology, 535 F. Supp. 1125, 1144 (D. Mass. 1982); Africa v. 
Pennsylvania, 520 F. Supp. 967, 970 (E.D. Pa. 1981), aff’d, 662 F.2d 1025 (3d Cir. 1981).  
Similarly, state courts have utilized directly or indirectly the analysis in Malnak.  See, e.g., 
Needham Pastoral Counseling Ctr. v. Bd. of Appeals of Needham, 557 N.E.2d 43, 45 (Mass. App. 
1990); Christofferson v. Church of Scientology, 644 P.2d 577, 601 (Or. App. 1982). 
604. Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 209 n.43 (3d Cir. 1979). 
605. Id. at 209. 
606. Malnak, 592 F.2d at 209-10 (citing DURKHEIM, supra note 495, at 43-44) (“[T]he really 
religious beliefs are always common to a determined group which makes profession of adhering 
to them and to practicing rites connected with them . . . .  In all history, we do not find a single 
religion without a Church.”); see K. DUNLAP, RELIGION: ITS FUNCTIONS IN HUMAN LIFE 255-70 
(1946); E. UNDERHILL, WORSHIP 20-41 (1937); see generally Note, Transcendental Meditation 
and the Meaning of Religion Under the Establishment Clause, 62 MINN. L. REV. 887, 906-08 
(1978). 
607. Malnak, 592 F.2d at 209 n.43. 
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However, given that Tillich, whose view of religion formed the basis 
for Seeger and the Welsh pluralities’ approach to defining religion,608 con-
ceives of the ultimate concern as fully permeating a person’s being, external 
signs can be reasonably expected.609  In employing Tillich’s understanding 
—the ultimate concern test—such considerations are entirely appropriate.  
Through this understanding of Tillich’s definition, external manifestations 
can be reintegrated into the courts’ ultimate concern analysis.  Thus, in 
considering the external component, Judge Adams actually had no reason 
for concern in having departed from Seeger.  While the Third Circuit 
traveled the route of incorporating Durkheim’s view of religion to embrace 
external elements, a court following Seeger can arrive at the same point by 
continuing to follow Tillich’s insights.  Where the break occurs is in the 
Second Circuit’s utilization of James’s definition and allowing religion to 
dwell exclusively internally within the mind and psyche.  A Tillichian 
ultimate concern will necessarily surrender itself to public manifestation, 
but the Jamesian understanding can remain purely an internal light, not 
shown or revealed to the world.  That is not to say that James did not 
believe that there will be some external effects of religion, of standing 
before the divine, but unlike Tillich’s or Durkheim’s understanding of 
religious experience, in James’s view we are not necessarily going to fill 
our world with symbols.  We are not necessarily going to build churches, 
attend meetings, wear particular clothing, eat certain foods, etc.  Thus, 
Tillich, Durkheim, and Geertz would suggest that we look for the symbols, 
the churches, the gatherings, how we spend our time, but James would 
argue that only by looking at the mind and psyche can we know if beliefs or 
practices are religious. 
E. HOW ULTIMATE AN ULTIMATE CONCERN? 
Regardless of whether religion is viewed as being communal or 
individualized, or external or internal, the question of how intense or 
important the belief must be in order to be deemed religious cannot be 
ignored.  As applied to Tillich’s definition of an ultimate concern, the word 
ultimate “signifies that the concern must be of an unconditional, absolute, 
 
608. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 180 (1965); Grove v. Mead School Dist. No. 
354, 753 F.2d 1528, 1537 n.10 (9th Cir. 1985) (Canby, J. concurring); Harvard Note, supra note 
3, at 1066; Peter D. Schmid, Religion, Secular Humanism and the First Amendment, 13 S. Ill. U. 
L.J. 357, 364-65 (1989). 
609. See The Honorable Wendell L. Griffen, The Case for Religious Values in Judicial 
Decision-Making, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 513, 515-16 (1998); Harvard Note, supra note 3, at 1067; 
Ingber, supra note 157, at 268; Richard H. Jones, Concerning Secularists’ Proposed Restrictions 
on the Role of Religion in American Politics, 8 BYU J. PUB. L. 343, 345 (1994). 
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or unqualified character;” the word “concern” indicates an affective or 
motivational component of a person’s experience.610  Unlike Tillich, who 
believed that religion was composed of a single essence,611 James 
emphasized a flexible understanding of religion.612  He argued that religion 
did not have one essence, but many characteristics that were of equal 
importance to the experience of religion or divinity.613  However, divinity 
for James was not unlimited.  He indicated that “[t]he individual feels 
impelled to respond to [the divine] solemnly and gravely, and neither by 
curse nor jest.”614 
Regarding the sacred or divine, Eliade indicated that sacred space or 
time makes it possible “to acquire orientation in the chaos of homogeneity, 
to ‘found the world’ and to live in a real sense.”615  Profane space and time, 
however, “maintains the homogeneity and hence the relativity of space [and 
time].”616  Eliade maintained an affinity for religious peoples that embrace 
a world of absolute dichotomous spheres separating the sacred and the pro-
fane, Gods and nothingness.  He recognized and abhored the problem of 
lessened religiosity, of non-singular orientation, of multiple concerns as 
opposed to an ultimate concern.617  But, Eliade did not think that religion is 
dead.  “To whatever degree he may have desacralized the world, a man who 
has made his choice in favor of a profane life never succeeds in completely 
doing away with religious behavior.”618  In the modern world, according to 
Eliade, even the experience of the profane contains religiosity, that is, 
breaks from the homogeneity: 
There are for example, privileged places qualitatively different 
from all others—a man’s birthplace, or the scenes of his first 
love . . . .  Even for the most frankly nonreligious man, all of these 
places retain an exceptional, a unique quality; they are the “holy 
places” of his private universe, as if it were in such spots that he 
 
610. Harvard Note, supra note 3, at 1067. 
611. Freeman, supra note 141, at 1553 (citing PAUL TILLICH, WHAT IS RELIGION? 56-86 
(J.L. Adams trans., 1969)) (“[T]he concept of essence . . . is the first and basic task of philosophy 
and religion.”); see Harvard Note, supra note 3, at 1066-83. 
612. Macklem, supra note 570, at 23. 
613. Freeman, supra note 141, at 1553 (citing WILLIAM JAMES, THE VARIETIES OF 
RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 26 (1920)). 
614. Donovan, supra note 179, at 80 (citing WILLIAM JAMES, THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS 
EXPERIENCE 31, 38 (1916)). 
615. MIRCEA ELIADE, THE SACRED & THE PROFANE: THE NATURE OF RELIGION 23 
(Willard R. Trask trans., 1959). 
616. Id. at 17-18, 23. 
617. Id. at 1-28. 
618. Id. at 23. 
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had received the revelation of a reality other than that in which he 
participates through his ordinary daily life.619 
Eliade, however, termed this behavior crypto-religious; it stands lesser than 
real religion.620  It is a “sort of degradation and desacralization of religious 
values and forms of behavior.”621 
Sexson further explored the deeper significance of these breaks in 
profane time and space.  She argued that toppling the barrier between the 
sacred and the profane “brings one into the sphere in which ordinary reality 
is saturated with the sacred.”622  For Sexson, the individual may even be 
unaware of her own religiosity or what is sacred to her.623  She asserts that 
in our society the ordinary becomes religious: “if religion or the sacred is to 
be discovered or reaffirmed in this culture, it will have to be found under 
the bed, in the box, like a string of dogwood berries upon which the rosary 
of life can be sung.”624  For her, “[i]t is the weaving of imagination and 
discovery, of the divine and the human, of the past and the present, that 
creates the fabric of our existence.  We all have bits and scraps of 
experience, dream, and thought out of which we weave the texture, the 
story, of our lives.”625  For Sexson, the flotsam of life that is preserved is 
sacred, which means that old tickets saved from concerts, an old tattered 
baseball glove, family stories that are told and not forgotten, rocks collected 
from the roadside, or even lint from the dryer can all be sacred.626  Sexson, 
however, recognizes the problem with this definition: “If everything is 
sacred, nothing is.  Or, how can we decide that one kid’s pocket is filled 
with divine objects and another is just trouble for the washer?”627 
Although we likely do not want to embrace Sexson’s radical breaking 
of the barriers of objectivity, destroying a notion that there is an objective 
sacred and profane, this is an almost unavoidable implication of Tillichian 
approach.  For Tillich, religion was an ultimate concern, everyone has an 
ultimate concern, and ultimate concerns are otherwise unconstrained.  An 
ultimate concern can be anything from collecting baseball cards, to being an 
obsessive Star Trek fan, a Christian, a business executive, a Neo-Platonist, 
 
619. Id. at 24. 
620. Id. 
621. Id. 
622. SEXSON, supra note 568, at 10. 
623. Id. at 13. “Some of the boxes that will draw our attention have already been perceived 
as containers of the sacred; others are the boxes that anyone except the owner, and perhaps even 
the owner, would say contain junk.”  Id. 
624. Id. at 6-7. 
625. Id. at 34. 
626. Id. at 16. 
627. Id. 
      
216 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 83:123 
and beyond.  The field of ultimate concerns is limitless.  This major prob-
lem with using the ultimate concern definition for religion will be discussed 
further below.  However, first there is another problem, which the Sexson/ 
Tillich approach needs to address: since the apparently ordinary can be 
sacred, how can we distinguish the two?  Which set of rocks are religious 
icons and which are simply ordinary objects?  After all, not all rocks should 
qualify for First Amendment protection under Tillich’s approach; only 
those gathered as part of an ultimate concern deserve such protection. 
In drawing upon Tillich, the Supreme Court alludes to the issue of the 
intensity of an ultimate concern.  “The word ‘ultimate’ signifies that the 
concern must be of an unconditional, absolute, or unqualified character.”628  
However, a test that is this demanding “probably forecloses constitutional 
protection for a large number of ordinary church—or synagogue-goers.”629  
Also, the entire concept of ultimate concerns is based upon the premise that 
individuals concerns are capable of being ranked with one being clearly 
more important than all the others,630 which is a questionable proposition. 
“Many people care a great deal about a number of things—their own 
happiness, the welfare of their family, their country, perhaps their 
religion—without any clear ordering among these and without any single 
ordering principle for clashes between them.”631  Either these people lack 
ultimate concerns or their ultimate concerns could be understood as some 
sort of amalgamation of this multitude of important concerns.632  However, 
under the Tillichian definition, an ultimate concern cannot be compromised; 
it excludes all other concerns from being ultimate.633  No amalgamation is 
possible.  This viewpoint seems strikingly excessive given the fact that hu-
man weaknesses in the Tillichian paradigm are unanticipated, unacceptable, 
and unexplainable except as being non-religious.  Thus, the person who 
misses church most Sundays for football games in the fall and winter and 
baseball games in the spring and summer is religious about sports, not 
church. 
 
628. Harvard Note, supra note 3, at 1067. 
629. Steven D. Collier, Beyond Seeger/Welsh: Redefining Religion Under The Constitution, 
31 EMORY L.J. 973, 995 (1982). 
630. Harvard Note, supra note 3, at 1067. 
631. Greenawalt, supra note 208, at 808. 
632. Id. 
633. Mark B. Greenlee, Faith on the Bench: The Role of Religious Belief in the Criminal 
Sentencing Decisions of Judges, 26 DAYTON L. REV. 1, 12 (2000) (“[R]eligious concern is 
ultimate; it excludes all other concerns from ultimate significance; it makes them preliminary.  
The ultimate concern is unconditional, independent of any conditions of character, desire, or 
circumstance.” (citing PAUL TILLICH, SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY 11-12 (1967))). 
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For purposes of this discussion though, there are two fundamental 
problems with Tillich’s demanding form of an ultimate concern being 
applied in courts of law.  First, if the Tillichian approach is truly applied, 
then the courts raise the stakes exponentially for the level of commitment 
that someone must manifest to be considered religious.  The level of com-
mitment demanded by Tillich is not reasonable in this or any other era.  
Tillich’s definition of religion requires that a person hold to Abraham’s 
level of sacrifice and commitment;634 to be religious, one must be prepared 
to sacrifice all to one’s ultimate concern.635  Although Tillich argued that 
everyone has an ultimate concern, the level of commitment to one’s ulti-
mate concern demanded by Tillich has led at least one critic to suggest that 
perhaps almost no one has an ultimate concern.636  A second complicating 
problem, if courts require this level of commitment for a non-traditional 
religion to be given religious status, whereas a nominal Christian, Jew, 
Muslim, Buddhist, or Hindu is considered protected under the First Amend-
ment, then the courts essentially establish a preference for traditional over 
non-traditional religions.  However, without this demanding standard of 
recognition, the distinction between a rock picked up along side the road 
and a sacred rock becomes an infinitely more complicated question. 
Having received a glimpse of the slope down which the ultimate 
concern definition of religion, which lacks much of a harness, can easily 
slide, it would, perhaps, be wise to remind ourselves why this definition is 
often so attractive to courts: “There is a common perception that religion is 
defined not so much by particular doctrines (like the existence of a god) or 
in particular functions (like providing a structure for morals) but instead by 
attitude.”637  One the foremost ways of expressing this sense of religion is 
Tillich’s contention that religion is not these doctrines or functions, but is 
instead “the focus of our ‘ultimate concern.’”638  And, it should not 
discount that “[t]here seems to be a certain validity to this position because 
so much about religion appears to revolve around a person’s attitude 
towards life, the universe, and what is most important to them.”639 
 
634. See Genesis 22:1-14 (relating the story of Abraham being asked to sacrifice his son 
Isaac, who God spared). 
635. Ingber, supra note 157, at 269. 
636. Id.; see Steven G. Gey, Why Is Religion Special?: Reconsidering the Accommodation of 
Religion Under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 75, 160 n.402 
(1990) (discussing Ingber’s views). 
637. Austin Cline, Religion as Faith and Ultimate Concern, http://atheism.about.com/od/ 
aboutreligion/a/UltimateConcern.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2006). 
638. Id. 
639. Id. 
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F. IS EVERYTHING REALLY SACRED? 
However, deficiencies in the ultimate concern test cannot be ignored.  
For example, a problem identified by a sociological view of the ultimate 
concern definition of religion is that “[i]t seems to include so much under 
the umbrella of religion that little is left over—and if everything qualifies as 
a religion, then the term itself stops being very useful anymore.”640  Sexson, 
although she is untroubled by it, showed us the slippery slope and just how 
easy it is to slide down.  Tillich’s definition of religion provides little ability 
to stop religion from moving from belief in God or Gods and devotion of 
one’s life to pursuing his, her, or their will, to pursuing money and devoting 
one’s life to its pursuit.  Professor John Mansfield described this failing of 
the Seeger definition as follows: 
Is it not also true that a belief that no one would dignify as 
religious may occupy an important if not dominant place in a 
man’s life, profoundly affecting his conduct, thoughts, and feel-
ings?  A person may make his pocketbook his master or his 
stomach a god, or consider that the highest virtue is the preserva-
tion of his own life and the advancement of his own interests, but 
no one would say, except ironically, that because of his devotion 
to these ends his belief in them is religious.641 
The problem is that “an honest application of Tillich’s theory would 
not in any way limit the field of constitutionally protected conduct.”642  A 
faithful application of Seeger in its broad form would include within the 
category of religion “anything that has the same importance to an individual 
that a belief in God has to a traditional believer, no matter how secular that 
belief might appear.”643  Accordingly, “[n]ot only does it include philoso-
phies that are specifically anti-religious such as atheism, Marxism, and 
secular humanism, but by making it subjective, it opens the doors to virtu-
ally anything someone wishes to assert as ultimate.  By making it so 
relative and universal, it robs the word of virtually any meaning.”644  
Additionally, “there is nothing about most strongly held beliefs that 
necessarily lies outside of the competence of legislatures or courts, unlike 
 
640. Id. 
641. Mitchell, supra note 150, at 661 n.263 (quoting John H. Mansfield, Conscientious 
Objection—1964 Term, 2 RELIGION AND PUB. ORD. 9-10 (1964)). 
642. Gey, supra note 634, at 160. 
643. Collier, supra note 627, at 983 (emphasis in original). 
644. Knechtle, supra note 6, at 527. 
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those qualities peculiar to religion, such as their non-rational and faith-
driven nature, that are not easily evaluated by government.”645 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
In defining religion, “[f]lexibility and careful consideration . . . are 
needed.  Still, it is important to have some objective guidelines in order to 
avoid ad hoc justice.”646  Some have argued that there cannot be an accept-
able definition of religion.647  Nevertheless, regardless of the difficulties, 
courts must develop an understanding of religion to be applied in cases 
before them.648  With regard to the non-legal theorists reviewed in the 
course of this discussion, one point, the plurality of their understandings of 
religion, is apparent.  This diversity of views leads some to the conclusion 
that what religion is depends upon who is looking and what her vantage 
point happens to be.649 
 
645. Paul Horwitz, Scientology in Court: A Comparative Analysis and Some Thoughts on 
Selected Issues in Law and Religion, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 85, 131 (1997). 
646. Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 210 (3d Cir. 1979). 
647. Freeman, supra note 141; Modak-Truran, Religious Dimension, supra note 444, at 257 
n.5. 
648. Mansfield, supra note 165, at 215-16; see Sullivan, supra note 459, at 454. 
649. Modak-Truran, Religious Dimension, supra 444, at 257 n.5 (citing JOHN HICK, 
PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 3 (2d ed. 1973)). 
However, this results in part from the different purposes of the many types of inquiries 
that analyze the nature of religion including the anthropology of religion (e.g., Clifford 
Geertz), sociology of religion (e.g., Emile Durkheim, Peter L. Berger), psychology of 
religion (e.g., William James), history of religions (e.g., Mircea Eliade), theology 
(e.g., Paul Tillich), and philosophy of religion (e.g., Charles Hartshorne). 
Id.  “For example, sociology of religion views religion ‘in terms of social interaction’ and studies 
religion ‘with reference to the general concepts of sociology, including leadership, stratification, 
and socialization.’”  Id. (quoting GEORGE A. THEODORSON & ACHILLES G. THEODORSON, A 
MODERN DICTIONARY OF SOCIOLOGY 406 (1969)).  In his text Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche 
advances a related point: 
Little by little I came to understand what every great philosophy to date has been: the 
personal confession of its author, a kind of unintended and unwitting memoir; and 
similarly, that the moral (or immoral) aims in every philosophy constituted the actual 
seed from which the whole plant invariably grew.  Whenever explaining how a 
philosopher’s most far-fetched metaphysical propositions have come about, in fact, 
one always does well (and wisely) to ask first: “What morality is it (is he) aiming at?”  
Thus I do not believe that an “instinct for knowledge” is the father of philosophy, but 
rather that here as elsewhere a different instinct has merely made use of knowledge 
(and knowledge [sic]) as its tool.  For anyone who scrutinizes the basic human in-
stincts to determine how influential they have been as inspiring spirits (or demons and 
goblins) will find that all the instincts have practiced philosophy, and that each one of 
them would like only too well to represent itself as the ultimate aim of existence and 
as the legitimate master of all other instincts.  For every instinct is tyrannical; and as 
such seeks to philosophize. 
FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL: PRELUDE TO A PHILOSOPHY OF THE FUTURE 8 
(Marion Faber trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1998). 
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Further complicating matters, the word religion possesses a seemingly 
limitless array of potential meanings and possible interpretations.  Much of 
the uncertainty that fills the text of various courts’ struggles to define 
religion is deeply imbued with post-modern thought, the deconstructionism 
advanced by Nietzsche.  In a post-modern world, what is a religion be-
comes to some extent a question without an answer.  An objective reality in 
defining religion becomes an almost laughable matter and qualifications 
become necessary before a discussion is even begun.  The thoughts and 
objections that are raised by postmodernist thought are not mere “childish 
philosophical skepticism and linguistic nihilism.”650  However, post-
modernists’ view of “a world of many competing and equal ideas”651 is 
only half right when it comes to the law.  Within the law, not all ideas are 
equal, nor are all understandings of religion of the same value, worth, or 
legitimacy in terms of striving for a definition of religion for purposes of 
constitutional analysis.  In part, the problem with postmodernist thought in 
general becomes actualized in the law.  In the ethereal world of aesthetics 
and the arts, there is freedom for words to be fully undefined, for conversa-
tions to not communicate.  In that world, language can be powerful and 
boundless: 
What most characterizes deconstruction is its notion of textuality, 
a view of language as it exists not only in books, but in speech, in 
history, and in culture.  For the deconstructionist, language is 
everything.  The world itself is “text.” Language directs humanity 
and creates human reality.  (A reality that cannot be named or 
described is illusory, at best.)  Yet, upon close examination, words 
seem to have no connection with reality or with concepts or 
ideas.652 
When the courts embrace postmodernism, as they deconstruct the 
concept of religion, it is not for its radicalism that postmodernism gains 
adherence in the law.  Rather, it is because of its capacity to embrace 
diversity and to be inclusive, which is of particular concern in dealing with 
religion. 
The problem generally with regard to the limitations of postmodernist 
thought in the field of law, and with the area of religion in particular, is that 
 
650. RadicalAcademy.com, Cultural theory, Structuralism, Postmodernism & Decon-
structionism, http://www.radicalacademy.com/adiphipostmodernism.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 
2007).  Cf. VINCENT B. LEITCH, AMERICAN LITERARY CRITICISM FROM THE THIRTIES TO THE 
EIGHTIES 305 (1988) (noting that W. Jackson Bate derided deconstructionism as “a childish 
philosophical skepticism and nihilism”). 
651. Id. 
652. Id. 
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the courts cannot abandon a working definition, but courts also cannot 
abandon the limitations imposed by their perceptual lenses.  For example, 
courts make implicit assumptions about religion that render creation science 
religion, but physical science not religion.  From the post-modern view-
point, it is difficult to see why science should not be deemed to be a 
religion.  The French philosopher Michel Foucault would argue that it is 
exactly those things that seem true and that we do not question that are our 
religion.  It is the unquestioned that is held with the deepest faith.  
Philosophers from George Berkeley to David Hume to Jacques Derrida 
could question the postulate that scientific knowledge is distinct from 
religious belief.  Berkeley, Hindu mystics, and Buddhist scholars could 
offer an explanation of reality and truth that is plausible, but which denies 
science.  Nevertheless, the reason that science is not religion and creation 
science is religion stands as the same reason that a definition of religion 
must exclude those rocks picked from the side of road, and the same reason 
that law may use postmodernism as a tool, but may never embrace it fully.  
Because in the final analysis, beyond all theory and beyond all thought and 
debate, questions and problems, shortcomings and failures, the law must 
function.  It must work; it must resolve disputes and reach conclusions.  
Schools must be able to teach, and judges must be able to decide cases.  
The definition of religion will never be perfect.  Its growing expanse or its 
contracting limits will ebb and flow as courts struggle to find the right 
balance.  But, courts must continue to do so, for in an era, where God is 
dead, religion is very much alive. 
So how should courts approach the task of defining religion?  I will 
discuss seven principles that I have come to believe, in the course of 
researching for this article, provide helpful governing parameters regarding 
defining religion under the First Amendment.  First, the courts cannot avoid 
defining religion.  Courts are necessarily operating under some understand-
ing of what religion is in applying the First Amendment.  That understand-
ing should be express, rather than assumed and hidden from public view.  
Second, there should be a singular definition of religion.  Courts should 
desist in explicitly or implicitly giving religion two different meanings, one 
for purposes of establishment and one for purposes of free exercise.  The 
core of the First Amendment protection of religious liberty is government 
not preferring one religion over another; the dual-definition approach inher-
ently creates such a preference for non-traditional over traditional faiths.  If, 
for example, the court determines that secular humanism is a religion for 
purposes of free exercise, then it should be a religion for Establishment 
Clause purposes.  If the court is unconcerned about the establishment of 
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secular humanism, it is the substantive determination of what constitutes 
establishment, rather than what is a religion, that should be applied. 
Third, the broad Seeger ultimate concern test should be rejected or 
many reasons; two will be discussed.  First, people do not have one ultimate 
concern; they experience life with a variety of competing and conflicting 
concerns.  We are not all Abrahams prepared to sacrifice Isaac.  And with-
out this clarity and dedication, we cannot give true meaning in a legal 
context to Tillich’s understanding of religion.  Second, there is no limiting 
principle in the Seeger test; Tillich would allow anything, any concern, 
however, secular to be deemed religious.  As noted by Professor Mansfield, 
“‘a religious belief is first of all a belief, that is to say the affirmation of 
some truth, reality or value.  In addition it addresses itself to basic 
questions’ about ‘the meaning of suffering and death and the existence of 
spiritual reality.’”653  Pursuing ultimate concerns, such as wealth or Star 
Trek memorabilia no matter how fanatical, simply is not a religion under 
the First Amendment. 
Fourth, the court should not return to the definition of religion that was 
utilized in the 1890s in cases like Beason.  Moral judgment regarding the 
validity of religion and its value simply has no place in the First Amend-
ment context.  Tillich is correct in indicating that God can encompass both 
the divine and demonic, the creative and the destructive.  There are enough 
varieties of religious beliefs, including arguably those set forth in the Old 
Testament, that present an understanding of God that is beyond our limited 
human comprehension of good and evil.  Thus, if Satanism or demonology, 
etc., otherwise satisfies the test for what constitutes a religion, it should be 
regarded as such and afforded First Amendment protection. 
Fifth, as stated by the Supreme Court: 
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is 
that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox 
in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or 
force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.  If there 
are any circumstances which permit an exception, they do not now 
occur to us.654 
This is a bedrock First Amendment principle, but the conclusion does not 
follow that all of these beliefs are protected by the guarantee of free exer-
cise and the prohibition on the establishment of religion.  In designing a 
definition of religion, we should be cognizant of the extremely important 
 
653. Mitchell, supra note 150, at 661 (quoting John H. Mansfield, Conscientious 
Objection—1964 Term, 2 RELIGION AND PUB. ORD. 10, 33-34 (1964)). 
654. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). 
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protections afforded by the free speech provision and not merely look to use 
the religion clauses as a repository for all areas of thought and conscience 
that we seek to protect from governmental intervention.  Many of the ques-
tions and beliefs that we hold which are secular in nature should find 
protection in rights of free speech, rather than religion. 
Sixth, to constitute a religious belief or practice under the First Amend-
ment, the belief or practice should be an approach toward or duty imposed 
by an authority that is part of some reality or understanding that is beyond 
the ordinary.  While extra-temporal consequences are unnecessary, the au-
thority must be sacred, that is not profane, and addressed to fundamental 
questions of existence.  A distinction should also be drawn between the 
philosophical/personal beliefs and religious beliefs.  Returning to our earlier 
discussion of why the Founders entrenched religious liberty in the Constitu-
tion, they understood religion as part of a duty owed to some sacred author-
ity that existed beyond the State.  If there is no separate authority, then there 
is no conflicting duty that can be considered religious.  Philosophical and 
personal commitments can be strongly held, but insofar as they are not 
duties originating from an authority beyond the individual; they are not 
religious. 
Seventh and most importantly, whatever definition of religion is 
applied, it should be applied in a consistent manner, and though courts 
should act with caution in defining religion, they should do so without fear.  
It is readily apparent that religion is incredibly difficult to define; scholars 
and courts have stumbled and will continue to do so in approaching this 
extraordinarily complicated subject.  In endeavoring to formulate the best 
possible definition, the most important elements of the continuing effort by 
judges and academics to define religion are: (1) adherence to equality as a 
guiding interpretative principle; (2) employing the definition in a consistent 
manor; and (3) being cautious but not so frightened that the courts retreat to 
so vague a definition that the term religion loses its meaning. 
 
